58 FR 6233
NOTICES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(C-428-812)
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Hot Rolled Lead
and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products From Germany
Wednesday, January 27, 1993
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AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, Department of
Commerce.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 27, 1993.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Rick Herring or Magd Zalok, Office of Countervailing Investigations, Import Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230;
telephone (202) 482-3530 or 482-4162, respectively.
Final Determination
The Department of Commerce (the Department) determines that benefits which constitute
subsidies within the meaning of the countervailing duty (CVD) law are being provided to
manufacturers, producers, or exporters in Germany of certain hot rolled lead and bismuth carbon
steel products (hereinafter: "certain additive steel products").
For information on the estimated net subsidy, please see the "Suspension of Liquidation" section of
this notice.
Case History
Since the publication of the preliminary determination (57 FR 42971, September 17, 1992), the
following events have occurred.
We verified the information used in making this final determination from October 12 through
October 22, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, in accordance with section 705(a)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended
(the Act), we aligned the final determination in this investigation with the final determination in the
companion antidumping duty (AD) investigation of the same merchandise (57 FR 48020, October
21, 1992). On November 6, 1992, at the request of the respondents, we postponed the final CVD and
AD determinations until January 11, 1993 (57 FR 53691, November 12, 1992). On January 11,
1993, we postponed for a second time the final CVD and AD determinations until January 19, 1993
(Not Yet Published).
The parties submitted case and rebuttal briefs on November 25, and December 2, 1992,
respectively. A public hearing was held on December 4, 1992. Supplemental post-hearing briefs
were filed on December 10, 1992.
Scope of Investigation
The products covered by this investigation are hot-rolled bars and rods of nonalloy or other alloy
steel, whether or not descaled, containing by weight 0.03 percent or more of lead or 0.05 percent
or more of bismuth, in coils or cut lengths, and in numerous shapes and sizes. Excluded from the
scope of this investigation are other alloy steels (as defined by the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States (HTSUS) Chapter 72, note 1 (f)), except steels classified as other alloy steels by
reasons of containing by weight 0.4 percent
or more of lead, or 0.1 percent or more of bismuth, tellurium, or selenium. Also excluded are
semi-finished steels and flat-rolled products. Most of the products covered in this investigation are
provided for under subheadings 7213.20.00.00 and 7214.30.00.00 of the HTSUS. Small
quantities of these products may also enter the United States under the following HTSUS
subheadings: 7213.31.30.00, 60.00; 7213.39.00.30, 00.60, 00.90; 7214.40.00.10, 00.30,
00.50; 7214.50.00.10, 00.30, 00.50; 7214.60.00.10, 00.30, 00.50; and 7228.30.80.00.
Although the HTSUS subheadings are provided for convenience and customs purposes, our
description of the scope of this proceeding is dispositive.
Analysis of Programs
For purposes of this final determination, the period for which we are measuring subsidies (the
period of investigation (POI)) is calendar year 1991.
Pursuant to 19 CFR 355.20(d), we compared the total ad valorem subsidy received by each firm to
the country-wide rate for all programs. On the basis of this comparison, the rate for Thyssen AG
was significantly different from the country-wide rate. Therefore, this firm received an individual
company rate. The calculated rate for Saarstahl AG will be used for all other manufacturers,
producers, and exporters of certain additive steel products in Germany.
