(Cite as: 51 FR 15037)

                                               NOTICES

                                       DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

                                              [C-122-505]

             Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Oil Country Tubular Goods
                                            From Canada

                                         Tuesday, April 22, 1986

*15037
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15037)

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, Commerce.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: We determine that certain benefits which constitute subsidies within the meaning of the countervailing duty
law are being provided to manufacturers, 
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producers, or exporters of oil country tubular goods (OCTG) in Canada. The estimated net subsidy is 0.72 percent ad
valorem for all companies except those specifically excluded from this determination. In addition, we determine that "critical
circumstances" do not exist with respect to the subject merchandise.

We have notified the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) of our determination. We are directing the U.S. Customs
Service to continue to suspend liquidation of all entries of OCTG from Canada that are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse,
for consumption, on or after the date of publication of this notice, except for companies that have been excluded from this
determination, and to require a cash deposit or bond on entries of this product in an amount equal to the estimated net subsidy as
described in the "Suspension of Liquidation" section of this notice.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 22, 1986.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Steven Morrison or Barbara Tillman, Office of Investigations, Import Administration,
  International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20230; telephone (202) 377-1248 (Morrison) or (202) 377-2438 (Tillman).


                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15037)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

  Final Determination

Based upon our investigation, we determine that certain benefits which constitute subsidies within the meaning of section 701 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act), are being provided to manufacturers, producers or exporters of OCTG in Canada.
For purposes of this investigation, the following programs are found to confer subsidies:
- Certain Types of Investment Tax Credits;
- Regional Development Incentives Program; and
- General Development Agreement/Canada-Saskatchewan Subsidiary Agreement on Iron, Steel and Other Related Metal
Industries.
We determine the estimated net subsidy for OCTG to be 0.72 percent ad valorem for all companies except those specifically
excluded from this determination.

Case History

On July 22, 1985, we received a petition filed in proper form by the Lone Star Steel Company and CF&I Steel Corporation,
producers of OCTG. In compliance with the filing requirements of §355.26 of our regulations (19 CFR 355.26), the 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15037)

petition alleged that manufacturers, producers or exporters of OCTG in Canada directly or indirectly receive benefits which
constitute subsidies within the meaning of section 701 of the Act, and that these imports materially injure, or threaten material
injury to, a U.S. industry. In addition, the petition alleged that "critical circumstances" exist within the meaning of section
703(e)(1) of the Act. We found that the petition contained *15038
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15038)

sufficient grounds upon which to initiate a countervailing duty investigation, and on August 12, 1985, we initiated the
investigation (50 FR 33383).
Since Canada is a "Country under the Agreement" within the meaning of section 701(b) of the Act, the ITC is required to
determine whether imports of the subject merchandise from Canada materially injure, or threaten materials injury to, a U.S.
industry. Therefore, we notified the ITC of our initiation. On September 5, 1985, the ITC determined that there is a reasonable
indication that these imports materially injure a U.S. industry (50 FR 37066).
On August 21, 1985, we presented a questionnaire concerning the petitioners' allegations to the government of Canada.
Responses to the questionnaire were received on September 23 and 24, 1985, from the government of Canada, the provinces
of Alberta, Ontario and Sakatchewan and from producers who account for substantially all exports of OCTG from Canada to
the United States.
There are eleven known producers and/or exporters of OCTG to the United States from Canada. These are Siegfried Kreiser
Pipe and Tube; IPSCO, Inc.; Stelco 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15038)

Inc.; Sonco Steel Tube (a division of Ferrum, Inc.); Algoma Steel Corp. Ltd.; Welded Tube of Canada, Ltd.; Prudential Steel,
Ltd.; Frank Pipe Co.; Christianson Pipe, Ltd.; Dominion Steel Export Co., Ltd.; and Matthew Tube & Pipe Supply Inc. We received
timely requests for exclusion from these companies. We sent them copies of the detailed questionnaire. We verified that eight
respondents received no benefits. In addition, Algoma Steel Corporation received benefits which we determine are de minimis.
Therefore, these nine companies are excluded from this final determination. IPSCO received countervailable benefits above
the de minimis rate of 0.50 percent. Siegfried Kreiser Pipe and Tube did not respond to our questionnaire.
On September 23, 1985, we received a timely request by petitioners for a extension of the deadline date for the preliminary
determination. An extension was granted on September 26, 1985 (50 FR 40209). We made our preliminary determination on
December 19, 1985 (50 FR 53172).
Verification was conducted in Canada from October 23, 1985 to November 14, 1985. After verification, supplemental
responses were received revising and adding information as requested at verification. Prehearing briefs were submitted on
January 9, 1986. The hearing was held on January 14, 1986. Post- hearing briefs were received by the Department on February 3,
1986.
On February 7, 1986, we received a request from petitioners to extend the final countervailing duty determination on
OCTG from Canada to coincide with 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15038)

the final antidumping duty determination on a simultaneously initiated investigation of the same merchandise from the same
country. This request was made pursuant to section 705(a)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. Pursuant to petitioners'
request we extended the date of the final countervailing duty determination on OCTG from Canada until not later than
April 16, 1986, to correspond to the date of the final antidumping duty determination (51 FR 7977).
Under Article 5.3 of the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (1979), we would have to terminate the suspension of liquidation of countervailing duties if the final
injury determination date, as extended, was more than four months after the date of publication of the preliminary affirmative
  countervailing duty determination, December 30, 1985 (50 FR 53172). Therefore, we will terminate the suspension of
liquidation ordered in our preliminary affirmative countervailing duty determination on May 1, 1986. We will reinstate the
suspension of liquidation if the ITC makes a final affirmative injury determination in this investigation.
Because of the extension of the final determination, we were able to conduct a supplemental verification of information
submitted by IPSCO after our preliminary determination. This suplemental verification was conducted in Washington, D.C. on
March 21, 1986.

