DATE: July 31, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR: Paul Piquado
Assistant Secretary
for Import Administration

FROM: Christian Marsh
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations

SUBJECT: Final Determinations: Section 129 Proceedings Pursuant to the WTO Appellate Body’s Findings in WTO DS 379 Regarding the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China

I. SUMMARY

Consistent with section 129 of the URRAA, which governs the actions of the Department following adverse WTO dispute settlement reports, the Department is revising the determinations in the four AD and four CVD proceedings examined in WTO DS 379. We are revising the analysis underlying these determinations in accordance with findings in the relevant reports adopted by the WTO DSB.

More specifically, as part of this proceeding, as discussed in greater detail below, the Department has revised the CVD rates as well as its approach to certain analytical issues in the CWP, LWRPT, OTR Tires, and Sacks investigations. Additionally, the Department, as part of these proceedings, has made adjustments to the AD cash deposit rates determined in the less-than-fair value investigations of CWP, LWRPT, OTR Tires, and Sacks from the PRC in the manner described in the respective Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memoranda.¹

If the U.S. Trade Representative, after consulting with the Department and Congress, directs the Department to implement these determinations, in whole or in part, the revised AD cash deposit rates will apply to unliquidated entries of the subject merchandise that are entered, or withdrawn

¹See CWP Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memorandum; LWRPT Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memorandum; OTR Tires Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memorandum; and Sacks Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memorandum.
from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which the U.S. Trade Representative so directs.

Included at the end of this memorandum is an Attachment containing 1) a complete list of abbreviations and acronyms used in this memorandum and 2) a list of the Federal Register Notices, litigation, and other documents cited in the discussion of the issue.

II. ISSUES ADDRESSED PURSUANT TO WTO DS 379

Given the number and complexity of the issues involved, the Department addressed the DSB’s findings through separate preliminary determination memoranda with respect to each of the issues addressed in WTO DS 379. We have analyzed the factual information submitted to the records of these proceedings and the affirmative and rebuttal comments submitted by interested parties on the preliminary determinations in each of the section 129 proceedings. Because the loan benchmark and trading company issues were raised only in the context of the OTR Tires proceedings, those issues are addressed only in the final determination for the OTR Tires proceedings. Similarly, because the land specificity issue was raised only in the context of the Sacks CVD proceeding, we address that issue only in the final determination for the Sacks section 129 proceedings. Additionally, because the facts available issue pertains only to the CWP and LWRPT proceedings, that issue is addressed only in the final determinations for those section 129 proceedings. However, because the public bodies and double remedies issues are present in the proceedings covering CWP, LWRPT, OTR Tires, and Sacks, we have included in the final determinations for all eight of the proceedings the summary and Department’s positions regarding all comments filed on those issues across the eight investigations.

For purposes of the final determinations, we are addressing all issues related to the concurrent AD and CVD investigations covering OTR Tires in a single memorandum. For ease of reference, we provide separate Background and Discussion of the Issues sections for each issue addressed in WTO DS 379.

As a result of our analysis, we have not made any changes to the respective preliminary determinations. Consequently, the Department is adopting the findings and analyses in the preliminary determinations for its final determinations in these proceedings. With regard to the issue of public bodies in particular, this means the Department is adopting the findings and categorization of the input producers at issue as found in the proprietary attachments to the preliminary determination. The Department is also adopting as final the May 18, 2012, Public Bodies Memorandum.

LOAN BENCHMARKS

**Background:** The Department issued the preliminary determination regarding loan benchmarks and loan recalculations on April 6, 2012. Thereafter, we provided interested parties with an opportunity to submit affirmative and rebuttal comments. We received no comments on

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2 See OTR Tires Loans and Trading Companies Preliminary Determination.
this issue. Therefore, as discussed in detail in the OTR Tires Loans and Trading Companies Preliminary Determination, in light of the Panel’s findings and recommendations, we revised our U.S. dollar loan benchmark calculations by using daily LIBOR and BB corporate bond rates instead of the yearly averages used in the original determination. Because daily LIBOR and BB corporate bond rates are quoted for specific terms (e.g., one month, two months, one year), the Department selected rates with the terms most similar to GTC’s loans. For example, for a hypothetical six-month loan with an origination date of February 1, 2006, we would use the rates for a six-month LIBOR loan and a six-month BB corporate bond as quoted on February 1, 2006. The revisions to the calculations resulted in an insignificant change to the rate for this program that was determined in the original investigation. The rate for this program for GTC (the only respondent that had U.S. dollar loans) remains 1.87 percent. As we received no comments on our preliminary determination regarding this issue or any comments regarding our calculations, and as we have no other reason to reconsider our determination or calculations, we have made no changes to our preliminary analysis or calculations for this program.

TRADING COMPANIES

Background: The Department issued the preliminary determination regarding the trading companies on April 6, 2012. Thereafter, we provided interested parties with an opportunity to submit affirmative and rebuttal comments. The GOC submitted comments on the record of the OTR Tires CVD proceeding on April 13, 2012. The USW submitted rebuttal comments on the record of the OTR Tires CVD proceeding on April 18, 2012.

Discussion of the Issues

Comment 1: Whether The Department Failed To Investigate The Precise Role Of Trading Companies In Supplying Rubber To The OTR Tire Respondents

- The GOC claims that the Department improperly shifted the burden for investigating this issue by establishing a rebuttable presumption that trading companies were “simple, logistical intermediaries,” a presumption the GOC could rebut only by providing clear information indicating otherwise. In the GOC’s view, shifting the burden to the GOC contradicts the Panel’s directive to the Department “to investigate the precise role played by the trading companies.”

- Moreover, the GOC finds the Department’s conclusion regarding the nature of the trading companies at issue to be based on “unsubstantiated assumptions and errors of fact.” The GOC catalogs the Department’s errors as follows.

- The Department assumes that trading companies that sell on an ex-works basis do not take physical possession of the goods they sell; the Department should have undertaken a “deeper analysis.”

- The Department ignores the possibility that even though the trading companies might not have taken physical possession of the rubber they sold, they might still have purchased in

3 Id.
bulk, another scenario the Panel noted might cause distortions in the Department’s benefit calculations.

- The Department assumes that the ability of the trading companies to identify the producer of each shipment of rubber sold to the respondents indicates that they were not warehousing their rubber.
- The Department erroneously suggests that the Panel “pre-endorsed” both the finding regarding ex-works shipments and the finding regarding the ability of the trading companies to identify the producer of each shipment. The GOC contends that the Panel was merely offering examples of the types of facts the Department should investigate.
- The Department erroneously assumes that because two suppliers had low levels of registered capital, they were unlikely to have warehousing facilities and operations.
- The Department erroneously assumes that references to distributors as “agents” in a verification report indicate that those distributors were simply intermediaries; the verification report language is the Department’s own and is not a direct quote from any respondent official.
- The Department erroneously draws conclusions regarding all rubber transactions based on facts from only a minority of shipments.
- The USW asserts that, the Department properly relied on record evidence in the original investigation to determine that trading companies acted as simple logistical intermediaries in supplying rubber to the respondents.
- The USW disputes the GOC’s contention that it was given an undue burden to rebut an alleged presumption. The Department reached a conclusion supported by the facts on the record of the investigation and provided the GOC with an opportunity to present facts indicating otherwise.
- The USW argues the GOC provides no justification for its speculation that tire producers who seek rubber from known and qualified producers would purchase that rubber from trading companies that maintain inventories or purchase in bulk rather than from trading companies that act as simple logistical intermediaries.

**Department Position:** The Panel determined that, in certain circumstances, the calculations used by the Department to determine the benefit from the provision of rubber to tire producers might lead to distorted results. In the Panel’s view, whether the benefits calculated might be distorted depends on the role played by the trading companies in supplying rubber. For instance, if a trading company is a “distributor/stockist” or sold from purchases made in bulk, a time lag between when the trading company purchased from the producer and when it sold to the respondent might cause distortions if not taken into account in the calculations. By contrast, sales by trading companies that are “simple logistical intermediaries,” who never take possession of the rubber and simply facilitate trade between the producers and the respondents, would not cause such distortions. In a detailed analysis memorandum relied upon for the preliminary

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determination, the Department concluded from its analysis of the record in the original OTR Tire investigation that the trading companies that supplied the respondents are “simple logistical intermediaries,” such that our calculations in the OTR Tire investigation did not give rise to the calculation distortions about which the Panel was concerned. The Department then provided the GOC with the opportunity to provide information indicating that this conclusion was incorrect. The GOC provided no information and did not otherwise comment on the Trading Company Memorandum until the case brief it submitted on April 13, 2012. For the reasons given in the OTR Tires Loans and Trading Companies Preliminary Determination and in the Trading Company Memorandum, the Department continues to find that the record from the original investigation indicates that the trading companies supplying rubber to tire producers are “simple logistical intermediaries.”

As noted, the Department preliminarily determined that the record of the original investigation demonstrated that the trading companies at issue are simple logistical intermediaries, and not the distributor/stockists the Panel was concerned might cause distortions in our benefit calculations. The GOC does not cite a single fact in its comments to support the opposite conclusion: that the suppliers were warehousing the rubber they sold or were selling from bulk purchases. It also did not provide any information to support the opposite conclusion when it was given the opportunity to do so. Instead, the GOC’s comments focus solely on contesting what it considers to be unreasonable “assumptions” made by the Department in the Trading Company Memorandum.

Regarding the Department’s analysis of the ex-factory delivery terms and the ability of the respondents to provide detailed information concerning their producers, the GOC is incorrect that the Department simply accepted what the Panel offered as a possible interpretation of those facts without conducting any further analysis. The Department undertook its own evaluation of those facts, as demonstrated in the Trading Company Memorandum, as well as an evaluation of the remainder of the record from the original investigation. As a result, the Department concluded that a number of additional facts indicated that the trading companies are simple logistical intermediaries. For instance, the Department also relied on information concerning the size of the producers and information concerning the size and concentration of the rubber and tire industries in China.

The GOC disputes the Department’s conclusions regarding the significance of the respondents’ detailed knowledge of the producers by noting that tire producers, like steel producers, are very concerned with the origin of their merchandise, needing such information to assure themselves and their customers that their raw materials meet relevant chemical and quality standards. While we agree that there is evidence on the record indicating tire producers do have such concerns with the rubber they purchase, this fact seems only to support further the conclusion that the trading companies are merely agents facilitating logistics between parties who are already familiar with each other and the requirements of the transaction. They are acting on behalf of tire producers who already know exactly what materials they need and have no need to buy from

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5 See Trading Company Memorandum.
6 See Letter to GOC Regarding Trading Companies.
7 See Trading Company Memorandum at 2-4.
8 See id. at 3-4.
a supplier with its own inventory. In such a situation, it is a reasonable conclusion that the role of the trading company would be very slight indeed.9

The GOC also argues that the Department erred by focusing exclusively on whether or not the trading companies warehoused the rubber, without considering that the trading companies might be selling from purchases made in bulk, another circumstance which would undermine the Department’s calculation methodology. However, the disaggregated sales from bulk purchases in the Panel’s hypothetical are far less likely to give rise to the time lag that is at the heart of the Panel’s concerns with the Department’s benefit calculations in situations where the trading company does not take physical possession of the inventory.10 If the trading company is not warehousing the inventory, in the vast majority of cases, that implies it has found a purchaser willing to take delivery near in time to the original bulk purchase. The Department’s analysis of the record found no information indicating the existence of bulk purchase transactions that would give rise to the Panel’s concerns. Nor did the GOC, despite the opportunity granted to it, provide any information indicating that the sales to the respondents were made from bulk purchases.

