65 FR 18307, April 7, 2000
C-469-804
Sunset Review
Public Document
MEMORANDUM TO: Robert S. LaRussa
Assistant Secretary
for Import Administration
FROM: Jeffrey A. May
Director
Office of Policy
SUBJECT: Issues and Decision Memo for the Expedited Sunset
Review of the Countervailing Duty Order on Cut-to-
Length Carbon Steel Plate from Spain; Final Results
Summary:
We have analyzed the substantive responses of domestic interested
parties and the inadequate response of respondent interested parties
in the expedited sunset review of the countervailing duty order on
cut-to-length carbon steel plate from Spain. We recommend that you
approve the positions we have developed in the Discussion of the
Issues section of this memorandum for these final results of review.
Below is the complete list of the issues in this expedited sunset
review for which we received substantive responses by parties:
1. Likelihood of continuation or recurrence of countervailable
subsidies
A. Net countervailable subsidy
B. Changes in program
C. Other factors
2. Net countervailable subsidy likely to prevail
A. Net countervailable subsidy from the investigation
B. Adjustments to the subsidy
3. Nature of the Subsidy
History of the Order:
On July 9, 1993, the Department issued a final affirmative
countervailing duty determination, covering the period January 1,
1991, through December 31, 1991. The following programs were found to
confer countervailable subsidies (58 FR 37374, July 9,1993):
(1) Law 60/78
Long-Term Loans from Bank of Industrial Credit ("BCI")
Equity Infusion;
(2) Royal Decree 878/81
BCI Exceptional Credits
Grants Provided to "Decrease Financial Charges" and to
"Compensate for
Losses;"
Equity Infusion
(3) The 1984 Council of Ministers Meeting
Equity Infusions
Loan Guarantees
Share "Issue Premium"
Grants Proved to "Decrease Financial Charges" and to "Compensate
for
Losses"
(4) The 1987 Government Delegated Commission on Economic Affairs
Deferral of social security and other tax obligations
Grants
Fund For Employment Promotion and early retirement
Contributions Made ot INI Special Finance Accounts
ECSC Article 54 Loans and Logan Guarantees.
The Department found a net subsidy of 36.86 percent ad valorem for
all Swedish producers/exporters of subject merchandise. The
countervailing duty order on certain steel products from Sweden was
subsequently published on August 17, 1993 (58 FR 43761).
There have been no administrative reviews of this countervailing
duty order. There have been no duty absorption findings in this
proceeding. Additionally, there have been no scope clarifications,
circumvention determinations or changed circumstances determinations.
Background:
On September 1, 1999, the Department initiated a sunset review of
the countervailing duty order on cut-to-length carbon steel plate
from Spain (64 FR 47767), pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, ("the Act"). The Department received a
notice of intent to participate on behalf of the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation and U.S. Steel Group, a unit of USX Corporation
("domestic interested parties"), within the applicable deadline
(September 15, 1999) specified in section 351.218(d)(1)(i) of the
Sunset Regulations. Domestic interested parties claimed interested-
party status under section 771(9)(C) of the Act, as U.S. producers of
a domestic like product.
On September 20, 1999, we received a request for an extension to
file rebuttal comments from domestic interested parties.(1) Pursuant
to 19 CFR 351.302(b)(1999), the Department extended the deadline for
all participants eligible to file rebuttal comments until October 15,
1999.(2)
On October 1, 1999, we received a complete substantive response from
domestic interested parties, within the 30-day deadline specified in
the Sunset Regulations under section 351.218(d)(3)(i). On September
29, 1999, we received a response from the European Union Delegation
of the European Commission ("EC") expressing its intent to
participate in this review as the authority responsible for defending
the interest of the Member States of the European Union (see
September 29, 1999, Substantive Response of the EU at 3). On
September 30, 1999, we received a response from the Government of
Spain ("GOS") expressing its intent to participate in this review, as
the government of a country in which subject merchandise is produced
and exported. The GOS notes that its has in the past participated in
this proceeding (see September 30, 1999, Response of the GOS at 2).
The Department did not receive a substantive response from any
foreign producer/ exporter, or the U.S. importer of the subject
merchandise as defined under 771(9)(A) of the Act. Thus, pursuant to
section 351.218(e)(1)(ii)(A) of the Sunset Regulations, the
Department determined the EC's and GOS's responses to be inadequate.