Based upon our analysis of the petition, responses to our questionnaires, verification, and written
comments from the interested parties, we determine the following:
Grant Methodology
Our policy with respect to grants is (1) to expense recurring grants in the year of receipt, and (2) to
allocate non-recurring grants over the average useful life of assets in the industry, unless the sum
of grants provided under a particular program is less than 0.5 percent of a firm's total or export
sales (depending on whether the program is a domestic or export subsidy) in the year in which the
grant was received. See e.g., Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Fresh
and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, (Salmon from Norway), 56 FR 7678 (February 25,
1991). We have considered the grants provided under the programs described below to be non-
recurring, unless otherwise noted, because the benefits are exceptional, the recipient cannot
expect to receive benefits on an ongoing basis from review period to review period, and/or the
provision of funds by the government must be approved every year. See, Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination; Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada
(Groundfish from
Canada), 51 FR 10041 (March 24, 1986). Therefore, we have allocated the benefits over 15 years,
which the Department considers to be reflective of the average useful life of assets in the steel
industry (see, § 355.49(b)(3) of the Department's proposed regulations (Countervailing
Duties; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comments, 54 FR 23366 (May 31,
1989) (Proposed Regulations)).
The benefit from each of the grant programs discussed below was calculated using the declining
balance methodology described in the Department's Proposed Regulations (see, section
355.49(b)(3)) and used in prior investigations (see, e.g., Salmon from Norway). For the discount
rate in these calculations, we used, whenever possible, each company's actual cost for long-term,
fixed-rate debt. If a company did not report this cost, or when a company had no long- term
borrowing in the year in which the grant was approved, we used the national average long-term
interest rate.
I. Programs Determined To Confer Subsidies
We determine that subsidies are being provided to manufacturers, producers, or exporters in
Germany of certain additive steel products as follows:
1. Government Debt Forgiveness in 1989
In the years 1971 through 1989, the companies which were eventually to become Saarstahl AG,
went through various mergers, restructurings, and name changes. For the sake of simplicity, we are
using the name "Saarstahl" when referring to assistance
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provided to Saarstahl AG or to assistance provided to any of its predecessor companies.
In response to the poor economic condition of the steel industry in the Saarland in the 1970's, the
Governments of Germany and Saarland, and the steel companies which were to become Saarstahl,
adopted their first restructuring plan in an attempt to create a viable steel industry in Saarland. In
order to facilitate the implementation of the restructuring plan, the Federal Government
authorized the provision of DM 244 million in funds to Saarstahl in 1978. Repayment of these funds
was contingent upon Saarstahl returning to profitability. This contingent repayment obligation was
called a Rueckzahlungsverpflichtung (RZV).
In addition, the Governments of Germany and Saarland guaranteed loans in the amount of DM 1.18
billion made to Saarstahl by a group of private banks. Due to the company's poor financial
condition, the banks would not have made the loans to Saarstahl without the government
guarantees. These loans were also used to finance the restructuring plan. Saarstahl made payments
on the guaranteed loans until April 1983. At that time, the Governments of Germany
and Saarland assumed the payment of interest and principal. Again, these government payments of
principal and interest were to be repaid by Saarstahl under RZVs.
The initial provision of DM 244 million by the Government of Germany and the payments of
interest and principal by the two governments were the first in a long line of assistance provided by
both governments to Saarstahl. Assistance provided to the company from 1981 through 1985 was
used to modernize the company, make capital investments, cover operating expenses, and cover
employee expenses pursuant to a number of Saarstahl restructuring plans. In addition, the
government payments of the interest and principal of the guaranteed loans continued until 1989.
All of this assistance was tied to RZVs which obligated Saarstahl to repay the assistance provided
the company earned a profit in the future. By 1989, Saarstahl had accumulated DM 3.948 billion in
repayment obligations to both governments.
During the period when most of the government assistance was being provided to Saarstahl, the
company was wholly-owned by a Luxembourg company, Arbed Luxembourg (Arbed). By 1985,
Arbed was no longer able or willing to function as the owner of Saarstahl. Because of the
importance of Saarstahl to the economy of Saarland, the Government of Saarland decided to look
for a new owner to replace Arbed. Another steel company in Saarland, the French-owned AG der
Dillinger Huttenwerke (Dillinger), expressed interest in Saarstahl. At that
time, Dillinger and Saarstahl were already joint venture partners in a company which produced pig
iron.