                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15038)


Scope of Investigation

The products covered by this investigation are "oil country tubular goods," which are hollow steel products of circular
cross-section intended for use in drilling for oil or gas. These products include oil well casings, tubing and drill pipe of carbon or
alloy steel, whether welded or seamless, manufactured to either American Petroleum Institute (API) or non-API (such as
proprietary) specifications as currently provided for in the Tariff Schedules of the United States Annotated (TSUSA), under items
610.3216, 610.3219, 610.3233, 610.3234, 610.3242, 610.3243, 610.3249, 610.3252, 610.3254, 610.3256, 610.3258, 610.3262,
610.3264, 610.3721, 610.3722, 610.3751, 610.3925, 610.3935, 610.4025, 610.4035, 610.4210, 610.4220, 610.4225,
610.4230, 610.4235, 610.4240, 610.4310, 610.4320, 610.4325, 610.4335, 610.4942, 610.4944, 610.4946, 610.4954,
610.4955, 610.4956, 610.4957, 610.4966, 610.4967, 610.4968, 610.4969, 610.4970, 610.5221, 610.5222, 610.5226,
610.5234, 610.5240, 610.5242, 610.5244, 610.5243. This investigation includes OCTG that are in both finished and unfinished
condition.

Analysis of Programs

Throughout this notice, we refer to certain general principles applied to the 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15038)

facts of the current investigation. These principles are described in the "Subsidies Appendix" attached to the notice of "Cold-Rolled
Carbon Steel Flat- Rolled Products from Argentina: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and
  Countervailing Duty Order," which was published on April 26, 1984 (49 FR 18006).
For purposes of this final determination, the period for which we are measuring subsidies (the review period) is calendar year
1984. Based upon our analysis of the petition, the responses to our questionnaires submitted by the federal and provincial
governments as well as those of the ten responding companies as amended, the verifications, and comments submitted by the
petitioners and the respondents, we determine the following:

I. Programs Determined To Confer Subsidies 

We determine that subsidies are being provided to manufacturers, producers or exporters of OCTG in Canada under the
following programs:

A. Certain Types of Investment Tax Credits

There are several categories of Investment Tax Credits (ITCs) in Canada. Two ITC programs are directed at encouraging
capital investment in certain regions 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15038)

of the country. One category of ITC is for investment in "qualified property," such as new plant and equipment used for
manufacturing or processing. The basic ITC for investment in qualified property is seven percent. An additional three or 13
percent is available for qualified property used in certain regions. IPSCO and Algoma each claimed the additional three percent
ITC for qualified property used in Saskatchewan and Sault Ste. Marie, respectively.
We verified that the basic seven percent rate for "qualified property" is not limited to a specific industry or region. We, therefore,
determine that it is not countervailable. However, because the additional rate of three percent for qualified property can only be
claimed on investments in assets used in certain regions, we determine that this additional benefit is *15039
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15039)

countervailable. We also verified that the additional 13 percent rate was not used by manufacturers, producers or exporters of
OCTG in Canada.
A second category of ITC is for investment in "certified property." The distinguishing factor between "certified property" and
"qualified property" is that the former must be located in prescribed regions characterized by high levels of unemployment and
low per capita income. The ITC rate for certified property is 50 percent. We verified that no manufacturer, producer or exporter
of OCTG in Canada used certified property ITCs in the review period.
A third category of ITC is for scientific research. Eligible expenditures under this category include the cost of capital equipment
used for scientific 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15039)

research and expenses attributable to scientific research. A basic 20 percent ITC rate is available for qualifying scientific research
expenditures to all companies in Canada. For small Canadian-controlled private corporations, the rate is 35 percent. For all
other corporations, the rate is 30 percent, if the expenditure is made in certain regions. From April 1983 to May 1985,
manufacturers incurring scientific research expenses, receiving scientific research and operating at a tax loss could sell these ITCs
to companies owing taxes. Algoma and Stelco used 20 percent scientific research ITCs. We determine that 20 and 35 percent
scientific research ITCs, whether sold or used by the company performing the research, do not confer domestic subsidies because
they are not limited to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, or to companies in specific regions.
We did not discover any corporations manufacturing, producing, or exporting OCTG in Canada that were eligible for the 30
percent regional benefit. We verified that the 35 percent scientific research ITC for small business was not used.
A fourth category of ITC is for qualified transportation and construction equipment. It is also a nationwide program. We verified
that no manufacturer, producer or exporter of OCTG used this particular tax credit.
In our "Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada"
"("Groundfish") (51 FR 10041), we stated that there were four categories of ITCs. We have since become aware of a fifth 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15039)

category which is for research and development. During the review period, a company could receive ITCs for ten percent of its
research and development expenses (20 percent for small businesses). This provision is available to companies nationwide.
IPSCO received tax deductions under this provision in 1984. We determine that research and development ITCs do not confer
domestic subsidies because they are not limited to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, or to
companies in specific regions.
Canadian tax law provides that ITCs may be subtracted from taxes owed, but if no taxes are owed (either because a company is
initially in a tax loss position or because only some of the ITCs have been used to satisfy all tax liability), those excess ITCs earned
after April 19, 1983, have a refundable, one-time cash value of equal to 20 percent of the initial, face value of the ITC (40 percent
for small businesses). We verified that Algoma did get refunds for some post- April 19, 1983 qualified property ITCs for cash on
tax returns filed in 1984.
To calculate the benefit from the "qualified property" ITCs, we followed our standard tax methodology. Under our tax
methodology, we allocate an income tax benefit to the year in which the tax return was filed. Thus, we looked at the tax return
filed in 1984, covering fiscal year 1983. We examined IPSCO's and Algoma's tax returns filed during the review period and found
the value of "qualified property" ITCs in excess of the seven percent threshold. We then divided that amount by each company's
total sales to calculate a net subsidy of 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15039)

0.01 percent ad valorem for Algoma and 0.01 percent ad valorem for IPSCO.