Finally, the GOC criticizes the Department’s conclusion, drawn from references to some trading companies as “agents” and from the capital verification reports, that the trading companies at issue are simple logistical intermediaries. While we do not have data or facts tied to each specific transaction or each specific trading company, the facts that are on the record indicate that the trading companies are “agents.”11 Likewise, the record does not contain comprehensive information regarding the size of each trading company, but the information that does exist indicates that the trading companies are small companies which likely have only administrative capacities.12 Once again, we note that the GOC was given the opportunity to provide information demonstrating otherwise but did not do so.

In conclusion, given the evidence on the record regarding delivery terms, the size of the trading companies at issue, the terms used to describe those trading companies, the relative size of the rubber and tire industries in China, and the detailed information the respondents were able to report regarding the producers of the rubber they purchased, we continue to conclude, as detailed in the Trading Company Memorandum, that the trading companies at issue acted as simple logistical intermediaries in supplying rubber to the respondent tire producers. Accordingly, we

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9 In footnote 14 of the Trading Company Memorandum, the Department noted the highly concentrated nature of the rubber industry in China and the significance of the Chinese market in terms of global rubber consumption (it was the top consumer during the POI). Thus, Chinese tire producers, among the largest consumers, if not the largest consumer, of rubber in China are hardly unfamiliar with Chinese rubber producers and do not need the assistance of a firm acting in a retail-like capacity to supply them with rubber.

10 The time lag is between the trading company’s purchase from the producer and its sale to the respondent tire producer. During this lapse of time, market prices could fluctuate, giving rise to the Panel’s concerns with the Department’s calculations.

11 See Trading Company Memorandum at 3 for details.

12 The GOC includes in its case brief a discussion of the phrase “registered capital” and its meaning in China, emphasizing that registered capital is subject to minimum thresholds. The GOC seems to be implying that shareholders will simply contribute the minimum amount of capital needed to meet the threshold and no more; thus registered capital understates the size of an enterprise. While additional capital can be contributed through loans or accumulated through retained earnings, registered capital is equal to paid-in capital and is thus the total of all equity contributed to an enterprise by its shareholders – equity contributions are obviously a very important source of a firm’s capital and a reasonable measure of its size.
continue to make no changes to our methodology for calculating the benefits from the provision of rubber to the respondents.

PUBLIC BODIES

Background: The Department issued the preliminary determinations regarding public bodies on May 18, 2012. Thereafter, we provided interested parties with an opportunity to submit affirmative and rebuttal comments. The GOC submitted comments on June 1, 2012 on the record of all four CVD section 129 proceedings. On June 8, 2012, rebuttal comments were submitted by U.S. Steel and Wheatland Tube in the CWP CVD proceeding, the USW in the OTR Tires CVD proceeding, as well as by the LWS Committee in the Sacks CVD proceeding.

Discussion of the Issues

Comment 1: Conduct Of The Public Body Inquiry And The RPT

- The GOC argues that the Department’s conduct of the public body implementation proceeding was excessively burdensome.
- The GOC complains that the Department sought “unprecedented and excessive amounts of information” without informing the parties what evidence is relevant and what the Department’s analysis would be.
- It further complains that the Department unilaterally extended the RPT for implementation.
- Domestic interested parties rebut the GOC’s comments and argue that the Department’s conduct of the investigation was consistent with the Appellate Body report and the GOC’s arguments before the WTO.

Department Position: In the underlying WTO dispute, the Appellate Body articulated a new interpretation of the term “public body,” finding that a public body is “an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority.” Accordingly, the Department’s task in this proceeding has been to determine whether the producers in question possess, exercise or are vested with governmental authority. This is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires the Department to examine, among other things, the nature of Chinese government administration, the scope and extent of governmental functions in China, the government’s role in the economy, and individual circumstances of the producers at issue. As the Appellate Body stated, “just as no two governments are exactly alike, the precise contours and characteristics of a public body are bound to differ from entity to entity, State to State, and case to case.”

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13 See CWP Public Bodies and Facts Available Preliminary Determination Memorandum; LWRPT Public Bodies and Facts Available Preliminary Determination Memorandum; OTR Tires Public Bodies Preliminary Determination Memorandum, and Sacks Public Bodies Preliminary Determination Memorandum.
14 Domestic interested parties filed rebuttal comments to the GOC’s public body comments in each of the Sacks, OTR and CWP section 129 proceedings, but not in the LWRP proceeding. They addressed this particular argument by the GOC in the CWP and Sacks proceedings.
15 Appellate Body Report, para. 317.
16 Appellate Body Report, para. 317.
noted that “determining whether an entity is a public or private body may be a complex exercise...” \(^{17}\) It stated that the Department “was under an obligation to actively seek out information relevant to the analysis of whether a financial contribution had been made,” including “information relevant to the potential characterization of SIEs as public bodies.”\(^{18}\)

In the underlying dispute, the GOC took the position that it was not sufficient for the Department to base a public body determination exclusively on government control established through majority shareholding. On this point, the Appellate Body agreed with the GOC. The Department’s actions throughout this 129 proceeding have been consistent with, and responsive to, the Appellate Body’s decision. The Department sought information from the GOC and the Chinese respondents that was relevant to its public body analysis. The GOC complains that the Department’s requests were excessive, but these requests were informed by and consonant with the Appellate Body’s newly articulated standard.

While the Department acknowledges that the very fact intensive nature of the public body analysis required considerable effort by both itself and interested parties, such an effort was an inherent consequence of the “complex exercise” envisioned by the Appellate Body. The GOC further complains that the Department did not inform parties what evidence would be relevant. However, all parties were aware of the Appellate Body’s findings, and the relevant evidence is simply evidence pertinent to those findings. Moreover, our preliminary determination further sets out our analysis and the relevant evidence, and we made that preliminary determination available for comment. The GOC elected not to provide detailed comments on this analysis, instead presumably reserving its views for potential future WTO dispute settlement.

Regarding the RPT, we note that these particular section 129 proceedings involve eight administrative proceedings, multiple complex issues in addition to the Appellate Body’s new interpretation of the term “public body”, and extensive administrative records. From the beginning of the proceeding, the United States has explained that it would be a time-consuming process. The GOC itself even asked for several extensions for its questionnaire response in order to provide the information requested. As described elsewhere in this determination, and as reflected in the administrative records of each section 129 proceeding, the Department has worked diligently and in good faith to complete this proceeding in a reasonable period of time.

**Comment 2: The GOC’s Claim That The Outcome Was “Preordained”**

- The GOC argues that the findings of the Public Bodies Memorandum appear to have been preordained and do not address any of the factual statements and documentation provided by the GOC.
- A domestic industry party\(^{19}\) argues that the Department considered all record evidence and frequently relied upon evidence provided by the GOC.

**Department Position:** The Department’s findings were not “preordained.” The Department considered all record evidence in making its determinations. In fact, in the Public Bodies

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\(^{17}\) Appellate Body Report, para. 345.

\(^{18}\) Appellate Body Report, para. 344.

\(^{19}\) Only one domestic interested party, U.S. Steel in the CWP proceeding, addressed this issue.
Memorandum, the Department relied upon approximately 20 documents submitted by the GOC in these section 129 proceedings. Moreover, we have responded to arguments made by the GOC in its questionnaire responses and elsewhere on the record, the majority of which already were addressed in the Public Bodies Memorandum or in our preliminary determinations. To the extent the GOC objects to our reliance upon documents and sources not submitted by the interested parties, we note that the Department has long valued and often relied upon the perspective of expert, third-party sources (e.g., the World Bank, the OECD, academic experts, etc.). Rather than explain its views as to why such sources are objectionable, or to otherwise support its assertion regarding the Department’s conclusions, the GOC chose not to rebut any of the expert, third-party documents placed on the record by other parties, some of which were core sources for the Department’s findings.

Comment 3: Initiation Standards

- The GOC argues that the petitions in the underlying four CVD investigations lacked sufficient allegations and evidence that the input producers at issue were vested with governmental authority.

- According to the GOC, the Department’s initiation of the investigations of whether goods were provided for LTAR raised serious concerns under Article 11 of the SCM Agreement. The GOC argues that the Department should have terminated these investigations.

- Domestic interested parties’ arguments vary by investigation. Generally, they argue that the Department’s initiations are not a relevant issue in these section 129 proceedings.

- Domestic interested parties also argue that the Department had sufficient evidence on the record to justify initiating investigations into whether goods were provided to the respondents for LTAR.

Department Position: The Department’s initiations of investigations into whether the respondents received goods for LTAR were not challenged by China in the underlying WTO dispute. The DSB made no findings or recommendations regarding initiation and, consequently, these initiations are not at issue in these section 129 proceedings.

Comments Made Prior To The Preliminary Determination

In addition to responding to comments made by the interested parties in their case briefs on our Preliminary Determinations, we are also responding to certain comments and arguments raised by the GOC earlier in these section 129 proceedings. These comments and the Department’s responses are set forth below. Our decision to address these issues in no way relieves interested parties of their obligation under 19 CFR 351.309(c)(2) to present all arguments that, in their view, continue to be relevant to the Department’s final decision, including any arguments previously presented on the record. Normally, the Department in a final determination only addresses arguments raised in a case brief. However, because of the unique nature of this determination, and particularly in light of the GOC decision to provide only limited comments and its statement that it “will reserve for the appropriate forum – the DSB – its detailed views on

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20 Domestic interested parties provided rebuttal comments on this argument by the GOC in all section 129 proceedings except LWRPT.
the substance of the Department’s public body findings,” we are addressing certain other arguments and issues.

**Comment 4: The Relevance Of The Doctrine Of Sovereign Immunity To A Public Bodies Inquiry**

- In its Questionnaire Response, the GOC submits several documents which it states address the question of whether or not entities engaged in commercial activity are vested with or exercising government authority or government functions. These include the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2004), the European Convention on State Immunity, a 2008 Report Prepared for the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights titled “State Immunity and State-Owned Enterprises”, and an OECD Working Paper titled “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors.”

- The GOC also notes that neither the GOC nor Chinese SIEs have claimed sovereign immunity when subject to antitrust lawsuits in the United States, relying instead on claims of sovereign compulsion and the act of state doctrine.

**Department Position:** In the Department’s view, the issue of whether an entity can or does exercise a claim of sovereign immunity is not determinative of, or relevant to, the question of whether that entity is a public body. As stated by the Appellate Body, the test for whether an entity is a “public body” within the meaning of the SCM Agreement is whether it “possesses, exercises, or is vested with government authority.” The Department’s Public Bodies Memorandum discusses the application of this test in the instant proceeding. Whether an entity possesses sovereign immunity is a separate question. The GOC has not stated any rationale for how discussions of the international law of sovereign immunity or the particular exercise of such claims in antitrust lawsuits bear on the issue of whether an entity is a public body within the meaning of the SCM Agreement. In the Department’s view, consideration of such matters has little bearing on the Department’s analysis in its public body inquiry and thus did not merit discussion in the Preliminary Determination.

The legal concepts of “sovereign immunity” and “public body” are not comparable, nor is one instructive of the other. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is, as the name implies, a jurisdictional defense of immunity from civil and criminal lawsuits. Those entities entitled to claim sovereign immunity include entities that are clearly not “public bodies” under the SCM Agreement. Government agencies and organs are a prime example. Conversely, public bodies and even government agencies are not entitled to claim sovereign immunity in all cases, even when they clearly “possess, exercise, or are vested with government authority.”

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21 See The GOC’s February 21, 2012, Questionnaire Response for CWP at pages 14-15 (“GOC Questionnaire Response”). Identical statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at pages 14-15 in OTR Tires; page 14 for Sacks; and pages 14 for LWRPT.