In order to facilitate finding a new investor for Saarstahl, Arbed transferred 76 percent of the
ownership of Saarstahl to the Governments of Germany and Saarland for one deutsche mark in
1986. A trustee was appointed to hold the shares for both governments while a new investor was
sought. The Federal Government was not interested in keeping any shares in Saarstahl. At the same
time, an agreement was signed under which Dillinger would manage Saarstahl in order to diagnose
the company's problems and, thereafter, delineate Usinor Sacilor's, Dillinger's parent company,
conditions for a potential merger. In April 1989, an agreement was reached between the
Government of Saarland and Usinor Sacilor regarding the merger of Saarstahl and Dillinger.
Based on the terms of this merger agreement, Saarstahl and Dillinger became subsidiaries of a
newly-created holding company, DHS-Dillinger Huette Saarstahl AG (DHS). The Government of
Saarland contributed the assets of Saarstahl and DM 145.1 million in cash in return for 27.5 percent
ownership of Saarstahl's new parent company, DHS. Usinor Sacilor conditioned this agreement
upon the Federal and Saarland governments' forgiveness of all of Saarstahl's RZVs.
Pursuant to the merger agreement, the Governments of Germany and Saarland, and Saarstahl
entered into an agreement concerning the previous assistance received
by Saarstahl. Under the latter agreement, the Entschuldungsvertrag (the EV), all outstanding RZV
repayment obligations for all the funds provided to Saarstahl by the Governments of Germany and
Saarstahl, as well as additional rights held by both governments for repayment of principal on the
guaranteed loans, were forgiven and relinquished. The EV was signed in June 1989.
Because the debt forgiveness under the EV was only provided to one company, we determine it to
be countervailable because it was limited to a specific enterprise or industry or group of
enterprises or industries.
To determine the benefit arising from the debt forgiveness, we are treating the amount of the
forgiveness, DM 3.948 billion, as a nonrecurring grant and calculating the benefit according to the
methodology described in the "Grant Methodology" section above. At verification, Ministry of
Economics officials stated that there are no official statistics on long-term interest rates published
by the federal government. Therefore, we reviewed the interest rates published in the International
Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics and used the average annual long-term interest
rate reported in that publication for 1989, which was 9.94 percent, as our discount rate.
The portion of the benefit allocated to the period of investigation was adjusted pursuant to section
771(6) of the Act. Under this section of the Act, the Department may subtract any application fee,
deposit, or similar payment from the benefit if that payment was made in order to qualify for, or to
receive, benefits under the program. According to the EV agreement, Saarstahl is required to pay a
yearly fee of DM 300,000 to the Government of Germany. Therefore, we deducted DM 300,000
from the portion of the benefit attributable to the period of investigation and divided the resultant
sum by DHS's total sales (which includes the total sales of both Saarstahl and Dillinger). We used the
sales of DHS because the forgiveness of Saarstahl's debt resulted in a benefit to DHS. On this basis,
we calculated an estimated net of 16.02 percent ad valorem. The estimated net subsidy for Thyssen
under this program is 0.00 percent ad valorem.
2. Debt Forgiveness by Private Banks
Commercial banks also participated in the restructuring of Saarstahl during the period from 1978
through the final restructuring of the company in 1989. During part of this time period they
provided both short- and long-term loans to Saarstahl which were not guaranteed by the
Governments of Germany or Saarland. In the years 1983 through 1985, the banks forgave Saarstahl
DM 106.8 million in interest on these loans. This forgiveness was in response to the company's poor
financial condition and was not made at the request of, or related to any assistance provided by,
the Governments of Germany and Saarland.
Toward the end of 1985, the Government of Saarland presented a long-term
restructuring plan for Saarstahl to Saarstahl's creditors and requested that they forgive an
additional amount of DM 350 million in loans. Based on this request, the banks agreed to forgive
DM 217.33 million of debt owed to them by Saarstahl, if the Governments of Germany and Saarland
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would forgive all debt owed to them by Saarstahl and if the Government of Saarland would assure
the future liquidity of Saarstahl. With the signing of the EV, the governments forgave Saarstahl's
debt owed to them, as discussed above, and the commercial banks forgave a portion their
unguaranteed loans to Saarstahl.