B. Regional Development Incentive Program (RDIP)

The RDIP, which was the predecessor of the Industrial and Regional Development Program, was administered by the Department
of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) for the purpose of creating stable employment opportunities in areas of Canada
where employment and economic opportunities were chronically low. The program provided development incentive (usually
grants) to manufacturers whose capital investment projects for establishing new facilities or expanding or modernizing existing
facilities would create jobs and economic opportunities in areas designated as economically disadvantaged.
Because benefits were limited to companies located within specific regions in Canada, we determine that grants provided
through the RDIP program of DREE are countervailable. We verified that the only manufacturers, producers or exporters of OCTG
located in regions of Canada eligible for RDIP were IPSCO and Algoma.
Each company received one RDIP grant for facilities not used in the production of OCTG. Consistent with our methodology, when
a grant is tied specifically to a production not under investigation, we do not include it in our calculation of benefits. In addition,
we verified that one RDIP grant, 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15039)

reported by the government of Canada as paid to IPSCO, was actually paid to a scrap metal company subsequently acquired
by IPSCO. The money was paid to the scrap metal company more than a year before its assets were acquired by IPSCO. We verified
that IPSCO did not receive any funds under this grant.
IPSCO also received a large grant under RDIP and a Saskatchewan subsidiary agreement which is discussed in the next section of
this notice. The benefit from this joint grant is included in the subsidy calculation for this RDIP program. Finally, IPSCO and
Algoma each received RDIP grants which were used for several facilities producing both OCTG and other products. Since these
grants were used in the production of OCTG, among other products, we included the full amount of these grants in our
calculations.
To calculate the benefits from these RDIP grants, we used the methodology for grants outlined in the Subsidies Appendix. Because
RDIP grants are not provided automatically every year, we allocate the benefits received over time. The average useful life of
equipment in the steel industry is 15 years as determined by srandard Internal Revenue Service tables. Thus, for all grants
received by each company in the past 15 years, we aggregated all grants received by each company in each year and divided by
the company's total sales in that year. If the result was less than 0.50 percent (de minimis), we expensed the full amount of the
grant(s) in the year of receipt. If the result was 0.50 percent or greater, we allocated the grant over the average useful 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15039)

life of equipment using our declining balance methodology.
We applied the methodology outlined in the Subsidies Appendix. Using this methodology, we determine the estimated net subsidy
to be 0.71 percent ad valorem for IPSCO and 0.04 percent ad valorem for Algoma. The amount calculated for IPSCO includes the
full amount of a grant jointly funded by RDIP and a subsidiary agreement discussed below.

*15040
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15040)

C. General Development Agreement (GDA) and the Canada-Saskatchewan Subsidiary Agreement on Iron, Steel and Other
Related Metal Industries

GDAs, which were umbrella agreements stating general economic development goals, provided the legal basis for departments of
the federal and provincial governments to cooperate in the establishment of economic development programs. Ten-year GDAs
were signed with all the provinces in 1974, except P.E.I., which had signed its own Comprehensive Development Plan in 1969.
Five- year GDAs were signed with the Yukon Territory in 1977 and with the Northwest Territories in 1979.
Pursuant to GDAs, subsidiary agreements were signed. The subsidiary agreements were generally between particular federal and
provincial government departments (e.g., DREE and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in Saskatchewan). These agreements
established various individual programs, 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15040)

delineated administrative procedures and set out the relative funding commitments of the federal and provincial governments.
Subsidiary agreements were typically directed at establishing traditional government programs (i.e., extension services,
developing infrastructure, providing for economic development assistance for certain regions within the province and creating
programs for specific industries).
The iron and steel subsidiary agreement in Saskatchewan was intended to enhance the viability of the existing iron and steel
industry in the province, to expand and diversify iron and steel production, and to increase employment opportunities in the
iron, steel and other related metal industries in Saskatchewan. IPSCO was and still is the only producer in Saskatchewan of pipe
(including OCTG) in addition to being the sole steel producer in the province. IPSCO received most of the funds the province
budgeted for primary and secondary steel facilities under the subsidiary agreement. As such, we determine this subsidiary
agreement to be countervailable because it provided direct financial assistance that was limited to a specific enterprise or
industry, or group of enterprises or industries.
IPSCO received two grants under the subsidiary agreement. These two grants were jointly approved and funded through RDIP and
the subsidiary agreement. IPSCO received funds under one grant in 1976 and 1978. These were the only grant funds IPSCO
received in each of those years. The funds received under 
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this grant were less than 0.50 percent of total IPSCO sales in each of those years. Thus, we expensed the amount of each of these
grants to the year of receipt. IPSCO received funds under the other grant in 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983. The amount of these
disbursements exceeded 0.50 percent of total IPSCO sales in each of those four years. Therefore, we allocated each of these
disbursements over time and have included the benefits in our calculation of the estimated net subsidy under RDIP.

II. Programs Determined Not To Confer Subsidies

We determine that subsidies are not being provided to manufacturers, producers or exporters of OCTG in Canada under the
following programs:

A. Grant Under the Enterprise Development Program (EDP)

The EDP was established to provide loans, loan guarantees and contributions to those engaged in manufacturing or processing. In
the "Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Softwood Products from Canada" ("Softwood")
(48 FR 24159 (1983)), we found EDP grants not countervailable and EDP loan programs not used. Based on that determination, we
initiated an investigation only on EDP loan programs and not EDP grants. However, IPSCO's 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15040)

1984 annual report stated that the company was being assisted by an EDP grant for research on a new alloy while the government
of Canada response said the EDP program was terminated in 1983. Because of this inconsistency in the information provided
in the two responses, we asked for additional information in order to determine whether a new EDP program has been established.
We verified that companies could continue to receive funds for projects approved prior to the termination of the EDP program
and that there was no new EDP program. In addition, although project funding for the grant has been approved, we verified that
IPSCO has not yet received any funding under this program. Accordingly, we have no information changing our prior conclusion
that EDP grants are not limited to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, or to companies in
specific regions. EDP loan programs were not used as explained in section III. I. of this notice.