22 Id. and Exhibits A-52 to A-55.

23 See CWP GOC Questionnaire Response at page 11. Identical statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at page 11 in OTR Tires; page 10 for Sacks; and pages 10 for LWRPT.

24 See Appellate Body Report, para. 317.
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity in general and in U.S. law in particular, foreign states are generally not entitled to claim sovereign immunity when the plaintiff’s claim is based on acts of commercial activity by the State. In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, the Supreme Court made clear that an activity may be considered “commercial” for purposes of sovereign immunity even where it was in pursuit of “fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives.” Thus, it is possible that an entity may “possess, exercise or be vested with government authority” (and thus be a public body), yet not be entitled to claim sovereign immunity. The fact that a government organ may not be entitled to claim, or chooses not to exercise a jurisdictional defense of, sovereign immunity because it is engaged in commercial activity thus has no bearing on whether the organ is properly considered to be part of the government. Similarly, the fact that an entity is engaged in commercial activity has no bearing on whether the entity is properly considered to be a public body.

Accordingly, it is not surprising that the GOC and Chinese SIEs have not attempted to claim sovereign immunity in U.S. antitrust lawsuits; whether such an entity is a government organ, a public body, or a private body, it would not be entitled to sovereign immunity for conduct stemming from its commercial activity. While the GOC has asserted that neither it nor its SIEs have claimed sovereign immunity in U.S. antitrust lawsuits, the Department finds that a failure to claim sovereign immunity in such circumstances has no bearing on whether such entities might be considered public bodies under the SCM Agreement.

Comment 5: Whether All Chinese Firms Are Legally Independent From The Government And Afforded Equal Legal Footing

- The GOC argues that a variety of laws provide Chinese firms with operational independence from the government. For example, with respect to the 2006 Company Law, the GOC argues that the law provides for the corporate governance structures for companies, defines the power of shareholders, the board of directors and the general manager of a company as well as “limits those matters subject to shareholder and board approval to significant matters,” regardless of the enterprises’ ownership type.

- Further, the GOC argues that the laws of China do not distinguish between private companies and state-owned companies, including with respect to the formation, governance and operations of companies under the Company Law, as well as with respect to rights, responsibilities and obligations under the Civil Law, the Criminal Law, the Bankruptcy

26 Id. at 614.
27 CWP GOC Questionnaire Response at page 6. Identical statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at page 6 OTR Tires; page 5 for Sacks; and pages 5 for LWRPT.
28 CWP GOC Questionnaire Response at pages 5, 6 and 13. Parallel statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at pages 5, 6 and 13 for OTR; pages 4, 5, and 12 for Sacks; and pages 5 and 13 for LWRPT.
Law\textsuperscript{29}, the Labor Law,\textsuperscript{30} the Enterprise Income Tax Law and the Interim Regulation of the PRC on Valued-Added Tax.\textsuperscript{31}

- The GOC argues that SIEs are subject to the competition laws including the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and are subject to the same scrutiny, for example, of mergers and acquisitions by the competition authorities as are private companies.\textsuperscript{32}

**Department Position:** As explained in the Public Bodies Memorandum, the Department’s review of the record evidence demonstrates that the Chinese legal regime governing the operation and equal treatment of Chinese SIEs is both complex and often times contradictory. The Department’s analysis weighed the totality of the record evidence with respect to the legal regime and the \textit{de facto} environment in which SIEs operate and concluded that certain Chinese SIEs are public bodies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement. Therefore, the Department’s analysis implicitly addressed the assertions made by the GOC in its questionnaire responses and the Public Bodies Memorandum accurately reflects this analysis for the purposes of the final determination.

To review that analysis, the Department notes for purposes of this final determination that many laws in China ostensibly provide for a certain level of commercial independence for economic actors and for equal treatment, regardless of ownership type. On the other hand, as noted in the Public Bodies Memorandum, many laws also explicitly provide for the protection and promotion of the state sector as well as explicitly and legally empower the government in China to play a pivotal role in ensuring that outcome.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, in China today, under the current legal and regulatory regime, there are procedures and regulations for the establishment and operations of firms that appear to be legally empowered to make independent decisions. However, the same legal and regulatory regime (in fact, in some cases, the same law, policy or regulation) also gives the State the legal authority and wide, unspecified latitude to control, influence or interfere in the operations or decisions of SIEs.

For example, the 2006 Company Law\textsuperscript{30} cited by the GOC provides SIEs with the apparent legal right and obligation to act as independent economic entities. However, the very same law also

\textsuperscript{29} CWP GOC Questionnaire Response at page 14. Parallel statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at page 14 for OTR; page 13 for Sacks; and page 13 for LWRPT.

\textsuperscript{30} CWP GOC Questionnaire Response at pages 7 and 8. Parallel statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at pages 7 and 8 for OTR; pages 6 and 7 for Sacks; and pages 6 and 7 for LWRPT.

\textsuperscript{31} CWP GOC Questionnaire Response at page 7. Parallel statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at page 7 for OTR; page 6 for Sacks; and page 6 for LWRPT.

\textsuperscript{32} CWP GOC Questionnaire Response at pages 10 and 11. Parallel statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at pages 10 and 11 for OTR; pages 9 and 10 for Sacks; and pages 9 and 10 for LWRPT.

\textsuperscript{33} Public Bodies Memorandum at page 6-8. In providing examples of the legal power and responsibilities of the government to guide the socialist market economy and uphold the leading role of the state-owned economy, the Public Bodies Memorandum also cites to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the 2007 Property Law of the People’s Republic of China, the 2008 Law on State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, the Tentative Measures for the Supervision and Administration of State-Owned Assets of Enterprises (2003) and the Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Forwarding the Guiding Opinions of the SASAC about Promoting the Adjustment of State-Owned Capital and the Reorganization of State-owned Enterprises (2006).
explicitly leaves open the possibility for the government to use a variety of levers to influence or control firms in a manner above and beyond the regulatory role normally reserved for a government in a market-economy. In that regard, article 1 of the 2006 Company Law states that, in addition to regulating the organization and operation of companies and protecting the interests of the relevant stakeholders, the law is also “formulated for the purposes of … maintaining the socialist economic order and promoting the development of the socialist market economy.” The law does not elaborate on how the otherwise legitimate rights of a (supposedly) independent firm would be adjudicated if they stood in opposition to the “socialist economic order” or the “socialist market economy.”

With respect to the GOC’s assertions regarding the laws governing mergers and acquisitions, there is record evidence that suggests that the implementation of China’s competition laws may be ineffective, in particular when they affect the state-owned sector. For example, the joint DRC/World Bank Report expresses some concerns with the law, stating that “[i]n its current version, the law lacks teeth” and “is not actionable, leaving enforcement as a voluntary matter for higher authorities.” The report goes on to state that “[t]he relevant provisions are explicitly subordinate to other laws and regulations, almost guaranteeing that they will be overridden.”

It also remains unclear how China will implement a provision that requires protection for the lawful operations of state-owned enterprises and government monopolies in industries deemed nationally important. Therefore, while SIEs may be subject to the same anti-monopoly law as other enterprises, implementation of the laws remains unclear and the continued administrative powers of agencies that are also deeply involved in industrial planning, such as the NDRC and SASAC itself, may hinder consistent application of the law across all enterprises. Further, as noted in the Public Bodies Memorandum, mergers and acquisitions (some forced by the government) have been found to be used by the government as a means to “manage competition” and hence, are not necessarily “commercial decisions made by shareholders and their boards” as asserted by the GOC.

As a general matter, the Department addressed the substance of the GOC’s arguments in its Public Bodies Memorandum through its analysis of the legal framework that governs China’s economy and enterprises as well as the reality on the ground regarding the role of the government in China’s economy. Moreover, in doing so, the Department relied on laws placed on the record by the GOC, as well as on expert, third-party sources placed on the record by parties (which the GOC chose not to rebut). Based on the record of this proceeding and in keeping with the broader findings of the Public Bodies Memorandum, we find that the legal regime governing SIEs in China does not isolate SIEs from significant state intervention. As

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34 China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society, the World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council of China (2012) (hereafter referred to as the joint DRC/World Bank Report) at page 119. As noted in footnote 37 of the Public Bodies Memorandum, the Department notes that this paper is still in “conference” form. Nevertheless, the Department also finds that the joint paper is informative and provides important insights into China’s economy and governance. In its press release for the report, the World Bank refers to the “key findings of a joint research report by a team from the World Bank and the Development Research Center of China’s State Council” -- without caveats regarding the finalization of the report -- stating further that these key findings “[lay] out the case for a new development strategy for China to rebalance the role of government and market, private sector and society, to reach the goal of a high income country by 2030.” See World Bank Press Release, “China: The Case for Change On the Road to 2030” (February 27, 2012).

35 Public Bodies Memorandum at pages 24-26.
noted above, the legal regime’s expectations of the pursuit of profit frequently conflict with requirements to fulfill state objectives.

Comment 6: Whether SASAC Acts As An “Institutional Firewall” Between The Government And SIEs

- The GOC argues that the 2006 Company Law does not expand SASAC’s rights beyond those normally enjoyed by shareholders under the Company Law and that SASAC was created to be an “institutional fire wall between the government ministries and offices performing traditional government function and the companies with government ownership.”

**Department Position:** The Department addressed these arguments fully in its Public Bodies Memorandum. The Department noted that Article 7 of the 2003 Tentative Measures for the Supervision and Administration of State-Owned Assets of Enterprises (the “Measures” that created SASAC) states that SASAC “shall not exercise the government’s function of administration of public affairs.” Nevertheless, the Department found that “the enterprises that SASAC supervises are not insulated from the control and influence of the government” and that the Measures state that SASAC was established for the purposes of meeting “the demand[s] of the socialist market economy, to further activate the state-owned enterprises, to promote the strategic adjustment of the layout and structure of the state-owned economy, to develop and strengthen the state-owned economy, and to try to maintain and increase the value of the state-owned assets.”

Further, the Department found that “despite the admonition in Article 7 of the 2003 Tentative Measures, the two Measures adopted in 2006 regarding investment plans and development strategies explicitly mandate that SASAC ensure consistency with government policy in the SIEs under its purview.”

In the context of the system of personnel appointments and career management in China, separation may also never be fully achieved until the government does not have legal rights over SIE appointments. The GOC notes that the document Guidance Opinions on Top Managers Appointment by the Board of Directors of Central Enterprises (2008) concerns “standards processes and procedures for top managers appointments by the Board of Directors of Central SASAC Enterprises” and that “this document has been classified as confidential and by law cannot be released until such classification is changed.” Apparently, this document is considered a state secret under the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State

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36 CWP GOC Questionnaire Response at pages 17-19. Parallel statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at pages 17-19 for OTR; page 16 - 18 for Sacks; and pages 17-19 for LWRPT.
37 Public Bodies Memorandum at page 27.
38 Id.
39 Public Bodies Memorandum at pages 26-27.
40 Described in the Public Bodies Memorandum and sources cited therein.
41 CWP GOC Questionnaire Response at page 5. Parallel statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at page 5 for OTR; page 4 for Sacks; and page 4 for LWRPT.
Secret\textsuperscript{42} which could indicate that appointment of top managers and directors is, in fact, a matter of state and not simply a typical “shareholder concern.”

**DOUBLE REMEDIES**

**Background:** The Department issued the preliminary determination regarding double remedies on May 31, 2012.\textsuperscript{43} At that time, the Department opened the record with respect to this issue and provided parties an opportunity to submit rebuttal factual information. On June 11, 2012, the USW submitted rebuttal factual information on the record of the OTR Tires CVD proceeding.