Consequently, on October 21, 1999, pursuant to 19 CFR 351.218
(e)(1)(ii)(A), the Department determined to conduct an expedited (120-
day) sunset review of this order.(3)
In accordance with section 751(c)(5)(C)(v) of the Act, the
Department may treat a review as extraordinarily complicated if it is
a review of a transition order (i.e., an order in effect on January
1, 1995). This review concerns a transition order within the meaning
of section 751(c)(6)(ii) of the Act. Accordingly, on December 22,
1999, the Department determined that the sunset review of cut-to-
length carbon steel flat plate from Spain is extraordinarily
complicated, and extended the time limit for completion of the final
results of this review until not later than March 29, 2000, in
accordance with section 751(c)(5)(B) of the Act.(4)
Discussion of the Issues:
In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department is
conducting this review to determine whether termination of the
countervailing duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of a countervailable subsidy. Section 752(b) of the Act
provides that, in making this determination, the Department shall
consider the net countervailable subsidy determined in the
investigation and subsequent reviews, and whether any change in the
program which gave rise to the net countervailable subsidy has
occurred and is likely to affect that net countervailable subsidy.
Pursuant to section 752(b)(3) of the Act, the Department shall
provide to the International Trade Commission ("the Commission") the
net countervailable subsidy likely to prevail if the order is
revoked. In addition, consistent with section 752(a)(6), the
Department shall provide to the Commission information concerning the
nature of the subsidy and whether it is a subsidy described in
Article 3 or Article 6.1 of the 1994 World Trade Organization ("WTO")
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("Subsidies
Agreement").
Below we address the responses of interested parties.
1. Continuation or Recurrence of a Countervailable Subsidy:
Interested Party Comments
In their October 1, 1999, substantive response, domestic interested
parties argue that revocation of the countervailing duty order on cut-
to-length carbon steel plate from Spain would lead to continued
unfair subsidization by the foreign producers and exporters, as well
as material injury to the U.S. industry. They base their conclusion
on the following factors: according to the Department's Final
Determination, at least seven of the subsidy programs, which comprise
64 percent of the countervailing duty rate, will continue to provide
countervailable benefits beyond the end of the sunset review period,
and (2) since the investigation, the GOS has provided numerous large
subsidies to Spanish steel producers (see October 1, 1999,
Substantive Response of domestic interested parties at 5). Domestic
interested parties note that the subsidy programs that provided a
23.64 percent ad valorem subsidy to Ensidesa during the period of
investigation have a benefit stream that extends beyond the sunset
review. Id. at 6. Therefore, given that these subsidy programs
continue beyond the end of the sunset review period, revocation of
the order would lead to the continuation or recurrence of a
countervailable subsidy. Id. at 6.
In addition, domestic interested parties assert that two subsidies
programs, Deferral of Social Security and Other Tax Obligations and
Fund for Employment Promotion and Early Retirement, that were
countervailed by the Department in 1993, are likely to have provided
new countervailable subsidies since 1992. Id. at 7. Further, there is
no information suggesting that these programs have been terminated.
With respect to the remaining subsidy programs investigated in 1993,
domestic interested parties assert that, although they cannot
demonstrate in each instance that new subsidy benefits have been
bestowed under these programs, there is no indication that these
programs have been terminated. Id.
Domestic interested parties claim that GOS and its entities under
its control, as well as the European Union ("EU") have provided new
countervailable subsidies to the Spanish steel industry through
numerous channels, including, restructuring and subsidies granted in
the course of privatization. Id. at 11. Domestic interested parties
assert that, despite these subsidies provided to Ensidesa and AHV by
GOS, the Spanish integrated steel sector has continued to struggle
and, as a result, GOS proposed a radical restructuring plant to the
Commission authorized an aid package for the restructuring of the
Spanish steel industry. Id. at 12. Domestic interested parties
described the restructuring as comprised of three parts: the (1)
"Butterfly" transaction; Corporacion de la Sidergica Integral's
("CSI") acquisition of a partial stake in Acera Campact de Bizkaia
("ACB"), the newly created highly advanced mini-mill; and the 1997
privatization of Aceralia; (2) the substantial interest in the
creation of ACB on the condition that it be majority controlled by
private sector investors; and finally, (3) privatization, whereby,
GOS agreed to sell 35 percent of CSI to Arbed, a Luxemburg company.