B. Employment Development Fund (EDF)

The Employment Development Fund (EDF), which was terminated in 1982, was an Ontario provincial grant program intended to
increase long-term investment and employment in the province. In its response, one OCTG manufacturer reported receipt of an
EDF grant. During verification, we saw that as part of the application procedure, applicants are required to predict the growth of 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15040)

production and exports. However, the default provisions of the application form are not triggered if the projected export goals
are not met.
We determine that EDF was not an export subsidy because these grants were provided to producers for the domestic market as
well as to exporters, and receipt of EDF grants was not contingent on export performance. Based on our examination of a report
on recipients of EDF, funding was provided to a wide range of industries in Ontario including general manufacturing, automotive,
high-technology electrical products, wood products, tourism, textiles, transport, chemicals, agriculture, and pulp and paper.
Therefore, we also determine that EDF grants do not confer domestic subsidies because they are not limited to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, or to companies in specific regions.

C. Alberta Opportunity Loan to IPSCO

The Alberta Opportuntiy Company (AOC), a crown corporation, issues loans and loan guarantees to companies in Alberta in order
to stimulate new businesses and assist expansion of existing enterprises when financing from other sources is unavailable. In
Softwood, we determined that AOC loans were not limited to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries, or to companies in specific regions. However, we initiated an investigation on this 
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program because we had information that AOC loans may be intended for export promotion. According to the responses, IPSCO
had a loan outstanding from the AOC during the review period.
IPSCO's AOC loan is not a part of normal loan program; it is part of a settlement reached in court for IPSCO's purchase of physical
assets of Ram Steel (Ram), a company placed into receivership by its primary secured creditor. Thus, even though we found no
linkage of this loan to exports, we examined whether the loan was granted on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.
Normally, we determine this by comparing the interest rate and other charges to comparable, commercial loans. To find
comparable, commerical loans, we look first to the company's debt experience. If it has no comparable, *15041
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15041)

commercial debt outstanding, we look to the national experience. The circumstances surrounding this loan were unusual. The
lending institution faced large losses, absent a favorable resolution of Ram's financial difficulties. Because of this, normal loans
from a commercial bank that is not exposed in a similar manner are not comparable. We were unable to find comparable,
commercial loans to determine the appropriate benchmark.
Thus, we had to determine whether a commercial lender would act as AOC did. AOC was the secondary, secured creditor of Ram at
the time the court placed Ram in receivership. The court assigned an officer of Peat Marwick, 
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Ltd. (a neutral, private party) as the receiver to negotiate the best deal possible on behalf of Ram's creditor and storkholders.
According to the receiver, the company could not be operated by the receiver or by Ram at a profit, and the price offered by
IPSCO was the highest price they could obtain (it was also the only offer they received). It included payoff of the primary creditor
which was a pre-condition of AOC receiving anything at all. The assets of Ram were appraised by an independent appraiser acting
on behalf of the Court. The appraiser evaluated the assets of Ram, purchaser by IPSCO, as if they were used in a profitable
business. The final price offered by IPSCO was seven percent more than the value that the appraiser placed on the assets.
IPSCO made its offer to buy contingent upon receiving a loan from AOC to cover part of the purchaser price. The receiver
determined that IPSCO' offer, including the AOC loan terms, was in the best interest of all of Ram's creditors, including AOC. By
granting that loan, AOC was able to recover most of the money owed it by Ram and to receive the full principal and interest of this
loan to IPSCO on deferred terms, as was a condition of IPSCO's offer.
Given the above information, we determine that AOC's loan to IPSCO was not inconsistent with commercial considerations. It is
commercially reasonable to accept deferred repayment terms on a portion of the purchase price in this situation, whether or not
the lender is a government-funded company, especially if acceptance of such terms is part of a settlement recommended by a
court- 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15041)

appointed receiver. By accepting deferred repayment on the remainder of the price, the lender avoided major financial losses,
otherwise reasonably expected, had it not accepted the deferral. (We note that banks, in particular, are willing to renegotiate loan
terms in order to avoid having to write off large amounts of bad debt.)
Additionally, it is commercially reasonable for IPSCO to negotiate the best terms possible for itself when borrowing. In a situation
where IPSCO make the only offer for Ram's assets, it is reasonable for IPSCO to look for credit from the lender who stands to lose
the most if the purchase falls through. IPSCO is still required to repay interest and principal on this loan and has made all
payments required thus far.
Therefore, since we have determined that the AOC loan was not provided on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations,
we determine that this loan does not confer a subsidy.

III. Programs Determined Not To Be Used

We determine that the following programs are not used by manufacturers, producers, or exporters of OCTG in Canada:

A. Loans Under Subsidiary Agreements

                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15041)


Petitioners allege that under the GDA and federal-provincial subsidiary agreement, loans were provided on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations. We verified that the GDA was not itself a program and that none of the companies had
outstanding loans under the subsidiary agreements during the review period.

B. Defense Industry Productivity Program (DIPP)

The DIPP, administered by the Department of Regional and Industrial Expansion (DRIE), has several purposes. Among these
purposes are the stimulation of exports of military hardware and the provision of assistance to upgrade equipment, processes and
facilities to make companies more competitive in bidding for military hardware contracts.
We verified that Algoma is the only manufacturer, producer or exporter of OCTG that received a DIPP grant. The grant was for a
facility to desulfurize steel, which is used in producing OCTG and other steel products. DIPP funds were paid to Algoma in 1980
and 1981. Although the Department may determine that DIPP grants serve as export subsidies in other cases, we verified that
there were no conditions in the Algoma DIPP grant agreement which were tied to export performance or which made the grant
contingent upon exporting. Algoma has a 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15041)

large home market for desulfurized steel and products made from desulfurized steel. This DIPP grant benefits Algoma's entire
production, and not exports alone. Thus, we determine that this grant was not an export subsidy.
Although we have determined that this program is not an export subsidy, we must still determine whether any benefits were
received during the review period and, if so, whether this program is limited to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of
enterprises of industries. Consistent with the Subsidies Appendix, we divide the sum of all grants received in each year by the total
sales of the company in the same year. Algoma received no other grants in the two years DIPP funds were received. The calculated
benefits in each year were de minimis; therefore we expensed them in the year of receipt. Because the DIPP grants received by
Algoma were expensed prior to the review period and because no DIP grants were received by Algoma during the review period,
we determine this program was not used.