Thereafter, we provided interested parties with an opportunity to submit affirmative and rebuttal comments. On June 15, 2012:

- Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO submitted comments in the CWP, LWRPT, OTR Tires, and Sacks AD and CVD proceedings;
- The GOC submitted comments in the CWP, LWRPT, OTR Tires, and Sacks CVD proceedings;
- The LWS Committee submitted comments in the Sacks AD and CVD proceedings;
- U.S. Steel submitted comments in the CWP AD and CVD proceedings;
- The USW submitted comments in the OTR Tires CVD proceeding;
- Wheatland Tube submitted comments in the CWP AD and CVD proceedings.

On June 20, 2012:

- Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO submitted rebuttal comments in the CWP, LWRPT, OTR Tires, and Sacks AD and CVD proceedings;
- The LWS Committee submitted comments in the Sacks CVD proceeding;
- Titan submitted rebuttal comments in the OTR Tires CVD proceeding;
- U.S. Steel submitted rebuttal comments in the CWP CVD proceeding;
- Wheatland Tube submitted rebuttal comments in the CWP CVD proceeding.

**Discussion of the Issues**

**Comment 1:** Whether The WTO AB Decision Found That Concurrent Application Of The NME AD Methodology And CVD Necessarily Results In A “Double Remedy” And Whether An Adjustment Is Required Absent Positive Evidence That Subsidies Lowered Export Prices

\textsuperscript{42} CWP GOC Supplemental Questionnaire Response at page 1. Parallel statements are found in the GOC’s questionnaire responses in the other Section 129 proceedings at page 1 for OTR; page 1 for Sacks; and page 1 for LWRPT.

\textsuperscript{43} For double remedies the Department released the following preliminary memoranda: the respective Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda (i.e., CWP Preliminary DR Estimation Memorandum; LWRPT Preliminary DR Estimation Memorandum; OTR Tires Preliminary DR Estimation Memorandum; and the Sacks Preliminary DR Estimation Memorandum) and the Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memoranda.
The LWS Committee, the USW and Wheatland Tube assert that the WTO AB concluded that double remedies do not necessarily result from the concurrent application of duties calculated pursuant to the NME AD methodology and CVDs.

Rather, the LWS Committee, U.S. Steel, Titan and the USW contend, pursuant to the WTO AB and the statute, the Department must conduct a sufficiently diligent investigation to determine whether and to what extent domestic subsidies lowered export prices and base its decision on the relevant record facts.44

**Department Position:** The Department does not dispute the above characterization of the WTO AB Report. The WTO AB Report only found that “double remedies would likely result from the concurrent application of anti-dumping duties calculated on the basis of an NME methodology and countervailing duties” and stated that it was “not convinced that double remedies necessarily result in every instance of such concurrent application of duties.”45 In numerous prior determinations, including those subject to the WTO DS 379 dispute, the Department has similarly questioned the notion that concurrent application of NME ADs and CVDs automatically results in a 100 percent overlap of the two remedies, particularly in the absence of supporting evidence.46

However, as the Department summarized in its preliminary determinations, the WTO AB did find that “the Department did not attempt ‘to establish whether or to what degree it would offset the same subsidies twice by imposing antidumping duties calculated under its NME methodology, concurrently with countervailing duties.’”47 It was by virtue of not undertaking such an inquiry in the four sets of investigations subject to the dispute that the Department was found by the WTO AB to have acted inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Article 19.3 and, by consequence, Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. Similarly, the applicable U.S. statute, section 777A(f)(1) of the Act, does not mandate that the Department always make an adjustment regardless of the factual circumstances, but does require that the Department make an adjustment when certain conditions are met.

In these proceedings conducted pursuant to section 129 of the URRAA, the Department has now engaged in the necessary inquiry to implement the findings of the WTO AB as well as to comply with the applicable statute. Specifically, the Department has relied upon information placed on the record by the GOC and respondent parties – including information about how certain purchases of inputs were booked in the direct raw materials inventory at the cost of acquisition – to conclude that certain adjustments to AD cash deposit rates are warranted pursuant to section 777A(f) of the Act.48 Importantly, the Department has not concluded in this determination or elsewhere that concurrent application of NME ADs and CVDs necessarily and automatically

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45 Id. (original emphasis).
48 See id. at 7-10.
results in overlapping remedies. A finding that there is an overlap in remedies, and any resulting adjustment, requires that the Department conduct a fact-based inquiry which, consistent with the ruling of the WTO AB, the Department has done as part of this proceeding.

Comment 2: Whether There Is A Basis To Apply An Offset To The AD Cash Deposit Rates.

A. Whether The Burden Of Demonstration Is On Respondents And Whether Respondents Have Met That Burden

• U.S. Steel, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube all contend that respondents have the burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to an adjustment for a double remedy. As a general matter, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube point out that the SAA and the Department’s regulations both place the burden of proof on the respondent or the entity which is seeking an adjustment.\(^{49}\)

• In this particular case, U.S. Steel, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube maintain that respondents in their respective proceedings did not meet this burden. Specifically, no entity provided evidence of double counting in the underlying investigation or in these section 129 proceedings.

• Moreover, the LWS Committee, Titan, U.S. Steel, the USW and Wheatland Tube point out that the Department provided ample opportunity for the respondents to do so. Specifically, despite the Department’s multiple requests for information during these section 129 proceedings, no party provided evidence that domestic subsidies affected CWP, LWRPT, OTR Tires or sacks export prices during the relevant period.\(^{50}\)

  o U.S. Steel further asserts that the GOC did not support its claims that potentially relevant cost data might be contained within the underlying CWP AD investigation record.

  o Titan and the USW highlight that the GOC failed to provide information regarding short-run pricing dynamics, how specific cost accounting categories are impacted by subsidies, and which of these costs, if any, factor into pricing in the short run.

  o Similarly, U.S. Steel notes that the GOC’s general understanding of basic economics (i.e., that producers generally seek to set prices at a level that will cover at least their long-run costs) does not address the prices of the specific imports at issue in the section 129 proceedings on CWP.

• The domestic producers in each of the respective AD and CVD segments conclude that the Department should not apply a double remedy adjustment to the AD cash deposit rates because respondents have not met their burden of demonstrating that a countervailable subsidy reduced the average price of imports of the class or kind of merchandise at issue during the relevant period.


\(^{50}\) Citing the GOC’s April 11 and 25, 2012, questionnaire responses, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube point to the GOC’s failure to fully respond to certain sections of the Department’s questionnaires regarding short-run price dynamics in their respective proceedings.
Department Position: The Department has determined that for the purposes of this proceeding respondent parties have met their respective burdens to receive an adjustment to their AD cash deposit rates pursuant to section 777A(f) of the Act.

As correctly stated by domestic producers, the burden is on a respondent to demonstrate its entitlement to a particular adjustment.51 The unique nature of these particular section 129 proceedings, however, placed certain limitations on the Department’s ability to solicit and receive information from parties with respect to any alleged overlap of AD and CVD remedies. As explained in the Department’s preliminary determinations, uncertainty accompanying the GPX litigation at the Federal Circuit as well as questions regarding the Department’s authority under domestic law to come into compliance with the DSB’s findings and recommendations compressed an already short time frame available to the Department to complete this proceeding.52 Because section 777A(f) of the Act was enacted only in March 2012,53 the Department had little time or flexibility to develop and hone its practice in applying the new law for the first time in these proceedings. To the extent that such constraints may have limited the Department’s ability to make follow-up requests for information from the GOC or other interested parties, the Department was nevertheless able to supplement the record with publicly available information such as the CLSA Report and HSBC Report to aid in its economic analysis.54

Despite those constraints, the GOC and respondent parties did provide information necessary to the Department’s determinations to make adjustments under section 777A(f) of the Act as part of these proceedings. As noted in the Department’s preliminary determinations, the GOC’s questionnaire responses permitted the Department to identify a high degree of similarity in industry conditions across a disparate group of manufactured products so that information provided by the GOC could be understood to be representative of China’s manufacturing sector as a whole.55 Furthermore, the Department relied upon information from respondent parties submitted during the underlying investigations to establish a link between a subsidy, variable cost, and price that is central to the Department’s analysis under section 777A(f)(1)(B) of the Act.56 In conjunction with additional record evidence establishing a correlation between changes in input costs and changes in output prices, information provided by the parties as to the manner in which subsidized inputs were booked has demonstrated the relationship between certain types of subsidies and export prices during the POI in the context of these section 129 proceedings.

B. Whether The Department’s Analysis Meets The Statutory Criteria For An Adjustment Because It Is Not Based On Industry-Specific Information

- The LWS Committee maintains that the Department has consistently held that domestic subsidies do not necessarily have an impact on export prices, and U.S. Steel similarly

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51 See SAA at 829; 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(b)(1); Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
52 See Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda at 7 (citing GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“GPX”)).
54 See, e.g., Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda at Attachment 1.
55 See id. at 8, n.43.
56 See id. at 9, n.47.
contends that the Department has long recognized that concurrent application of the NME AD methodology and CVDs does not necessarily result in a double remedy.

- According to the LWS Committee, Allied Tube, TMK, Wheatland Tube and the USW, section 777A(f)(1) of the Act directs the Department to make an adjustment to the antidumping cash deposit rates in the following narrowly defined circumstances: when (1) a “countervailable subsidy has been demonstrated to have reduced the average price of imports of the class or kind of merchandise during the relevant period,” and (2) the Department “can reasonably estimate the extent to which the countervailable subsidy... has increased the weighted average dumping margin for the class or kind of merchandise.”

- Allied Tube, TMK and the USW assert that the Department’s current analysis does not fulfill the first of these two conditions because it does not demonstrate that the subsidies provided led to reduced export prices in the industries covered by these section 129 proceedings.

- Titan and the USW contend that because the Department was unable to uncover any evidence that domestic subsidies to the OTR Tires industry reduced that industry’s export prices, the Department improperly provided an adjustment for input subsidies based on evidence concerning the existence of a “cost-price link” in China during the relevant period.

- U.S. Steel asserts that the Department relied on national rather than industry data because the GOC refused to provide industry data and contends that the GOC’s failure to provide the requisite data does not constitute a lawful basis for the Department to depart from the statute, which mandates an industry-specific analysis. Titan and the USW assert that the lack of evidence regarding the effect of any subsidies to OTR tire producers on that industry’s export prices makes any adjustment both unnecessary under the AB’s findings and unjustifiable under the statute. Similarly, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube conclude that because the Department’s preliminary determination is not based on industry-specific data, it does not provide a reasonable basis to estimate the extent of any reduction in export prices resulting from a subsidy pass-through.