The talks on the forgiveness of Saarstahl's debt were based on the common notion that all of the
participants, including the private and public creditors, would have to contribute to the
restructuring of Saarstahl if this restructuring was to be successful. The Governments of Germany
and Saarland made their forgiveness dependent on private creditors also forgiving a portion of
their claims against Saarstahl. The private creditors laid down the same condition with regard to
the claims of the Governments of Germany and Saarland.
We determine the forgiveness of interest payments in the years 1983 through 1985 did not confer a
countervailable subsidy on Saarstahl because the banks were acting independently, without any
direction or participation by the Governments of Germany and Saarland. However, we determine
that the subsequent forgiveness of principal was countervailable because it was required by the
governments as part of a government-led debt reduction package for Saarstahl
and because the two governments guaranteed the future liquidity of Saarstahl, thereby, implicitly
assuring the private banks that the remaining portion of Saarstahl's outstanding loans would be
repaid.
At verification, we established that the loans were forgiven by private banks in 1989, the same year
the EV was signed, and in 1987. One private bank forgave DM 541,000 in debts in 1987. The
remaining portion of the debt. DM 216.819 million was forgiven in 1989.
Using the same methodology used to calculate the subsidy for the government forgiveness of
Saarstahl's debt in 1989, we calculated an estimated net subsidy of 0.88 percent ad valorem for the
1989 debt forgiveness of DM 216.819 million. The debt forgiveness which occurred in 1987 was
expensed in the year of receipt because the amount forgiven was less than 0.5 percent of total
sales. The estimated net subsidy for Thyssen under this program is 0.00 percent ad valorem.
3. Worker Assistance Program
Under Article 56 of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, persons employed in
the coal and steel industry who lose their jobs may receive assistance for "social adjustment." This
assistance is provided for workers affected by restructuring measures, particularly as workers
withdraw from the
labor market into early retirement or are forced into unemployment. The ECSC disburses
assistance on the condition that the affected country makes an equivalent contribution.
German companies seeking assistance under Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty must apply to both the
Federal Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and to the Federal Minister of Economics. Notification
of approval is provided by the Federal Minister of Labor and Social Affairs which is also in charge of
distributing such funds on its own account and on behalf of the ECSC.
During the period of investigation, Saarstahl and Thyssen received payments for their workers
under Article 56(2)(b) of the ECSC Treaty. The payments were made to provide for prematurely
retired employees. In Germany, a company's obligations with respect to prematurely retired
employees are delineated in the social plans these companies have with their employees. We
verified that anticipated Article 56 payments were taken into account during the negotiations of
Saarstahl's and Thyssen's social plans.
At verification, we also established that the ECSC share of the payments is provided from its
budget, which is financed through levies and fines from coal and steel producers and the interest
earned on the investment of these proceeds. Deficits in the budget are made up by Member State
contributions. However, no contributions have been made by the Member States since 1984. Since
the ECSC payments in 1991 were financed solely from producer
contributions, they do not confer a countervailable benefit.
With respect to the German contributions under this program, however, we determine that the
funds are limited to a specific industry or group of industries and, because the funds relieve the
companies of obligations they normally would have incurred, that they confer a countervailable
subsidy. We further determine that the assistance provided under this program is recurring since
the recipients can expect to receive benefits on an ongoing basis. Therefore, we limited our
analysis to funds received during the period of investigation, 1991.
To calculate the benefit, we took half of the funds received by the companies under this program in
1991, which is that portion attributable to the Government of Germany, and divided it by each
company's total sales during the period of investigation. Using this methodoloy, we calculated, for
Saarstahl, an estimated net subsidy of 0.38 percent ad valorem. The estimated net subsidy for
Thyssen was 0.16 percent ad valorem under this program.