C. Community-Based Industrial Adjustment Program of the Industry and Labor Adjustment Program (CIAP/ILAP)

This program, now terminated, provided loans and grants to firms in designated communities affected by high unemployment. We
verified that 12 identified communities were eligible for CIAP during the life of the program. None of the 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15041)

OCTG respondents were located in these communities.

D. Promotional Projects Program (PPP)

The PPP is run by the Department of External Affairs. At selected foreign trade shows, the government of Canada rents space,
furniture, and facilities which it subleases at minimal charge to Canadian exhibitors. The government of Canada reported that
one OCTG respondent, Stelco, used the PPP in 1983 and 1985 (but not 1984) at a trade show in the United States. This benefit was
received outside the review period. We verified that no benefit was received by OCTG companies during the review period.

E. Program for Export Market Development (PEMD)

The PEMD program is also run by the Department of External Affairs. One PEMD subprogram was reportedly used by Stelco,
Algoma and IPSCO to recover certain transportation expenses incurred in selling specific products in potential markets. We
verified that none of these trips were for selling OCTG in the United States. Therefore, we determine that this program was not
used.

*15042
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15042)

F. Industrial and Regional Development Program (IRDP)

                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15042)


Under the administration of DRIE, IRDP was established in 1983 as the successor to the RDIP. Its purpose is to increase industrial
development and improve the overall economic climate in Canada. To accomplish this goal, grants are provided for four
major purposes: (1) To encourage the development of new products and new processes and to increase industrial productivity
and industrial competitiveness; (2) to assist in the establishment of new production facilities in less developed areas; (3) to
increase industrial productivity through the improvement, modernization and expansion of existing manufacturing and
processing operations; and (4) for marketing purposes. Each census district in Canada is classified into one of four tiers based
on its level of economic development. The level of benefit varies inversely with employment, population density, and existing
facilities.
The petitioners alleged that DRIE provides discretionary grants, interest-free loans and loan guarantees under IRDP. We verified
that no IRDP loans or loan guarantees were provided to manufacturers, producers or exporters of OCTG. We have, however,
verified that IPSCO and Siegfried Kreiser have been approved for specific IRDP grants, but have not yet received any funds.
Therefore, we determine that this program was not used in the review period. We will examine any future provisions of money
under IRDP in any section 751 review that may be requested.

                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15042)

G. Saskatchewan Economic Development Commission (SEDCO) SEDCO issues loans, loan guarantees and in some cases invests in
Saskatchewan industries and commerce. We verified from company financial records that, in the review period, none of the OCTG
respondents had any outstanding loans, loan guarantees, investments or other assistance from SEDCO.

H. Ontario Development Corporation (ODC) Export Support Loans, Other Loans and Loan Guarantees

The ODC controls, approves and administers loan and loan guarantee programs in addition to administering, but not approving,
grant programs (such as the Employment Development Fund, discussed earlier in this notice). We verified that no OCTG producer
has received assistance under these programs.

I. Enterprise Development Program (EDP) Loans

Petitioners alleged that loans were provided on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations under EDP. Based on
information in the records we inspected, none of the manufacturers, producers or exporters of OCTG had EDP loans outstanding
during the review period.


                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15042)

J. Interest-Free Loans and Below-Commercial Rate Loans

Petitioners alleged that loans have been provided on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations by the government or at
the direction of the government. We have verified that no government-funded or directed loan programs were used by
manufacturers, producers or exporters of OCTG other than those programs already addressed in this notice.

K. Government Grants for Purchase of Fixed Assets

Petitioners alleged that government grants have been provided to IPSCO for purchase of fixed assets. We have verified that IPSCO
and Algoma received grants for acquisition of fixed assets under the RDIP, DIPP and a subsidiary agreement. These grant
programs are addressed elsewhere in this notice. The verified financial records of the governments and the companies indicate
that there are no other government grant programs used by manufacturers, producers or exporters of OCTG, other than those
previously discussed.

Negative Determination of Critical Circumstances

Petitioners alleged that imports of OCTG from Canada present "critical 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15042)

circumstances." Under section 703(e)(1) of the Act, critical circumstances exist when the Department has a reasonable basis to
believe or suspect that (1) the alleged subsidy is inconsistent with the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI,
XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("the Subsidies Code"), and (2) there have been massive imports of
the class or kind of merchandise which is the subject of the investigation over a relatively short period. Based upon our analysis,
there were no export subsidies bestowed upon OCTG in Canada during the review period. Accordingly, we determine that the
subsidies received are not inconsistent with the Subsidies Code.
Since we have determined that the subsidies are not inconsistent with Code commitments, we need not determine whether there
have been massive imports. Accordingly, we determine that "critical circumstances" do not exist with respect to OCTG from
  Canada.

Petitioners' Comments

Comment 1: Petitioners argue the original AOC loan to Ram Steel provided a countervailable benefit to IPSCO. Petitioners have
two major concerns. First, they argue that the loan to Ram was given on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.
Second, they argue that AOC provided another countervailable 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15042)

subsidy through its apparent forgiveness of two million dollars of Ram's outstanding debt. In both situations, petitioners argue
that since the funds were provided to Ram, the subsidies accure to Ram's assets. Therefore, by purchasing Ram's subsidized assets,
IPSCO is benefitting from those subsidies. Petitioners argue that the Department should find that AOC's subsidization of Ram's
assets did not cease to confer a benefit to those assets once IPSCO purchased them.
DOC Position: Petitioners are asking the Department to determine that AOC loans to Ram conferred a subsidy that was passed
through to IPSCO. We looked at the pass-through issue first.
Funds for the AOC loan were received by Ram Steel in January 1983, well after Ram had acquired its plant and equipment and was
manufacturing steel pipe. As a factual matter, the loan was not tied to purchase of specific assets. In fact, Ram was manufacturing
pipe before it obtained the loan. Further, IPSCO's purchase of Ram's assets was an arm's length transaction. IPSCO purchased
Ram's assets at a price above the appraised value. The appraisal of the assets was conducted independently for the Court as part of
the receivership proceedings. In an arm's legnth transaction, such as this one, subsidies, if there are any, are not passed through.
Finally, the other possibility is that IPSCO, in some way, benefitted from a reduction of Ram's liabilities through a forgiveness of
debt. IPSCO 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15042)