**Department Position:** The Department disagrees with domestic producers’ contentions that its determinations are not based upon industry-specific information. As an initial matter, domestic producers overstate the Department’s historical position with respect to the effect of domestic subsidies on prices. While it is correct that the Department has long contested the notion that concurrent application of AD and CVD remedies on imports from NME countries automatically results in a 100 percent overlap of remedies in every instance, the Department has otherwise pointed to the complexity of the relationship between subsidies and prices when presented with arguments that subsidies lower prices and, consistent with section 771(5)(C) of the Act, has generally refrained from speculating about the effect of a subsidy. To the extent that the Department has made any categorical statements “when it has considered the issue, the Department has sometimes presumed that, whatever the effect, if any, of domestic subsidies upon the prices subsequently charged by their recipients, that effect would be the same for

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58 See, e.g., OTR Tires from China Final LTFV Determination and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum at Comment 2.
domestic prices and export prices.”59 It is for this reason that the Department has recognized the potential of some overlap in remedies with respect to domestic subsidies through concurrent application of ADs and CVDs, but has required an evidentiary showing before considering any possible adjustment or offset.60 It is this same reasoning that permeates the AB’s conclusion that the United States did not undertake the proper inquiry with respect to the double remedy issue in the underlying investigations giving rise to the dispute in WTO DS 379:

When the Department calculates a dumping margin in an anti-dumping investigation involving a product from an NME country, it compares the export price to a normal value that is calculated based on surrogate costs or prices from a third country. Because prices and costs in the NME country are considered unreliable, prices (or, more commonly, costs of production) in a market economy country are used as the basis for calculating normal value. In the dumping margin calculation, the Department compares the product’s constructed normal value (not reflecting the amount of any subsidy received by the producer) with the product’s actual export price (which, when subsidies have been received by the producer, is presumably lower than it would otherwise have been). The resulting dumping margin is thus generally considered to be based on an asymmetric comparison and is generally higher than would otherwise be the case.61

Hence, the “double remedies” theory adopted by the DSB presumes that domestic subsidies tend to have a symmetrical effect on normal value and export prices and that symmetrical effect is presumed to be a reduction to both components of the dumping comparison. Under this theory, the use of surrogate values under the NME AD methodology disrupts that symmetry because normal value presumably is no longer affected, i.e., reduced, by domestic subsidies.

Section 777A(f)(1)(B) of the Act requires a demonstration that a countervailable subsidy has “reduced the average price of imports of the class or kind of merchandise during the relevant period.” Evidence on the record of these proceedings demonstrates a correlation between changes in input costs and changes in output prices.62 To the extent that certain types of subsidies have been shown to reduce input costs in an industry in the short run, the Department concludes that, in the context of these section 129 proceedings and consistent with the presumption of the AB, the effect of subsidies upon export prices would be a corresponding reduction to some degree.63

In response to the argument that the Department is relying upon national data rather than industry-specific data in its analysis, the Department has used these data to augment its analysis in light of some of the constraints endemic to these section 129 proceedings that are discussed above.64 The record contains industry-specific evidence submitted by the GOC that provides a

59 Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China, 72 FR 60632 (October 25, 2007) and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum at Comment 2.
60 See, e.g. id.
61 WTO AB Report at para. 542 (emphasis added).
62 See Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda at 8-9 & Attachment 1.
63 As noted it the preliminary determination, the Department reaches this conclusion with the expectation that, as with all aspects of the Department’s practice, our administration and understanding of section 777A(f) of the Act will likely evolve with time and experience.
64 See Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda at 7-9.
reasonable basis to conclude that industry conditions were similar enough to rely on data pertaining to the Chinese manufacturing sector as a whole.\(^65\) Thus, the Department is making use of industry-specific data as well as national data, but has clearly identified the connection between the two sets of information and the rationale for using both in the context of these section 129 proceedings.

**Comment 3: Whether The Department Correctly Framed Its Pass-Through Analysis**

**A. Whether The Department Correctly Limited Its Analysis To Input Subsidies**

- The GOC contends that the Department has no basis for limiting its analysis to alleged input subsidies because:
  - The Department presents no evidence or rationale in support of its determination to limit its analysis to alleged input subsidies.
  - The Department’s reliance on the CLSA Report is unfounded because nothing in that document supports the proposition that pricing decisions are affected only by changes in variable costs.
  - The Department does not define variable costs.
  - The Department does not define the cost-price link, or explain the role of the cost-price link in how double remedies arise in NME cases.

- Rebutting the GOC’s position, U.S. Steel contends that the Department properly declined to find any pass-through effects for subsidies other than input subsidies because the GOC failed to provide evidence to support its claim that the pass-through effect was not just limited to inputs. Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO, Titan and the USW also assert that the Department appropriately did not attribute a reduction in export prices to other subsidies.

- Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO contend that subsidies of different kinds may have many different effects, and different magnitudes in relationship to the government’s financial contribution and provide a number of examples to that effect.

- U.S. Steel alleges that the GOC misinterpreted the Department’s reliance on the CL report. Rather than relying on the report to support the proposition that pricing decisions are only affected by changes in variable costs, U.S. Steel concludes the Department relied on this report because it identified variable cost changes, and suggested that there might be a link between variable costs and prices.

- Contrary to the GOC’s claims, U.S. Steel, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube assert that the Department did not find any pass-through for other types of subsidies because it found no evidence on the record with respect to other subsidies and the cost categories they might impact.

- U.S. Steel, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube conclude that this lack of evidence is the responsibility of the GOC for failing to provide such evidence in response to the Department’s numerous and specific requests.

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\(^65\) See id. at 8, n.43 (citing GOC questionnaire responses).
**Department Position:** The Department disagrees with the GOC that the evidence on the record does not support limiting the pass-through analysis to input subsidies that affect variable costs. As an initial matter, the Department agrees with U.S. Steel and similar comments from Wheatland Tube and the LWS Committee that the record lacked affirmative evidence that any other type of subsidy affected pricing behavior and that the GOC failed to provide evidence to support its claim that the pass-through effect was not just limited to inputs. The Department also disagrees with the GOC statement that the CLSA Report does not support the proposition that pricing decisions are affected only by changes in variable costs. As the Department noted in its preliminary determinations, the CLSA Report finds that manufacturers in China changed output prices in response to increases in input costs over the previous month, and that only part of the cost increases were passed on to customers in the form of higher selling prices. The analysis in the CLSA Report does not extend to the relationship between changes in other types of costs and changes in output prices. Nor did the GOC proffer any affirmative data that would shed light on such an analysis. Therefore, as noted by U.S. Steel, the CLSA Report constitutes record evidence to support a link between costs and prices based on actual data and that link is focused on the relationship between changes in output prices and changes in input costs, i.e., variable costs.

While the Department did not explicitly define “variable costs,” the Department did consider carefully which subsidy programs on each record would affect the costs that were captured in the CLSA Report’s analysis. The Department found that direct raw materials constitute a variable cost of production and, for reasons described above, limited its pass-through analysis to those subsidies that affected such costs. Moreover, as noted by U.S. Steel, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube, the GOC provided no subsidy-cost mapping, alternative framework or definitions; nor did it otherwise provide any rebuttal factual information that calls into question the reasonableness of the variable cost-price finding in the Department’s preliminary determinations.

**B. Whether The RCT Provides The Proper Basis To Assess The Extent Of Pass-Through**

- The GOC argues that the Department’s RCT does not provide a basis to evaluate the extent to which subsidies passed through to prices.
  - The GOC claims that the Department’s adjustment methodology compares the ratio of change between the purchasing price index (CNPIIY) and the PPI (CHEFTYOY). Thus, the GOC maintains, in any given period, if the CNPIIY declined by six and the PPI declined by three, the Department’s approach would yield the result that 50 percent of the decline in input prices was passed through in the form of lower sales prices \((3/6 = .5)\). However, the GOC maintains that comparing rates of change in this manner does not indicate how much of a subsidy was passed through to the consumer in the form of lower prices.
  - Rather, the GOC contends, the Department should compare absolute changes in costs and prices. According to the GOC, when a producer lowers the sales price by the full amount of the subsidy, the Department’s methodology finds that only a portion of the subsidy
passes through to the export price, when according to the GOC, the entire amount of the subsidy passes through.66

- Therefore, the GOC claims that the Department’s RCT provides no insight into the price effects of subsidies and, for that reason, is irrelevant to the double remedy inquiry even if one accepts the mistaken proposition that the double remedy occurs entirely on the price side of the dumping comparison.

- The GOC alleges that the Department’s finding that only 63 percent of the alleged input subsidies passed through to the price of subject merchandise is contrary to the rationale for imposing countervailing duties in the full amount of the subsidy.

- The LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube assert that the GOC’s argument that the Department’s assumption regarding the percentage of subsidies retained by PRC producers is erroneous, fails because the GOC offers no evidence to demonstrate that the Sacks or CWP industries, respectively, were price sensitive to the extent that a decrease in cost would result in lower prices. Moreover, they contend, the GOC’s arguments are not supported by economic theory.

- Furthermore, Titan and the USW contend, the GOC’s claims that, in its calculations, the Department should have examined the relationship between absolute costs and prices rather than the rate of change in costs and prices to estimate the extent of pass-through is based on a flawed assumption that input subsidies pass through completely in the form of lower prices, an assumption that, as reviewed above, is not merited as a legal matter under the AB’s findings or U.S. law and that is not supported as a factual matter on the record of this proceeding.

- Titan and the USW proffer that the GOC’s reasoning that prices decline absolutely by as much as the absolute decline in a single input cost, and that such absolute price declines demonstrate a pass-through ratio of 100 percent, is circular. Titan and the USW argue that this conclusion erroneously stems from an assumption that the decline in price is due solely to the decline in input cost as a result of a subsidy, when there could be any number of factors that could have also affected the price decline. Thus, they argue that the absolute figures for one input and overall price are meaningless when compared to one another in isolation.

**Department Position:** As explained in the preliminary determinations, the Department in these proceedings has relied on the extent of manufacturing sector-level pass-through of (variable) cost inflation as a proxy for the extent of subsidy pass-through. For that purpose, the Department used data available from Bloomberg, where the data was reported as a percentage year-on-year change in index values, to measure rates of input cost and price inflation.67 The Department’s use of the indexes in this manner is consistent with the analysis typically done at the aggregate

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66 Specifically, the GOC provides an example where a producer receives a subsidy of 15 percent, which is passed on to the consumer in full. According to the GOC, the Department’s methodology determines the percentage change in the price and the producer’s input cost, then divides the percentage change of the export price by the percentage change of the input price. Because the value of the original pre-subsidy export price is higher than the producer’s pre-subsidy input cost, the relative percentage change in the export price will be smaller than the change in the input price, when the absolute value of the subsidy is applied to both.

67 See Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda at Attachment 2.
level to understand how input cost changes are passed through to the price of the ex-factory product.\textsuperscript{68}

Moreover, the GOC provided no rebuttal factual information that could have provided an alternative estimate of the extent of subsidy pass-through apart from its constructed example. The GOC in these proceedings provided no affirmative cost or pricing evidence on any basis – firm-, industry-, or sector-specific – that substantiates a claim of full subsidy pass-through. All of the information on the record of this proceeding—the CLSA Report, manufacturing sector cost-price data, and HSBC Report\textsuperscript{69}—provide positive evidence to the contrary and further corroborate the reasonable estimate in the Department’s preliminary determinations. With respect to the GOC’s argument that any pass-through estimation less than 100 percent is contrary to the rationale underlying the countervailing duty law, the Department notes that the GOC cites no legal authority to support its claim. Furthermore, the CVD law does not require the administering authority to assess the extent to which a subsidy passes through to price for purposes of assessing the CVD.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{C. Whether The Department Should Further Refine Its Pass-Through Analysis To Focus On The Specific Inputs In Question}

- The USW maintains that, if the Department makes a double remedy adjustment in its final determinations, it should use the following method to estimate pass-through effects that are specific to the class or kind of merchandise at issue on both the cost and price side and that are specific to U.S. imports on the price side.
  - Record the U.S. import prices of natural rubber, synthetic rubber and OTR Tires for the period covering the POIs of the AD and CVD investigations (January 2006 through March 2007).\textsuperscript{71}
  - Calculate the percentage change \((\frac{B-A}{A})\) for each month compared to the January 2006 import price for natural rubber, synthetic rubber and OTR Tires.\textsuperscript{72}
  - Calculate the ratio \((\frac{B}{A})\) between the change in rubber input cost and the change in tire import price for each month of the antidumping POI for natural and synthetic rubber.
  - Calculate an average ratio for the antidumping POI as a whole\textsuperscript{73} to arrive at an estimated pass-through ratio of 41.85 percent for natural rubber and 13.07 percent for synthetic rubber.