II. Program Determined Not To Be Countervailable
1. The Government of Saarland's Equity Investment in DHS
We determined that the Saarland's capital contribution of DM 145.1
million described in the "Government Debt Forgiveness in 1989" above to be consistent with
commercial considerations. At the same time that the Saarland government was investing these
funds, two private investors were also investing in DHS. Using these private investors as a
benchmark, we find that the Government of Saarland made its investment on the same terms.
Therefore, we determine that the Government of Saarland's equity contribution of DM 145.1 million
does not confer a countervailable benefit. For additional information regarding this issue, please
see Comment 4, below.
Comments
All written comments submitted by the interested parties in this investigation which have not been
previously addressed in this notice are addressed below.
Comment 1
Respondent maintains that the private banks' forgiveness of Saarstahl's debts was a rational
commercial decision because, if Saarstahl had filed for bankruptcy, the banks would have lost more
money than the forgiven portion of the debt. Respondent further asserts that private banks were
not, in any way, coerced by the federal or Saarland governments to forgiven the debt.
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that private creditors released Saarstahl from its debts as part
of a package deal in which the governments agreed that they would continue to assume payments
on the guaranteed debt. Without government intervention, the private banks' forgiveness would
not have occurred. Therefore, petitioners maintain that the private banks forgiveness in
countervailable, especially since Saarstahl failed to produce documents during verification that,
Saarstahl claimed, would have proved otherwise.
DOC Position
The private debt forgiveness was part of a debt reduction package negotiated by the Governments
of Germany and Saarland. The governments made the initial approach to private creditors
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requesting that they forgive Saarstahl's debt. In exchange for the private debt forgiveness, the
governments agreed to forgive all of the debt due to them by the company. In addition, the
Government of Saarland assured the private banks of Saarstahl's liquidity. Given the governments'
extensive role in bringing about the private banks' debt forgiveness and the absence of any
documentation to support respondent's claim that the banks' actions were commercially sound, we
find the forgiveness to be countervailable.
We also note that we requested additional documents relating to the debt
forgiveness which were referred to in Saarstahl's response. These documents were not provided to
the Department by the company.
Comment 2
Petitioners argue that the Department should treat the portion of Article 56 assistance provided by
the ECSC like any national subsidization of employee severance costs, since there is no difference
between producer contributions set by the EC and other taxes collected by governments through
other funding mechanisms. Petitioners further maintain that if the Department decides that the
benefits funded by the ECSC are per se non-countervailable, then this should only apply to what
Saarstahl paid in levies in that year. In other words, the Department should countervail the money
received by the companies in excess of what the companies paid in levies to the EC during the
period of investigation.
DOC Position
We disagree with petitioners. Premiums paid to the ECSC are not similar to taxes paid to a national
or state government. These premiums are more analogous to premiums paid for insurance or to
dues paid by members of an
association or union which are used to support the activities of the organization. Premiums paid by
steel producers to the ECSC are used for a variety of activities to support ECSC members, including
the funding of research and development and the provision of assistance to laid-off steel workers.
Government-administered unemployment programs funded solely through employee and
employer contributions are not countervailable. Such programs, like the workers assistance
program under Article 56(2)(b) of the ECSC Treaty, operate like an insurance program. The fact
that a company or individual may receive more in any given year than the amount it paid into the
program is not a basis for concluding that the program provides a countervailable benefit. Such an
occurrence is natural with any insurance program. As long as the program operates without
government funds, there is no countervailable benefit.
Comment 3
Petitioners maintain that Saarstahl failed to provide translated versions of its social plans, passed
after the Stahlstiftung was created, which could have revealed whether the company was obligated
to provide assistance for retraining its former employees. Therefore, the Department should
determine, as best information available, that Saarstahl's social plan requires the company to
provide assistance for retraining purposes. Moreover, petitioners argue that the Department
should countervail the government's funding of the Stahlstiftung, since it is specific to Saarstahl and
it relieves the company of its financial obligations.