Id. at 13-15.
Domestic interested parties note that the Department determined the
country-wide rate for cold-rolled steel products to be 36.86 percent
in 1993. They argue that Aceralia, directly and through Ensidessa,
AHV, Sideurgica del Mediteraneo, S.A., AHM, and ACB, has received a
much higher rate of subsidization up to today. First, domestic
interested parties argue that, in 1992, BEX, a government-controlled
entity, prevented AHV's liquidation and subsequent transfer of
ownership to CSI with a capital infusion by converting the series A
Debentures of AHV into equity at a time when AHV was not
equityworthy. Id. 17. Domestic interested parties contend that the
GOS has a controlling interest in BEX and BEX's conversion
constitutes government action. As CSI was one hundred percent owned
by the State, this transaction - a debt to equity conversion - was
government approved and initiated as part of a GOS restructuring
plan, which qualifies as an act by a governmental authority. Id. at
18. Moreover, government entities INI and ICO ultimately provided the
infusion to AHV. Id. at 19.
Second, domestic interested parties assert that GOS undertook a
"butterfly" restructuring of the Spanish steel industry, in which
the profitable operations of Ensidessa and AHV were transferred in
1995 to CSI, the new state-held integrated steel holding group. The
remainder of the assets and the vast majority of the liabilities of
Ensidesa and AHV were place in an entity called Ensidesa - AHV
Capital S.A., which was charged with the liquidation of the remainder
of the assets and the closing of the businesses. Id. at 21. As a
result of this restructuring, CSI, received a staggering amount of
subsidies and Ensidesa - AHV was financially responsible for liable
for the liquidation costs of closing down, dismantling and disposing
of the unprofitable plants and equipment. Id.
Third, in 1994, CSI received shares representing a 30 percent
interest in ACB when it was in no position to purchase the shares
absent a contribution by GOS. Id. at 27. Additionally, domestic
interested parties have been unable to locate any reference to
payment made by CSI to ACB for those shares. Id. Based on this
information, domestic interested parties allege that CSI received a
grant from GOS of share in ACB, and maintained its ownership
percentage in ACB throughout 1995 without contributing at least
Pesetas 1.852 billion in additional capital. Id.
In their individual responses, the EC and GOS state that revocation
of the order is not likely to lead to recurrence of subsidization
because the Spanish steel sector has undergone a painful
restructuring in the last years under the careful monitoring of the
EC and is now privately operated and competes on commercial terms in
international markets (see September 29, 1999, Response of the EC at
2, and September 30, 1999, Response of GOS at 2). The EC and GOS
contend that, to the extent that the Department considers that a pass-
through benefit of benefits is possible, most of the schemes
countervailed no longer exist or have ceased to provide any
meaningful benefits to the current exporter of the subject
merchandise, especially in view of the fact that in the meantime most
of the subsidy would have been amortized. Id. at 3.
In particular, the EC and GOS state that: (1) Law 60/78 no longer
applies to the steel sector; (2) the Royal Decree 878/8 and the 1984
Counsel of Ministers Meeting program no longer exists; (3) the 1987
Government Delegated Commission on Economic Affairs were one time
measures which no longer exist following the 1994 restructuring plan;
and (4) Article 54 ECSC Loans are no longer available in view of the
forthcoming expiry of the ECSC Treaty in 2002. Id.
Further, the EC and GOS assert that subsidization of the steel
sector in the European Union is strictly prohibited following the
adoption of a series of European Commission Decision in the Community
Steel Aids Codes, and this is a major reason for the unlikelihood of
continuation of subsidization. Id. GOS states that the existence of
Commission Decision 2496/96 of December 18, 1996 ("EU Commission
Decision"), which entered into force on January 1, 1997, prohibits
the granting of aid to the steel industry except under three distinct
circumstances, namely the closing of facilities for environmental
reasons and for research and development (the last two types reflect
the type of aid which is not actionable under Article 8 of the WTO
Subsidies Agreement). Id. The EC and GOS add that, in all three
cases, aid must first be notified and approved by the European
Commission following the procedures provided in the EU Commission
Decision. Id.