- The USW maintains that, if the Department employs this alternative methodology, it must acknowledge that any methodology used in these proceedings is limited to the unique and expedited circumstances of this proceeding, that it does not constitute the establishment of agency practice, and that the Department’s approach in this area will continue to evolve with time and experience.

\begin{itemize}
  \item See Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda at Attachment 3.
  \item See Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda at Attachments 1, 2, 4, and 5.
  \item See section 771(5)(C) of the Act.
  \item See USW Section 129 Comments at 14.
  \item See id. Comments at 15.
  \item Id.
\end{itemize}
Department Position: As explained, a detailed analysis of the relationship between changes in the specific input costs in question and the output prices of the subject merchandise was not possible in the context of the truncated time period of these section 129 proceedings. For example, in the OTR Tires proceedings, there are multiple types of rubber inputs that are utilized in the production of OTR Tires. While, given sufficient time and information, the Department might have been able to aggregate these input costs for each respondent, the USW did not propose any method or provide any basis for doing so. Further, the Department may need to assess the effect of varying utilization rates in production in order to properly apply the appropriate pass-through rates. The Department continues to consider the RCT based on manufacturing sector data as a reasonable estimate for each industry’s input costs, given the time and data constraints that were present in these proceedings.

D. Whether Aggregate Cost-Price Changes Are A Reasonable Estimate Of The Subsidy-Variable Cost-Price Linkage In These Proceedings

- The LWS Committee, Wheatland Tube and the USW assert that the aggregate PPI for the manufacturing sector in the PRC is not an appropriate proxy for changes in export prices to the United States because it covers all goods and the conditions prevalent in China’s overall manufacturing sector and, hence, may not necessarily reflect the individual conditions of the industries subject to these section 129 proceedings. For example, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube suggest that the impact of cost increases on all PRC ex-factory prices may be far greater than the impact of cost increases on PRC export prices and the USW maintains that the conditions may differ if a particular industry has received countervailable subsidies or the merchandise being sold to the United States is dumped.

- The USW and Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO aver that the cost and price indexes used in the Department’s analysis reflect only an estimate of the impact that increases in variable costs have on increased prices, but do not reflect the impact of input price declines caused by subsidies.

- The LWS Committee, U.S. Steel and Wheatland Tube further claim that the Department’s approach is based on data that show how firms in the PRC respond to industry-wide changes in variable costs, which may be different from the way in which they respond to input subsidies specific to an individual firm. From this, they conclude that the methodology reflects an upward bias.

- More specifically, the LWS Committee asserts that, contrary to the GOC’s assertion, record evidence suggests that Chinese sacks producers’ prices did not cover costs during the POI. Thus, there is no reason to assume that respondent Aifudi’s pricing was based on its costs.

- The USW concludes that aggregate input cost increases (such as rises in the price of energy or a major input) affect all producers in an industry similarly, whereas the impact of subsidies, which reduce costs for particular producers, is much more variable.

Department Position: The Department continues to find that the variable cost-price link, as measured by the RCT in these proceedings, is consistent with section 777A(f)(1)(C) of the Act.

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74 See Preliminary Surrogate Value Memorandum, dated February 5, 2008, at Attachment II.
and is a reasonable estimate of the extent to which subsidies that impacted variable cost passed through to prices. The Department recognizes that there may be a range of other factors which may warrant further consideration as the Department refines its analytical framework in future proceedings and gains greater experience in implementing section 777A(f) of the Act. The Department, however, must carefully weigh the benefits of collecting all potentially relevant information against the administrative challenges of identifying, collecting, analyzing, and verifying this data.

As noted in the preliminary determinations, the Department initially focused its analysis at the industry level in these section 129 proceedings in recognition of the possibility that there might be variations in accounting practices or other export market dynamics that were industry-specific. The Department determined, however, that the industry-level information provided by the GOC was reasonably similar across all four industries in the section 129 proceedings, which covered the same period of time and spanned a highly disparate group of manufactured products. The Department also explained that in light of the compressed schedule of these section 129 proceedings after passage of Public Law 112-99, there was insufficient time for the Department to make further inquiries of the GOC or conduct a de novo investigation of individual firms, including with respect to industry- or firm-specific price and cost data, which may have provided a basis to further refine the pass-through estimate.

The LWS Committee, Wheatland Tube and the USW also argue that increased aggregate material costs and their effect on ex-factory prices may not provide an exact proxy for subsidy pass-through, particularly in the case where subsidies affect one of many costs incurred by a firm. We acknowledged as much in our preliminary determinations, stating that:

The extent of input price inflation pass-through is an inexact proxy for the extent of subsidy pass-through, not only because input price inflation and subsidies push cost in opposite directions, but because the impact of input price inflation may be more uniform and systemic in nature.

However, putting the feasibility of such a detailed analysis aside, the records of these expedited section 129 proceedings do not provide a reliable basis for increasing the precision of the reasonable estimate to accommodate such firm-specific refinements in the manner proposed by domestic producers.

**E. Whether And To What Extent The Department Should Account For Market Dynamics In Its Pass-Through Analysis Framework**

- The GOC alleges that the Department presents no evidence in support of its conclusion that Chinese producers retain any of the alleged input subsidies rather than passing them through to the price. Rather, the GOC asserts, producers in competitive markets tend to compete away any temporary advantage that they obtain from lower costs by passing anything that reduces their cost to the consumers in the form of lower prices.

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76 See Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda at 8.
77 See id. at 7-8
78 Id. at 10.
The GOC argues that the Department’s presumption that a producer who has lower costs can retain a significant portion of the cost reduction implies that the producer possesses market power. According to the GOC, the Department presented no evidence that competitive conditions in the industries subject to these section 129 proceedings support its conclusion that the Chinese producers in these industries had the market power to retain more than one-third of the value of the input subsidies they received.

Further, the GOC asserts that the products at issue here are commodity products and that the relevant industries comprise many different producers who compete on price. Under such conditions, the GOC avers, one expects producers to compete away any reduction in input costs and there is no evidence on the record to support the Department’s assumption to the contrary.

Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO disagree with the GOC’s argument that in a competitive industry in a free market, none of the companies will be able to “retain” any subsidy because they will tend to “compete away” any temporary advantage that they obtain from having lower costs. According to Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO, there are many potential effects of subsidies other than being passed through to export price or being kept as profits.

For these reasons, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO urge the Department not to make any adjustment to the antidumping duties in these cases to account for alleged double counting. In any case, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO argue that the Department should reject the GOC’s suggestion that the Department increase the adjustment.

Titan and the USW also contend that the economic theories put forth by the GOC fail to justify an assumption of 100 percent pass-through, arguing that, even in a competitive market, firms may have an incentive to retain much or all of their cost reductions without passing them through in the form of lower prices if their competitors have not experienced similar cost declines.

Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO refute the assumption of a uniform pass-through rate that is applicable across all markets, including the domestic market, arguing that the pass-through effects differ in different markets.

Changes to Chinese raw material prices have a greater impact on domestic output prices than on export prices because exports are sold into separate foreign markets where prices are determined primarily by foreign market conditions, not Chinese supply considerations.

A change in the Chinese producers’ input costs affects how much output Chinese producers are willing to supply at any given price, which in turn has an effect on Chinese supply and, therefore, on Chinese price.

Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO argue that prices in every country are determined by supply and demand so that changes in costs affect the quantity of output producers are willing to supply. They present a number of hypothetical examples explaining how the provision of a subsidy (e.g., the provision of steel to Chinese manufacturers of steel pipes at a 50 percent discount) would result in varying degrees of increased production and shipments, and price reductions.

Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO request that the Department forego a pass-through adjustment in these cases, or modify its adjustment to account for the relevant import market share.
Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO argue that the general increases in Chinese input costs were not passed through to Chinese export prices since Chinese domestic input costs were rising at the same time that the prices of U.S. imports were falling.  

Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO maintain that any impact would be smaller in the United States than in China because market conditions are different and there are other potential sources of supply in the United States that do not exist in China.

Therefore, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO argue that the Department would achieve more industry-specific pass-through calculations by multiplying the Chinese domestic RCT by the percentage market share of each subject product in the U.S. market for each industry.

The USW argues that unique aspects of competition in export markets limit the ability of producers to pass on subsidy benefits in the form of lower export prices, and these factors do not apply to the same extent throughout the domestic market in China. For example, the USW argues that:

- In the U.S. market, Chinese firms compete with U.S. and third country competitors, while foreign competition is restricted in the Chinese domestic market.
- No foreign firms receive the same subsidy benefits that Chinese producers receive in the domestic market, whereas some other domestic producers may have received the same subsidies as the producers at issue.

The LWS Committee, U.S. Steel and Wheatland Tube argue that firms with differentiated products are more willing to increase prices in response to increased input costs than to decrease prices in response to decreased input costs. They maintain that this is especially relevant here because the Department used the ratio of input costs to ex-factory prices for the PRC manufacturing sector during a time of inflation, when input prices were rising and, thus, the analysis can only measure producer responses to increased input costs and not to specific subsidies which reduce those costs.

**Department Position:** The GOC assumes that a subsidy’s impact on cost translates dollar-for-dollar to price, but provides no basis or justification in fact or theory for that assumption. It appears that the GOC is conflating the cost effects and price effects of a subsidy. The Department agrees that where a subsidy impacts cost, the reduction in cost is dollar-for-dollar, *i.e.*, a (dollar-for-dollar) vertical displacement of the marginal cost curve. But a dollar-for-dollar reduction in cost does not necessarily result in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in price, as the GOC asserts, since such a drop in price could bring about an increase in production and sales. Firms that expand output increase their demand for production inputs, and this increased demand is associated with suppliers raising their prices charged for these inputs. The result is rising marginal cost, as reflected in movement *along* a rising cost curve as output expands. In fact, during the POI, manufacturers in China reported that their higher production requirements led to

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79 Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO also claim that the Department has found in its investigations that Chinese domestic price signals are frequently not at world market levels. The Department notes that Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO have not provided any citations to support this claim.

80 See CWP Petitioner’s submission regarding Factual Information Relating to the Department’s Preliminary Double Remedy Analysis, dated June 11, 2012, at Exhibit 1 (Export Report of Dr. George G. Korenko at 10).
sharp cost inflation, shortages of inputs, and longer delivery times.\textsuperscript{81} For the GOC argument to have merit, manufacturers in China would have to be able to increase their purchases of inputs without \textit{any} change in the unit cost of these inputs or any constraints or limitations on the volume of these purchases. As such, although the Department agrees that when subsidies impact cost, it is reasonable to assume that they reduce cost dollar-for-dollar, there is no basis in theory (even in the case of highly competitive markets) or the facts on the record of this proceeding to assume or conclude that there was also a dollar-for-dollar reduction in price, because of the impact increased production had on cost.