DOC Position
Although we are not assuming any obligation to translate documents, our review of Saarstahl's
social plans, both the translated and the untranslated versions, shows that the company is not
required to provide assistance to its former (or present) employees for retraining purposes.
Therefore, we view the assistance provided by the Stahlstiftung, for retraining former Saarstahl's
employees, as distinct from Saarstahl's assistance as delineated in its social plans. Since Saarstahl,
according to German law, is only obligated to provide assistance pursuant to the terms delineated
in its Social Plan, the Stahlstiftung did not relieve the company of any obligations. Therefore, no
countervailable benefit was provided to Saarstahl from the government's funding of the
Stahlstiftung.
Comment 4
Petitioners maintain that the financial performance of Saarstahl and Dillinger
shows that neither company, nor the two combined, were equityworthy in 1989. Consequently,
petitioners argue that the Department should consider the Saarland government's DM 145 million
equity infusion into DHS as inconsistent with commercial considerations.
Respondent asserts that the Land's payment of DM 145 million cannot be construed as a subsidy
because it represented a fair price for its investment in DHS that was valued by an independent
accounting firm (KPMG).
DOC Position
We believe that the equity infusion made by the Government of Saarland into DHS was on terms
consistent with commercial considerations. Because there were other investors besides the
Government of Saarland, the terms of the other investors, rather than the financial performance of
the recipient company, determine whether the government investment was made on terms
consistent with commercial considerations. Moreover, the fact that there were private parties
willing to invest in DHS supports the conclusion that the company is equityworthy. Therefore,
because the two other investors, ARBED and Usinor Sacilor, made equity infusions at the same time
and on the same terms as the Government of Saarland, we determine that the equity infusion made
by the Government of Saarland into DHS was made on terms consistent with commercial
considerations. This analysis is consistent with Department practice when there are other parties
making equity investments at the same time as the government. (See, e.g., Groundfish from Canada
and Offshore Platform Jackets and Piles from the Republic of Korea, 51 FR 11779, April 7, 1986.)
Comment 5
Respondent contends that Saarstahl Voelkingen GmbH (SVK) was privatized in 1989 by the
Government of Saarstahl in an arm's length transaction which involved a change of majority
ownership and control to a major unaffiliated corporation. Therefore, respondent argues that the
Department should not consider any benefits bestowed upon Saarstahl's predecessor company to
pass through to the new entity, DHS.
Petitioners maintain that the 1989 reorganization of Saarstahl merely shifted the existing public
and private interests in Saarstahl and did not privatize the company. This is because the
government's partial sale of its interest in Saarstahl in 1989 was negotiated with only one bidder
(Usinor Sacilor), a situation where market discipline was not applied, and because the government
continued to maintain ownership and control over DHS. Consequently, the change in Saarstahl's
ownership does not affect pass-through of benefits.
DOC Position
Because the debt forgiveness was part of the deal negotiated to effect the merger, we consider the
forgiveness to benefit the newly-formed company, not
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the predecessor to DHS. Therefore, pass through of subsidies received by the predecessor
company is not at issue here.
Comment 6
Respondent contends that the Department should characterize the loans guaranteed by federal and
Land governments as grants provided to Saarstahl in 1978 in the amount of the loans. This is
because both governments guaranteed these loans to a financially-troubled company, with the
knowledge that Saarstahl could never repay the bank creditors, and that they ultimately would
have to repay the entire principal and interest on the loan. Therefore, respondent argues that the
Department should allocate the guaranteed loan amount, as a grant, over time commencing in
1978.