In addition, the EC and GOS assert that, with the exception of the
aid for the closure of facilities, the other two types of aid must be
provided in accordance with the relevant Community Frameworks
(namely, the Community frameworks for State Aid for research and
development and on State Aid for environmental protection - Articles
2 and 3 of the EU Commission Decision) which are available throughout
the Community for all sectors, such aid is non-specific within the
meaning of Article 2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties. Id.
In their October 15, 1999, rebuttal, domestic interested parties
assert that despite the alleged privatization of Aceralia, the
company continues to benefit from the subsidies granted to it when it
was state-owned; a mere change in ownership of a subsidized company
does not imply that these companies are no longer subsidized. First,
domestic interested parties contend that official EU state aid
regulation state that privatization does nothing to extinguish
previously owned subsidies; therefore, privatization has no impact on
the determination off whether a subsidy is illegal. Id. at 4. Rather,
the purpose of the EU state aid regulation is to preserve the
integrity of the single internal market by preventing subsidies that
would otherwise distort competition among EU firms. Id. Indeed, in
particular circumstances, the Commission excuses distorting state aid
based upon regional policy considerations or the desire to avoid
monopolies; this principle underlies both state aid regulation and
countervailing duty enforcement. Id.
Second, domestic interested parties assert that the EU's own
countervailing duty regime does not consider the issue of whether the
subsidy recipient has changed ownership subsequent to the receipt of
the subsidy. Id. at 5. The EU's rules indicated that the only
deviation between the face value of a subsidy and the "current
benefit" is the time value of money that must be added, and the EC's
own practice demonstrates that it will countervail an allocated share
of previously-bestowed subsidies without considering whether there is
any actual current competitive benefit from both sides. Domestic
interested parties provide the recent investigation of bright steel
bars from India, whereby the EC applied its standard methodology
without reference to the actual competitive benefit in the period of
investigation or the possibility of post-bestowal changes in the
ownership of the recipients. Id. at 5-6.
Third, domestic interested parties argue that, like the Commission,
EU steel producers ced competitiveness afforded subsidies survives a
later change in ownership. For example, Britsh Steel's reaction to
the Irish government agreeing to write off previous loans and
liabilities of Irish Steel as part of its privatization. Id. at 6.
Finally, domestic interested parties contend that the EU wrongly
implies that the history of state ownership in the European steel
sector is that once a company is privatized, there is no likelihood
of either further subsidization or even government ownership. Id. at
7. Rather, history has proven of the European state ownership of the
steel sector that, in severe downturns, the government vastly
increases subsidies and ensure domestic production through state
ownership. Id. Therefore, domestic interested parties contend, the
EU's emphasis on the recent privatization of EU steel companies is
irrelevant to the question of whether there is a continuing benefit
from prior subsidies and the future state ownership and
subsidization. Id. at 8.
With respect whether most of the programs countervailed still exist,
domestic interested parties contend that seven programs, which
account for the majority of the ad valorem countervailing duty rate,
were assigned an amortization period that continues beyond the period
of review. Id. Moreover, respondent interested parties' argument that
most of the subsidies have ceased to exist implies that subsidization
continues to exist and, therefore, pursuant to the Sunset Policy
Bulletin, is probative of the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of countervailable subsidies.
Domestic interested parties argue that the Steel Aid Code permits
numerous kinds and amounts of subsidies which are actionable under
the WTO Agreement and U.S. law. Id. at 11. For instance, the Steel
Aid Code permits the granting of closure aid, and environmental aid
subsidies for investments beyond what is needed to meet environmental
standards, both of which are fully countervailable under U.S. law. In
addition, domestic interested parties assert that there is no basis
for confidence that this Steel Aid Code will prevent even the kinds
of subsidies which it nominally bans. Id. In fact, the Steel Aid Code
existed during the original investigation, nominally prohibiting all
aid to the steel industry apart from certain regional development
incentives. Domestic interested parties state that, moreover, the
Commission has consistently demonstrated an inability to enforce its
Steel Aid rules, as seen in the fourth administrative review of the
countervailing duty order Carbon Steel Plate from Belgium. Thus, the
mere existence of the Steel Aid Code does not demonstrate that
subsidization is unlikely to continue or recur. Id. at 14.
The Department's Position
Drawing on the guidance provided in the legislative history
accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA"), specifically
the SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 (1994), the House Report, H.R.