purchased only Ram's physical assets; it did not purchase Ram itself. Since IPSCO was not responsible to Ram's creditors (Ram's
stockholders were), it could not benefit from a reduction in Ram's liabilities.
Thus, since any subsidy to Ram was not passed through to IPSCO, the question of whether Ram received any subsidies is moot.
Comment 2: The petitioners note that the AOC loan to IPSCO, which financed part of the IPSCO purchase price for Ram Steel's plant
and equipment, was *15043
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15043)

provided on deferred repayment terms. Therefore, the loan was on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.
Petitioners suggest that we compare the actual payments terms to the payment terms normally offered by commercial banks.
DOC Position: We disagree. See section II.C., "Alberta Opportunity Company Loan to IPSCO," of this notice.
Comment 3: Petitioners note that for one IPSCO grant, approved in 1972, the Department allocated the benefit using a rate of
interest on debt applicable to a long-term commercial loan taken out by IPSCO in 1972. They point out that IPSCO also issued
bonds at a higher rate of interest in the same year in addition to the commercial loan. Petitioners suggest that we allocate the 1972
grant based on the bond interest rate.
DOC Position: While it is inappropriate to use only the higher interest rate on the bonds in the weighted cost of capital calculation,
we have now included 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15043)

this higher interest rate in calculating the average long-term debt rate for the year in which the grant was approved. However,
using this average long- term debt rate in IPSCO's weighted cost of capital had no effect on the ad valorem subsidy rate.

Respondents' Comments

Comment 1: The government of Canada and other respondents have observed that most of the OCTG manufacturers,
producers or exporters received no countervailable subsidies and one company received subsidies which we calculated ad de
minimis. (All these companies had requested exclusion from the determination.) One company, IPSCO, received countervailable
subsidies. They claim that the Department incorrectly determined that the country-wide rate was the same rate applicable to the
non-excluded company, and argue that the Department should have divided all subsidies to all companies by sales from these
companies, including those not receiving subsidies, to determine the country-wide rate. If this were done, the country-wide rate
would be de minimis. Only after determining whether there will be an order should companies be excluded.
DOC Position: The purpose of our determination is to find a bonding or deposit rate equal to the average level of subsidization of
imports subject to an 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15043)

order, assuming that average rate is above de minimis. The way we calculate this country-wide average is to take the subsidies
found and divide by either the value of export sales of all firms subject to the investigation, or their total sales (depending on
whether it is an export or a domestic subsidy). We do not normally calculate specific rates for each company.
In the case on OCTG, all the respondent firms requested exclusion from the determination. Kreiser chose not to respond to our
questionnaire; therefore it could not be excluded and we had to use best information as representing its level of subsidization (i.e.,
the highest subsidy found for other companies, in this case, IPSCO). The other exclusion requests required us to look at each
company individually. All the respondents except IPSCO qualified for exclusion. Their imports will not be subject to a
  countervailing duty order, if the ITC issues an affirmative injury determination. Thus, IPSCO became the basis for our
country-wide average.
Section 701 of the Act directs the Department (upon determination that a subsidy exists) to impose a countervailing duty
equal to the amount of the net subsidy. If the Department averaged benefits to companies which are excluded from the collection
of countervailing duties, as the government of Canada requests, with countervailing duties collected only from
companies which are receiving subsidies, the aggregate amount of countervailing duties collected would be less than the
net subsidy. Therefore, the Department will continue 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15043)

its practice of only using rates applicable to firms receiving more than de minimis benefits when computing country-wide rates.
Comment 2: The government of Canada and IPSCO state that the provincial portion of the GDA grant is "not targeted at
specific regions or industries." Within Saskatchewan, the scope of this and other subsidiary agreements under the GDA and its
successor act means that the entire economy of Saskatchewan has access to such funding under very general eligibility criteria.
DOC Position: As we stated in Groundfish, GDAs are not programs per se. They do not establish government programs, nor do they
provide for the administration and funding of government programs. They are merely legal agreements under which departments
of the federal and provincial governments may cooperate in establishing and administering joint economic development
programs in spheres of dual or conflicting jurisdiction. The implementation, administration, and funding of industry and
regional-specific programs occurs exclusively through subsidiary agreements. Therefore, we decided that in determining whether
a subsidiary agreement is limited to specific enterprises or industries, the proper level of analysis is the subsidiary agreement.
In this case, the Saskatchewan Iron, Steel and Other Related Metal Industries Subsidiary Agreement in question was targeted
specifically to the iron, steel, and other related metal industries. Even more specifically, in Saskatchewan, only one company,
IPSOC, constitutes the entire industry which could have 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15043)

availed itself of a major portion of the subsidiary agreement benefits, those targeted at primary and at secondary steel producers.
As such, the subsidiary agreement is clearly limited to a specific enterprise or industry.
Comment 3: IPSCO claims that the Department's method for apportioning the value of grants used by IPSCO for the capital
improvement of its steel facilities (by sales value rather than by weight) unfarily biases the subsidy to products, such as OCTG,
with a relatively high unit value per ton. IPSCO suggests that since the money was granted for steel making capital equipment, it
would be fairer to allocate the benefits on the basis of weight rather than value.
DOC Position: Except in certain involving agricultural products, the Department has consistently allocated the value of grants
received based on the value of products sold. We cannot determine, a priori, if a cash grant is more beneficial to the volume than
the value of the goods produced. Therefore, we utilize a standard method to avoid biasing the outcome.
Comment 4: The Department of Commerce calculated the value of the benefit of an IPSCO grant based on the published debt to
equity ratio for IPSCO in the year that the grant was approved. IPSCO contends that we should have used IPSCO's average debt to
equity ratio between IPSCO's first year of operation and the year the grant was provided.
DOC Position: As we stated in the Subsidies Appendix, the discount rate 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15043)