Petitioner has proposed an adjustment to the Department’s pass-through estimate to make it specific to exports to the United States, but the Department knows of no economic theory or rationale that would support the proposed adjustment. The Department agrees with Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO that PRC export prices/U.S. import prices of subject merchandise may be the more appropriate price measure. That said, the Department has not switched to PRC export/U.S. import data for purposes of the RCT in these proceedings for the following reason. The RCT should, to the extent possible, (1) match price and cost to the subject merchandise and (2) pair cost and price series from the same universe, or group, at the firm, industry or sector level. Only in this manner can the Department ensure that the cost series and price series are actually associated with one another. To accomplish this, the Department relied on manufacturing sector data from the same source, with similar coverage: manufacturing sector variable costs and manufacturing sector prices. Switching to PRC export/U.S. import data as suggested by Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO would nullify this matching and, in fact, reduce the validity of the measurement given the possibly opposite trends in domestic and export prices identified by Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO. In order to ensure a true “apples-to-apples” cost and price comparison, the Department elected to match the price and cost series rather than rely upon a sub-group or subset of the overall manufacturing sector for prices when the cost series is measured using the entire group. Furthermore, data constraints precluded the Department from disaggregating U.S. import data to ensure a one-to-one mapping.

\textbf{Comment 4: The Relevant Period Covered By The Section 129 Proceedings}

- U.S. Steel contends that any implementation of the WTO AB Report is prospective in nature and, therefore, is not applicable to the AD and CVD investigations of CWP, but only to subsequent reviews covering imports after implementation of the section 129 determinations.
- U.S. Steel continues that because the pass-through ratios are based on five-year-old data from the investigation on CWP, they bear no relationship to future imports of CWP, which are the imports affected by the prospective WTO ruling.

\textsuperscript{81} See Preliminary DR Estimation Memorandum at Attachment 1, “Higher production requirements underpinned a further rise in purchasing activity. Despite easing slightly from November’s nineteen-month high, the rate of growth of input buying remained robust. As a result, stocks of purchases increased at a solid pace. Strong demand for inputs meant that suppliers remained under pressure in December. Consequently, average lead-times lengthened for an eleventh successive month, with delivery delays blamed on a lack of availability of raw materials and transportation problems. Firms operating in the Chinese manufacturing sector continued to face a sharp rate of input price inflation in December, with a wide variety of items reported to have increased in cost since the previous month. Nevertheless, the latest rise in input prices was slightly weaker than in November” January 2007.
• According to U.S. Steel, any offset based on such data would fail to comply with section 777A(f)(1)(B) of the statute which directs that the demonstration must be made with respect to imports “during the relevant period.”

**Department Position:** Although determinations issued pursuant to section 129 of the URAA apply prospectively to all subject merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which the USTR directs the Department to implement, the Department must nonetheless engage in an inquiry to determine the extent of any overlapping remedies and to make any resulting adjustments to AD margins used as the basis for AD cash deposit rates in order to comply with the WTO AB Report and section 777A(f) of the Act. As the Department’s regulations state, “the Act does not specify the precise period of time that the Secretary should examine in an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation.” Section 777A(f)(1)(B) of the Act provides no further clarification as to what is meant by the term “relevant period.” For that reason, the Department has limited its examination in this proceeding to the period of investigation used in the underlying investigations and prescribed by 19 CFR 351.204(b) and intends to apply these determinations prospectively in the form of revised cash deposit rates.

With regard to the argument that implementation should apply to subsequent administrative reviews, the Department notes that the effective date of Public Law 112-99, which amended the Act to include section 777A(f), requires that section 777A(f) of the Act be applied to administrative reviews initiated on or after March 12, 2012. Therefore, subsequent administrative reviews will be subject to section 777A(f) of the Act.

**Comment 5: Whether The Statute Requires That Offsets Be Made To AD Duties, Not Cash Deposit Rates**

• According to U.S. Steel, if an adjustment is made, it should be made to the AD assessment rates and not cash deposit rates because cash deposits are “conditional payments” of estimated antidumping duties.

• Because section 777A(f)(1) of the Act makes no allowance for the Department to adjust cash deposit rates, but only applies to the antidumping duty actually assessed against imports of subject merchandise during the relevant time period, the application of an offset to cash deposit rates in this case finds no basis in law and should be rejected.

**Department Position:** Although section 777A(f)(1) only refers to reducing “the antidumping duty” upon the satisfaction of certain conditions to address overlapping remedies, the Department nonetheless finds it appropriate to make similar adjustments to estimated ADs in the form of cash deposits as part of the investigations subject to these proceedings.

Interpreting section 777A(f)(1) in this fashion is consistent with the Department’s practice in analogous circumstances involving adjustments to export price and constructed export price for

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82 See section 129(c)(1)(B) of the URAA.
83 19 CFR 351.204(a).
export subsidies under section 772(c)(1)(C) of the Act. That provision directs the Department to increase the price used to establish export price and constructed export price by “the amount of countervailing duty imposed on the subject merchandise under part I of this subtitle to offset an export subsidy.”\textsuperscript{85} In the case of concurrent AD and CVD investigations, even though the imposition of CVDs at specific assessment rates does not take place upon the completion of an investigation and section 772(c)(1)(C) of the Act makes no reference to adjusting cash deposit rates, the Department nonetheless reduces the AD cash deposit rate by the portion of the companion CVD rate attributable to export subsidies.\textsuperscript{86} The Federal Circuit in Dupont Teijin has upheld the Department’s practice of adjusting the AD cash deposit rate in this manner.\textsuperscript{87}

Following a similar principle, the Department here seeks to effectuate the statutory objective of section 777A(f)(1) of the Act in the context of concurrent AD and CVD investigations by making an adjustment to estimated ADs in the form of cash deposits.\textsuperscript{88} As with section 772(c)(1)(C) of the Act, the language of section 777A(f)(1) of the Act makes no specific mention of cash deposit rates. However, based upon the discretion afforded the Department as reflected in the DuPont Teijin decision to make adjustments to AD cash deposit rates in the context of section 772(c)(1)(C) of the Act, the Department finds it to be an equally reasonable interpretation of section 777A(f)(1) of the Act to permit adjustments to estimated ADs arising from overlapping AD and CVD remedies determined to have offset the same subsidization twice. Such adjusted cash deposit rates – aside from possibly serving as the basis for assessment in the absence of a completed administrative review of the AD order – reflect an amount of estimated duties that takes into account the adjustment to “the antidumping duty” required by section 777A(f)(1) of the Act.

Comment 6: Whether The Department’s Focus On The Price Effects Of Alleged Subsidies Addresses The Problem Of Double Remedies In The NME Context

- The GOC claims that the Department provides no analytical framework in which to evaluate the existence of a double remedy resulting from the use of an NME AD methodology in conjunction with the application of CVDs to the same products. Rather, the GOC contends that the Department erroneously considers a double remedy to arise exclusively from the effect that subsidies have on the price of subject merchandise based on section 771A(f)(1)(B) of the Act, which instructs the Department to determine whether a “countervailable subsidy is demonstrated to have reduced the average price of imports of the class or kind of merchandise during the relevant period.” The GOC argues, however, that neither the preliminary determinations nor the legislative history of section 771A(f) of the Act explains why the existence of a double remedy in the NME context depends exclusively on the effect that subsidies have on prices.

\textsuperscript{85} Section 772(c)(1)(C) of the Act (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{86} See, e.g., Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Honey From Argentina, 66 FR 50611, 50612-13 (October 4, 2001)
\textsuperscript{87} See Dupont Teijin Films USA, LP v. United States, 407 F.3d 1211, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Dupont Teijin”).
\textsuperscript{88} See section735(c)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act (requiring the posting of a cash deposit, among other instruments, as estimated duties upon a final determination in an AD investigation).
To the contrary, the GOC asserts, the double remedy arises in NME cases because the
Department’s NME AD methodology affects only the determination of normal value (i.e., the
cost side) and, thus, has no effect on the determination of export price. The GOC argues that
when the Department replaces a producer’s actual costs with market-determined,
unsubsidized costs, it increases the resulting dumping margin in direct proportion to any
subsidy received by the producer. Consequently, the GOC contends that a double remedy
occurs even if the subsidies have no impact on the price of the imported product.

Acknowledging that subsidies affect the price of subsidized merchandise, the GOC argues
that absent such an effect, there would be no rationale for imposing CVDs. However, the
GOC claims that the Department’s methodology, by imposing CVDs in the full amount of
the subsidy, presumes that the entire amount of the subsidy had an effect on output and price.
As a result, the GOC argues that the Department should have similarly assumed that there
was a 100-percent pass through of the subsidy to the price of the imported product in its
double-remedy analysis.

The GOC continues that, even if the Department assumed that there was no pass through, any
amount of pass-through increases the excess remedy over and above the double remedy that
occurs if one assumes no pass-through because the dumping comparison offsets the subsidy
in two different places: once in the replacement of the producer’s actual costs with market-
determined costs (i.e., on the cost side), and then again in the increased differential between
the unsubsidized normal value and the subsidized export price (i.e., on the price side). As a
result, asserts the GOC, imposing a CVD on top of any dumping margin results in offsetting
the subsidy in three different places and serves to increase the excess remedy that the NME
methodology already creates on the cost side of the dumping comparison, relative to a
baseline assumption of no pass-through.

Therefore, for the final determinations, the GOC argues that the Department should modify
its adjustment methodology to focus on the double remedy that occurs on the cost side of the
dumping comparison.

Titan and the USW disagree with the GOC’s argument that double remedies arise as a result
of the impact of the NME AD methodology on the cost side of the dumping comparison.
While they acknowledge that the difference between the market-economy and NME AD
methodologies rests on how normal value is calculated, Titan and the USW disagree that the
Department can examine the extent to which double remedies arise by limiting its analysis to
the impact subsidies have on costs.

Citing the WTO AB Report, Titan and the USW assert that double remedies arise in NME
cases because of the “asymmetric comparison” between the export price (the exporter’s
actual export price) and the normal value (based on market-economy surrogate values) that
underlies the dumping calculation. Titan and the USW argue that when both the normal
value and U.S. price used in the dumping calculations are based on the producer’s actual
prices, the extent to which subsidies pass through to the price is irrelevant, because the
subsidy is likely to pass through to both sides of the dumping calculation to the same extent,
without having an impact on the dumping margin. In such a case, Titan and the USW reason,
no double remedy arises, because any effect on export price will be balanced by a similar
effect on normal value. Thus, Titan and the USW argue that the Department has no
obligation to examine the extent of a subsidy’s effect on export prices in market-economy cases.

- Titan and the USW contend, however, that when the comparison is asymmetrical, such as in NME cases, the WTO AB Report requires the Department to determine whether, and to what extent, a subsidy affects export prices in order to determine whether the lack of symmetry gives rise to a potential double remedy.

- Moreover, Titan and the USW disagree with the GOC’s claim that U.S. law embodies a presumption that subsidies pass through completely to export prices. Rather, Titan and the USW argue that the Department assesses countervailing duties equal to the full amount of the subsidy, not because the subsidy passes through to the price of the merchandise, but in order to offset the full amount of the benefit and unfair advantage that results from the subsidy, regardless of the subsidy’s impact on prices or output. Furthermore, Titan and the USW claim that the statute explicitly instructs the Department not to consider the impact of the subsidy on prices or output in making a CVD determination. Moreover, they also contend that the statute allows no adjustment to dumping margins for double remedies unless such subsidies are demonstrated to have lowered export prices.

- Titan and the USW contend that, by comparing the rate of change in input costs to the rate of change in prices, the Department was able to evaluate the extent to which the pace of cost increases may have been reflected in the pace of price increases. Titan and the USW further assert that examining the rate of change accounts for the fact that absolute changes in output prices will tend to be larger than absolute changes in any individual input costs, and thus avoids relying on the distorted appearance of full (or even more than full) pass-through where none in fact can be demonstrated.

- The LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube also contest the GOC’s position that the Department should have assumed 100 percent pass-through, asserting that there is no factual merit to the GOC’s position as the GOC has not provided any evidence that any PRC producers within the sacks or CWP industries, respectively, passed through any subsidies to their export prices.