Furthermore, respondent maintains that the funds provided pursuant to administrative orders and
government contracts were recurring benefits during the period 1978-1985. Due to limitations
imposed on assistance to the European steel companies, under the European Communities State
Aids Code, these funds
were terminated in 1985. Therefore, respondent argues that the Department should expense rather
than allocate these benefits.
DOC Position
There is no evidence on the record to suggest that the Governments of Germany and Saarland
provided the loan guarantees to Saarstahl with the knowledge that the company would be unable to
repay its bank creditors. Indeed, at the time the loan guarantees were given, Saarstahl received
loans from private banks without guarantees from either government. Payments made on the
guaranteed loans as well as other subsidies provided to Saarstahl were all subject to repayment
obligations (RZVs) upon the company's realization of profit in the future. Prior to the debt
forgiveness in 1989, if Saarstahl had been able to realize profits the company would have been
obligated to resume its payments to its creditor banks, and, according to the company's
contractual agreement with the two governments, would also have been obligated to repay all of its
RZVs.
Similarly, with respect to funds provided pursuant to administrative orders and government
contracts, these funds were not grants because they were tied to repayment obligations. Therefore,
we have treated them as loans which were forgiven in 1989.
Comment 7
Petitioners and Saarstahl argue that we should allocate the benefit from the debt forgiveness only
over Saarstahl's sales, and not the sales of DHS. Petitioners argue that the benefits from the
forgiveness are tied only to Saarstahl's products.
DOC Position
Although the original debt was incurred by Saarstahl, the forgiveness of the debt was tied
specifically to the creation of DHS. Without the forgiveness of the debt, there would have been no
DHS. Therefore, we believe that since the debt forgiveness was a condition for the creation of DHS,
the benefit from the forgiveness is properly allocated to DHS's sales.
Verification
In accordance with section 776(b) of the Act, we verified the information used in making our final
determination. We followed standard verification procedures, including meeting with government
and company officials, examination of relevant accounting records, and examination of original
source
documents. Our verification results are outlined in detail in the public versions of the verification
reports, which are on file in the Central Records Unit (Room B-099 of the Main Commerce
Building).
Suspension of Liquidation
In accordance with section 705(c) of the Act, we are directing the Customs Service to continue to
suspend liquidation of entries of certain additive steel products from Germany, which are entered
or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption on or after the date of publication of this notice in
the Federal Register, and to require a cash deposit or bond of estimated countervailing duties
equal to the following rate:
-----------------------------------
Company Ad valorem rate
-----------------------------------
Country-wide rate .. 17.28 percent.
-----------------------------------
Because the estimated net subsidy for Thyssen is 0.16 percent ad valorem, which is de minimis,
Thyssen is exempt from the suspension of liquidation.
ITC Notification
In accordance with section 705(d) of the Act we will notify the ITC of our determination. In
addition, we are making available to the ITC all nonprivileged and nonproprietary information
relating to this investigation. We will allow the ITC access to all privileged and business proprietary
information in our files provided the ITC confirms that it will not disclose such information, either
publicly or under an administrative protective order, without the written consent of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Investigations, Import Administration.
If the ITC determines that material injury, or the threat of material injury, does not exist, these
proceedings will be terminated and all estimated duties deposited or securities posted as a result of
the suspension of liquidation will be refunded or cancelled. If, however, the ITC determines that
such injury does exist, we will issue a countervailing duty order, directing Customs officers
to access countervailing duties on entries of certain additive steel products from Germany
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption, as described in the "Suspension of
Liquidation" section of this notice.
Return or Destruction of Proprietary Information
This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to Administrative Protective Order (APO)
of their responsibility concerning the return or destruction of proprietary information disclosed
under APO in accordance with 19 CFR 355.34(d). Failure to comply is a violation of the APO.
This determination is published pursuant to section 705(d) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1671d(d)) and 19
CFR 355.20(a)(4).
Dated: January 19, 1993.
Alan M. Dunn,
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
(FR Doc. 93-2003 Filed 1-26-93; 8:45 am)
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-M