applied in our grant methodology is a measure of the company's time preference for money. We further stated that a company's
time preference for money is determined by its expected rate of return on investments at the time the subsidy was received. Since
that rate of return is not easily quantifiable, we considered the company's actual cost of raising money (weighted cost of capital) at
the time the grant was bestowed. Using a debt to equity ratio affected by other time periods would not reflect the cost to the
company of raising money at the time the subsidy was *15044
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15044)

approved. Furthermore, the proposed method does not use standardized times over which one company's time preference for
money could be compared to another.
Comment 5: IPSCO argues that the Department was incorrect to use national average cost of debt in calculating the value of a
benefit for an IPSCO grant. IPSCO argues that we should use IPSCO's short-term interest rate that it would have paid in the year the
grant was approved. IPSCO further argues that without the grant, it would have used short-term financing and it would have
received the same rate as for other short-term borrowings that year.
DOC Position: The project, partially funded by the grant, was built over several successive years. It was a major capital expansion.
During the years that the project was being built, IPSCO floated two 15-year debenture issues at higher interest rates than IPSCO
suggests we use for calculation purposes. To say that this large capital expansion project would have been financed by 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15044)

short-term borrowings is purely speculative and unsupported by any verified facts. In general, firms use long-term debt or equity
to finance such long- term projects.
Comment 6: IPSCO claims that DOC should have used 25 years rather than 15 years as the period over which to amortize the
grants. It claims that it uses 25 years for financial reporting purposes, that this period has been accepted by its external auditors
and that the steel industry in Canada generally writes off its capital assets in this time.
DOC Position: In the Subsidies appendix, we state that we will allocate grants over the average useful life of a company's renewable
physical assets as determined by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the 1977 Class Life Asset Depreciation Range System.
That is the source of the 15-year allocation period used in this case. We feel the use of the IRS tables provides a consistent and
predictable standard for allocating grants. If we were to use different countries' tax tables or different companies' amortization
periods for allocating grant benefits, we might arrive at different subsidy rates for equal grants due solely to the different periods
of allocation. (In addition, this method provides petitioners, before filing a petition, with a consistent and publicly-available
standard for determining whether programs potentially provide countervailable benefits.)
In this case we have found that, while IPSCO and other Canadian primary 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15044)

and secondary steel producers may amortize capital equipment expenditures over 25 years, we are aware of nothing that requres
them to do so. Accepting that IPSCO depreciates capital equipment for financial statement purposes over a 25- year period, the
majority of this equipment is depreciated for tax purposes by IPSCO over a two-year period with the remainder depreciated for
tax purposes over other intervals. The Canadian government accepts these various methods. So even if we did attempt to find a
company-or country-specific allocation period, there is often no clear choice of what that period should be. Therefore, we
continue to rely on the IRS tables as a reasonable measure of the average life of a company's renewable physical assets.
Comment 7: IPSCO argues that the Department should reduce the value of the grants by the tax savings which IPSCO gave up in
accepting grants. IPSCO states that it does not receive a capital cost allowance (depreciation) on grant money. If it had paid for the
assets out of company funds instead of accepting a grant, it would have received a non-countervailable capital cost allowance
which could have been deducted from taxable income. Using an incremental tax rate, IPSCO contends that it would have reduced
its taxes owed by a percentage of the full capital cost allowance that it would have receive if the full value of the assets purchased
by the grant money had been subject to capital cost allowance.
DOC Position: It has been our consistent policy not to take into account the 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15044)

secondary effects, including tax effects, of subsidies. Any offsets to a counteravailable subsidy are strictly limited by section
771(6) of the Act. Furthermore, the review period for this investigation was calendar year 1984. During the review period, IPSCO
filed its fiscal year 1983 tax return. IPSCO had negative taxable income on its 1983 tax return. Thus, assuming the facts as IPSCO
presents them, additional capital cost allowance would not result in tax savings during the review period.
Comment 8: IPSCO argues that if it had invested its own money in lieu of grant funds on the project, it would have had to borrow
the money. If it had borrowed the money, it would have incurred an interest expense, which it could have taken as a tax
deduction. The tax deduction (which IPSCO did not get because it accepted the grant), IPSCO postulates, would have resulted in a
tax savings which they contend should be used to reduce the value of the grant.
DOC Position: As stated above, we do not consider the secondary effects of subsidy. Since IPSCO did, indeed, accept the grant
funds, the hypothesis it poses is speculative.
Comment 9: IPSCO argues that the use of the Subsidies Appendix, published in 1984, may have been warranted in the case for
which it was first published since the parties to that case had opportunity to present their views on the proposed methodologies.
They contend that the use of the Subsidies Appendix in subsequent cases constitutes rulemaking and is in violation of the 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15044)

Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Since the parties in this investigation did not have an opportunity to submit comments and
be heard prior to publication of the Subsidies Appendix, they argue that it should not be applied to the present case.
DOC Position: IPSCO is in error when it states that it had no notice or opportunity to comment on the methodologies from the
Subsidies Appendix that were employed in the present case. It admits that notice and comment are adequately provided for in the
case where the methodologies are formulated. However, IPSCO fails to recognize that the same justification applies to subsequent
cases where such methodology may be employed. In this case, IPSCO has been provided with notice and opportunity to comment
on the methodologies used even though they were first formulated in an earlier case. It has, in fact, commented on them in its
prehearing brief, at the hearing and in its post-hearing brief.
Furthermore, an investigative agency such as the Department of Commerce, has the discretion to develop general policies on a
case-by-case basis rather than through rulemaking procedures. (See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company, 416 U.S. 267, 290-295
(1973)). IPSCO seeks to have the Department follow a fairly rigid standard with regard to all methodologies used. The
responsibilities of the Department preclude strict compliance with the APA. Because of the large number of government programs
that confer subsidies, the Department needs the 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15044)

flexibility to formulate and adjust methodologies that are applicable to the various government programs. Strict compliance with
the APA formal rulemaking procedures, including the requirement that rules go into effect at least 30 days after publication,
would severely retard the Department's ability to meet its obligations with ragard to the countervailing duty law. Such a
result could not have been intended by Congress. Therefore, the Department does not consider formulation of methodology to be
formal rulemaking.
*15045
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15045)