Rep. No. 103-826, pt.1 (1994), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 103-
412 (1994), the Department issued its Sunset Policy Bulletin
providing guidance on methodological and analytical issues, including
the basis for likelihood determinations. The Department clarified
that determinations of likelihood will be made on an order-wide basis
(see section III.A.2 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin). Additionally,
the Department normally will determine that revocation of a
countervailing duty order is likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of a countervailable subsidy where (a) a subsidy program
continues, (b) a subsidy program has been only temporarily suspended,
or (c) a subsidy program has been only partially terminated (see
section III.A.3.a of the Sunset Policy Bulletin). Exceptions to this
policy are provided where a company has a long record of not using a
program (see section III.A.3.b of the Sunset Policy Bulletin).
In addition to considering the guidance on likelihood cited above,
section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Act provides that the Department shall
determine that revocation of an order is likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy where a
respondent interested party waives its participation in the sunset
review. Pursuant to the SAA, at 881, in a sunset review of a
countervailing duty order, when the foreign producer/exporter has
waived participation, the Department shall conclude that revocation
of the order would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence
of a countervailable subsidy for all respondent interested
parties.(5) In the instant review, the Department did not receive a
response from the foreign producer/exporter and, pursuant to section
351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the Sunset Regulations, this constitutes a
waiver of participation.
As noted above, in the final determination, the Department
determined that eight countervailable subsidy programs were
conferring benefits on all Spanish producers/exporters at a net
subsidy of 36.86 percent. Subsequently, the Department found in the
1992/93 review and the 1994 review, that two programs, Mining
Exploration Grants and State Stockpiling Subsidies, respectively,
were terminated. The Department agrees with the EC and GOS that, as
of the 1994 review, three programs were found to still provide some
benefits to SSAB: (1) Equity Infusions at 0.51 percent, (2)
Structural Loans and 0.26 percent, and (3) Forgiven Reconstruction
Loans and 1.14 percent. Further, the Department agrees with domestic
interested parties that the Structural Loans will continue until
2008, and Forgiven Reconstruction Loans will continue until 2004.
Although the EC and GOS assert that these programs have been
terminated as they involved specific governmental action with regard
to the then state-owned SSAB and, further, that subsidization of the
steel sector in the EU is strictly prohibited following the adoption
of the EC Decision, the Department normally will determine that a
countervailable subsidy will continue to exist until it is fully
amortized. Without evidence that Structural Loans and Forgiven
Reconstruction Loans have been fully amortized, or participation in
this review of a foreign producer/exporter, we determine that at
least one these programs and the Equity Infusions program continues
to confer benefits above de minimis, and that revocation of a
countervailing duty order is likely to lead to continuation or
recurrence of a countervailable subsidy.
2. Net Countervailable Subsidy Likely to Prevail
Interested Party Comments:
In their substantive response, domestic interested parties, citing
the SAA, note that the Department normally will select the rate from
the investigation, because that is the only calculated rate that
reflects the behavior or exporters and foreign governments without
the discipline of an order in place. Accordingly, domestic interested
parties contend that the Department should determine that the net
countervailable subsidy likely to prevail is 36.86 percent, the rate
set forth in the original investigation. (see October 1, 1999
Substantive Response of domestic interested parties at 10).
In their responses, the EC and GOS restate that the likelihood of
continuation or recurrence of subsidization is nil and do not
specifically address the net countervailable subsidy likely to
prevail (see September 29, 1999, Response of the EC at 2, and
September 30, 1999, Response of GOS at 2).
Department's Position:
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that,consistent
with the SAA and House Report, the Department normally will select a
rate from the investigation as the net countervailable subsidy likely
to prevail if the order is revoked, because that is the only
calculated
rate that reflects the behavior of exporters and foreign governments
without the discipline of an order or suspension agreement in place.
However, this rate may not be the most appropriate rate if, for
example,
the rate was derived from subsidy programs which were found in
subsequent
reviews to be terminated, there has been a program-wide change, or the
rate ignores a program found to be countervailable in a subsequent
administrative review.(6)
Additionally, where the Department determined company-specific
countervailing duty rates in the original investigation, the
Department normally will report to the Commission company-specific
rates from the original investigation or where no company-specific
rate was determined for a company, the Department normally will
provide to the Commission the country-wide or "all-others" rate (see
Sunset Policy Bulletin at section III.B.2.)