Congressional authority for this position is apparent in the legislation governing the Department's duties in the area of
  countervailing duties. Congress has provided strict requirements in every countervailing duty investigation or
review proceeding for notice and opportunity for comment from all parties, as well as a hearing, if requested. Further evidence of
Congressional intent can be found in 19 U.S.C. 1677(c)(b), where adherence to the APA is waived for these hearings. Congress
would not have waived the APA requirements for hearings, where the parties are invited to comment, if it expected compliance
with the APA concerning the methodology employed. It is clear that Congress, recognizing the nature of countervailing duty
   proceedings, provided a system of notice and comment that protects the same rights protected under the APA, without
hampering the work of the Department.
Comment 10: IPSCO claims that the application of the procedures published in the Subsidies Appendix, for grants approved in
1978 and received between 1980 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15045)

and 1983, amounts to the imposition of a retroactive tax. IPSCO feels that the Subsidies Appendix should apply only to grants
received after its publication. IPSCO claims that it studied our past countervailing duty practices and would never have
applied for or accepted a grant which it understood to be countervailable when it chose to apply for the grants in question.
DOC Position: We disagree. Since at least 1974, we have been allocating the value of Canadian subsidies over time. The Subsidies
Appendix altered our prior valuation method of a subsidy, not our determination of its countervailability. Grants approved in
1978 and received in 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983 would be countervailable according to the 1973 methodology we used for
Michelin Tires from Canada (3 ITRD 1177 (CIT, 1981)) or the latter method published in the Subsidies Appendix. There is no
evidence that IPSCO relied on past practices, as it claimed. If IPSCO has relied on past practices, the subsidy it received would still
have been countervailable.
The countervailing duty imposed is prospective, affecting merchandise entered or withdrawn from warehouse after the
date of the preliminary determination or order. IPSCO has confused the method of valuation of a subsidy, which is necessarily
based on activities in an earlier period, with the merchandise on which the countervailing duty is imposed.
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 redefined the term "subsidy" in relation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It did
not constrain us to apply 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15045)

this new standard only to subsidies received after the date of enactment. To do so would have vitiated the effective use of the
  countervailing duty law for several years. This was clearly not the Congressional intent.
Comment 11: The respondents request that the Department take steps to subdivide the TSUSA classification numbers to segregate
non-OCTG pipe and tube products now in mixed classifications with OCTG. Otherwise, liquidation of these non-OCTG products
would be unfairly delayed by U.S. Customs.
DOC Position: The prime responsibility for establishing TSUSA classifications is that of the ITC. We see no reason for the ITC to
make the requested breakouts in the TSUSA. We have had affirmative antidumping and/or countervailing duty
determinations on OCTG from other countries. These have been administered using the existing TSUSA. Based on this experience,
there is no need for the proposed modifications.

Verification

In accordance with section 776(a) of the Act, we verified the information used in making our final determination. During
verification, we followed standard verification procedures, including meeting with government officials, inspection of documents
and ledgers, and tracing the information in the responses to source documents, accounting records, and financial statements.

                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15045)


Suspension of Liquidation

In accordance with section 703(d) of the Act, we are directing the U.S. Customs Service to continue to suspend liquidation of all
unliquidated entries of OCTG from Canada which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption, on or after
December 30, 1985 and before May 1, 1986. On May 1, 1986, the suspension of liquidation, ordered in our preliminary affirmative
  countervailing duty determination, will be terminated. As of the date of publication of this notice in the Federal Register,
The Customs Service should require a cash deposit or bond for each such entry of this merchandise equal to 0.72 percent ad
valorem except for OCTG from Stelco Inc., Sonco Steel Tube (a division of Ferrum Inc.), Algoma Steel Corp., Ltd., Welded Tube of 
  Canada, Ltd., Prudential Steel Ltd., Frank Pipe Co., Christianson Pipe, Ltd., Dominion Steel Export Co., Ltd., and Matthew
Tube & Pipe Supply Inc. We will reinstate the suspension of liquidation if the ITC makes a final affirmative injury
determination in this investigation.

ITC Notification

In accordance with section 705(c) of the Act, we will notify the ITC of our 
                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15045)

determination In addition, we are making available to the ITC all non- privileged and non-confidential information relating to this
investigation. We will allow the ITC access to all privileged and confidential information in our files, provided the ITC confirms
that it will not disclose such information, either publicly or under an administrative protective order, without the written consent
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
The ITC will determine whether these imports materially injure, or threaten material injury to a U.S. industry within 45 days after
the date of publication of this notice. If the ITC determines that material injury, or the threat of material injury, does not exist,
this proceeding will be terminated and all estimated duties deposited or securities posted as a result of the suspension of
liquidation will be refunded or cancelled. If, however, the ITC determines that injury exists, we will issue a countervailing
duty order, directing Customs officers not to assess a countervailing duty on shipments from the nine firms with zero or
de minimis assessment rates during the period of review, and to assess a countervailing duty on all other oil country
tubular goods from Canada entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption, on or after the date of the
suspension of liquidation, as indicated in the "Suspension of Liquidation" section of this notice.
This notice is published pursuant to section 705(d) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1671d(d)).

                                       (Cite as: 51 FR 15037, *15045)


Paul Freedenberg,

Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration.

April 16, 1986.

[FR Doc. 86-8959 Filed 4-21-86; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-M