The Department agrees with domestic interested parties' argument
that the rate likely to prevail should be the 4.27 percent margin
from the original investigation. Although two programs, Mining
Exploration Grants and State Stockpiling Subsidies, were terminated,
their net subsidies - at zero percent in the original investigation -
will not affect the net subsidy. The Department has not determined
that the remaining programs determined to confer subsidies in the
original investigation to be terminated. We note that the Department
normally will not make adjustments to the net countervailable subsidy
rate for programs that still exist, but were modified subsequent to
the order, as applicable, to eliminate exports to the United States
from eligibility. Although the EC and GOS claim that some programs
noted above, including Equity Infusions, Structural Loans and
Forgiven Reconstruction Loans, in accordance with the EC Commission
Decision, can no longer provide countervailable benefits to
producers/exporters of subject merchandise. However, because the EC
and GOS did not provide substantive evidence to the Department with
respect to the termination of these programs, we will include the
remaining programs from the original investigation in our calculation
of the net subsidy. Thus, the Department will report to the
Commission the original rate as contained in the Final Results of
Review section of this notice.
Nature of the Subsidy:
In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department states that,
consistent with section 752(a)(6) of the Act, the Department will
provide to the Commission information concerning the nature of the
subsidy, and whether the subsidy is a subsidy described in Article 3
or Article 6.1 of the Subsidies Agreement.
In their substantive response, domestic interested parties assert
that, as demonstrated above, subsidies provided by GOS contravene all
four test set forth in Article 6.1 and, therefore, seriously
prejudice the interests of another Member.
The following programs, although not falling within the definition
of an export subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of the Subsidies Agreement,
could be found to be inconsistent with Article 6 if the net
countervailable subsidy exceeds five percent, as measured in
accordance with Annex IV of the Subsidies Agreement. The Department,
however, has no information with which to make such a calculation,
nor do we believe it appropriate to attempt such a calculation in the
course of a sunset review. Rather, we are providing the Commission
with the following program descriptions.
(1) Law 60/78. This law, limited to the steel industry, appropriated
fifteen billion pesetas to the budgets of the Ministry of Industry
and Energy and INI in a set of emergency measures in 1978 in support
of the steel industry. In 1979, ENSIDESA received under this law
Long-Term Loans from the Bank of Industrial Credit ("BCI") although
the Department found it to uncreditworthy, and
Final Results of Review:
As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of
the countervailing duty order would likely lead to continuation or
recurrence of a countervailable subsidy at the rate listed below:
___________________________________________________________
Producer/Exporter Net Countervailable
Subsidy (%)
___________________________________________________________
All Producers/Exporters from Spain 36.86
___________________________________________________________
Recommendation
Based on our analysis of the comments received, we recommend
adopting all of the above positions. If the recommendations are
accepted, we will publish the Final Results of Review in the Federal
Register.
Joseph A. Spetrini
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Import Administration
_____________________
(Date)
___________________________________________________________
footnotes:
1. See September 20, 1999, Request for an Extension to File Rebuttal
Comments in the Sunset Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Orders on Certain Steel Products from Belgium, France Germany,
Mexico, Spain, South Korea, Taiwan and the United Kingdom: A-583-080,
A-423-805, A-427-808, A-428-815, A-428-814, A-428-816, A-580-815, A-
580-816, S-201-809, A-469-803, A-412-814, C-423-806, C-427-810, C-428-
817 (CTL), C-428-817 (CR), C-580-818 (CORE), C-201-810, C-469-804, C-
412-815, from Barbara Ward, Dewey Balantine LLP, to Jeffrey A. May,
Office of Policy.
2. See September 30, 1999, Letter from Jeffrey A. May, Director,
Office of Policy to Michael H. Stein, Dewey Ballantine LLP.
3. See October 20, 1999, Memoranda for Jeffrey A. May, Re: Certain
Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Flat Plate from Sweden: Adequacy of
Respondent Interested Party Response to the Notice of Initiation.
4. See Extension of Time Limit for Final Results of Expedited Five-
Year Reviews, 64 FR 71726 (December 22, 1999).
5. See 19 CFR 351.218(d)(2)(iv).
6. See section III.B.3 of the Sunset Policy Bulletin