- Additionally, the LWS Committee, Wheatland Tube and Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO reason that there is no legal basis for the GOC’s claim. Specifically, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube argue:
  - the AB made no finding regarding the extent of the potential pass-through, and only required that the Department (1) conduct a “sufficiently diligent ‘investigation’” to determine whether subsidies have an effect on export prices; and (2) base a determination on positive record evidence, and
  - section 777A(f) of the Act does not permit an assumption regarding the extent of the pass-through. Instead the Act requires a demonstration that a countervailable subsidy reduced the average price of imports, based on record evidence.89

- U.S. Steel takes issue with the GOC’s assertions that the Department’s preliminary determinations did not present an analytical framework for its evaluation of the existence and

89 Citing GPX.
extent of double remedies. Rather, U.S. Steel asserts, the Department clearly identified its focus as the effect of the subsidies on U.S. import prices.

- U.S. Steel, the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube refute the GOC’s position that the Department’s focus should have been on cost, claiming such a position has no basis in either U.S. law or the WTO AB Report. Rather, they maintain, the Department’s analysis specifically followed the framework directed by the WTO AB which directed that the Department should have investigated whether a countervailed subsidy resulted in reduced export prices. Moreover, they contend, the Department’s analysis is consistent with section 777A(f) of the Act, which the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube assert was enacted to implement the AB findings on double remedies. The LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube point out that there is no analogous provision in the Act regarding the impact of such subsidies on costs.

- Arguing that the GOC failed to provide the factual evidence that was requested by the Department, thus failing to meet the U.S. law and AD Agreement requirement that determinations be based on positive evidence, U.S. Steel posits that the GOC is basing its arguments on hypothetical scenarios.

- According to the LWS Committee and Wheatland Tube, the arguments made by the GOC in these proceedings have already been considered and rejected. They are similar to those that the GOC submitted to the WTO Panel, and the AB implicitly rejected the cost-based double remedy arguments by finding that the Department only needed to assess the effect of subsidies on export prices.

- Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO assert that, because in NME proceedings normal value is based on surrogate costs of inputs from other countries, subsidies that reduce the price of inputs in China do not, as a matter of law, reduce normal value.

- As a result, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO construe the GOC’s position not as a double counting argument, but as an assertion, with no supporting legal basis, that if a subsidy reduces normal value, the AD rate should automatically be reduced.

- Focusing on a market economy-based argument, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO posit that the GOC’s methodology also lacks any economic basis. Specifically, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO assert that in a market economy, if a government reduces the cost of one input to an end product, production of the end product tends to increase resulting in increased consumption of all inputs to that end product. This, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO claim, tends to increase the prices of the other inputs which results in increases to the total cost of production. As a result, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO maintain that one cannot consider the subsidized input in isolation, and cannot say exactly how large the total price/cost effects would be in an NME country without constructing an entire economy-wide set of prices.

- Arguing that there are many reasons that costs in China might deviate from surrogate values, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO assert that it makes no sense to consider only factors that cause Chinese costs to be lower than in the surrogate country. According to Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO, U.S. law avoids this problem by determining normal value using only prices from

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surrogate market economies without deviating from this procedure to selectively account for a subset of hypothetical price movements within investigated NME countries.

- Finally, contending that there are numerous other legal and economic flaws (which it does not identify), in the GOC’s analysis, Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO state that since the GOC has not offered any legal basis for its positions, the Department should ignore them.

**Department Position:** The Department disagrees with the GOC’s contention that the Department has provided no analytical framework by which to evaluate the presence of a double remedy resulting from the concurrent application of NME ADs and CVDs. The Department also rejects the GOC’s argument that a double remedy arises in NME cases because the Department’s NME methodology affects only the determination of normal value.

As indicated in the Department’s preliminary determinations, the Department has adhered to the analytical approach identified by the WTO AB Report and required under section 777A(f) of the Act. The AB rejected arguments by the GOC that a double remedy in the NME context occurs because the calculation of normal value under the NME AD methodology captures entirely the effects of subsidization. Instead, the AB found that the existence of a double remedy “depends, rather, on whether and to what extent domestic subsidies have lowered the export price of a product, and on whether the investigating authority has taken the necessary corrective steps to adjust its methodology to take account of this factual situation.”91 Under the theory of double remedies endorsed by the WTO AB Report, domestic subsidies, which are presumed to have a symmetrical effect on normal value and export prices in most instances, continue to affect export prices in an NME context, but have no effect upon the normal value component of the AD comparison because normal value is essentially imported from a surrogate market economy country not affected by domestic subsidies.92 Section 777A(f) of the Act, which was adopted, in part, to ensure that the United States is able to implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in the ongoing WTO dispute with respect to double remedies,93 reflects the WTO AB Report’s concern with the purported asymmetrical impact of domestic subsidies on export price and normal value in the NME context through its requirement that a countervailable subsidy be demonstrated to have reduced the average price of imports.94

In applying section 777A(f) of the Act for the first time in this proceeding, the Department has therefore employed the analytical framework proposed by the WTO AB Report and required by the statute. Accordingly, the Department has examined in these section 129 proceedings (1) whether a countervailable subsidy (other than an export subsidy) has been provided with respect to a class or kind of merchandise, (2) whether such countervailable subsidy has been demonstrated to have reduced the average price of imports of the class or kind of merchandise during the relevant period, and (3) whether the Department can reasonably estimate the extent to which that countervailable subsidy, in combination with the use of normal value determined pursuant to section 773(c) of the Act, has increased the weighted average dumping margin for

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91 WTO AB Report at para. 599.
92 See id. at para 542.
93 See, e.g., 158 Cong. Rec. H1167 (daily ed. March 6, 2012 (statement of Rep. Camp) (“This legislation also brings the United States into compliance with its obligations by requiring the Department of Commerce to make an adjustment when there is evidence of a double remedy.”)).
the class or kind of merchandise.\textsuperscript{95} For a subsidy meeting these criteria, the statute requires the Department to reduce the antidumping duty by the estimated amount of the increase in the weighted average dumping margin subject to a specified cap.\textsuperscript{96} As explained in the preliminary determinations and above, the Department conducted its analysis in this proceeding on an industry level and, based upon record evidence, identified a subsidy-(variable) cost-price link in the case of input price subsidies in the relevant industry.\textsuperscript{97} From there, the Department applied a test derived from a documented ratio of price-cost changes in the Chinese manufacturing sector to estimate the extent of price responsiveness during the POI to changes in variable cost for Chinese producers.\textsuperscript{98} Thus, contrary to the GOC’s assertions, the Department has applied a clearly identifiable analytical framework focusing on the relationship between certain costs and price that is consistent with both the WTO AB Report and the statute.

Contrast the Department’s analytical framework with the GOC’s argument that a double remedy uniquely arises in NME cases because the Department’s NME methodology only affects the determination of normal value. Aside from the fact that the GOC’s argument was rejected by both the WTO Panel and AB, the GOC’s theory wrongly equates normal value with the remedy in question, namely the antidumping duty. In evaluating the GOC’s comments, it is important to bear in mind that the two remedies in question – AD and CVD measures – are both duties imposed upon the importation of the product under investigation. Normal values, of course, are not in and of themselves AD duties. The GOC’s focus on normal values overlooks the fact that, depending upon the export price, a $50 per unit subsidy could be accompanied by an NME dumping margin of $0, $1, or $100. Thus, even under China’s theory, NME AD dumping margins do not necessarily offset subsidies, and may have very little relationship to them.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that normal values, by themselves, could create a double remedy, the GOC’s theory about NME normal values – that they necessarily are high enough to cover the full value of any subsidies provided within China – is unsound. The GOC’s argument amounts to the assertion that NME normal values necessarily equal at least the sum of: (1) the cost of production that the Chinese producers would have had, if China had been a market economy country at the time of the investigation; plus (2) the amount by which those costs would have been lowered by the subsidies to those producers. The theory that NME normal values necessarily offset the amount by which normal values in a “market economy China” would have been lowered by subsidies is based on the assumption that NME normal values are completely unaffected by subsidies. This is simply not true.

First, put simply, while NME subsidies may not directly reduce the factor values used to calculate normal value in an NME proceeding, such subsidies may easily affect the quantity of factors consumed by the NME producer in manufacturing the product under investigation. The simplest example would be where a domestic subsidy in an NME country enables an investigated producer to purchase more efficient equipment, lowering its consumption of labor, raw materials, or energy. When the surrogate factor values are multiplied by the NME producer’s lower factor quantities, they result in lower normal values and, hence, lower dumping margins. Any

\textsuperscript{95} See section 777A(f)(1)(A)-(C) of the Act.
\textsuperscript{96} See section 777A(f)(1)-(2) of the Act.
\textsuperscript{97} See Preliminary DR Estimation Memoranda at 7-9.
\textsuperscript{98} See id. at 9-10.
reduction in factor usage by NME producers would reduce normal value in a second manner, because the final factor values are also used to calculate the amounts to be added to normal value for overhead, general and administrative expenses, and profit.

Second, the GOC’s economic theory rests upon the mistaken presumption that normal value calculated under the NME AD methodology reflects subsidy-free surrogate values. Although Congress instructed the Department to avoid using as surrogate values “any prices which it has reason to believe or suspect may be dumped or subsidized prices,” Congress specifically cautioned that “the conferees do not intend for Commerce to conduct a formal investigation to ensure that such prices are not dumped or subsidized, but rather intend that Commerce base its decision on information generally available to it at that time.” Accordingly, the Department conducts no formal investigation and, consequently, makes no determination that the factor values to be used are not subsidized. Rather, the Department relies upon generally available information, such as existing countervailing duty orders, to determine whether factor values from certain countries are appropriate.

Moreover, in determining normal value in NME cases, the Department does not exclusively use factor quantities in the NME countries, valued in the surrogate, market economy country. Factor values may also be based on the prices of inputs imported into China from market economy countries. Given that the input suppliers in these countries are often competing with Chinese suppliers of those same inputs, it is by no means safe to assume that those prices are not lower as the result of competing with subsidized products in China.

Furthermore, in at least some cases, the NME exports of the product under investigation will account for a large enough share of the world market to influence prices in world markets. In such cases, particularly where the industry is export-oriented or has excess capacity, subsidies could increase output and exports from China, which, in turn, would reduce the prices of the good in question in world markets. These lower prices would reduce profits for producers selling in these markets, which, in turn, would reduce the profit rates the Department derives from their financial statements to add to normal value.

Also mistaken is the GOC’s argument that there must be a 100-percent pass through of a subsidy to the price of an imported product. The WTO AB Report to which this determination is responding expressly rejected the notion of an automatic pass-through of subsidies – 100 percent or otherwise – when it stated, “{W}e are not convinced that double remedies necessarily result in every instance of such concurrent application of duties.”

100 See, e.g., OTR Tires/PRC AD Preliminary Determination (February 20, 2008), unchanged in OTR Tires/PRC AD Final Determination (July 15, 2008).
101 See, e.g., id. at 9288, unchanged in OTR Tires/PRC Final Determination (July 15, 2008).
102 WTO AB Report at para. 599.
III. FINAL DETERMINATION

Revised Countervailing Duty Rates

As part of these section 129 proceedings, the Department has revised the CVD rates in the OTR Tires investigation as follows:103

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amended Countervailable Subsidy Rates (Percent)</th>
<th>Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exporter/ Producer</td>
<td>CVD Rate (Investigation)104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebei Starbright Co., Ltd./GPX International Tire Corporation, Ltd.</td>
<td>14.00</td>
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<td>Tianjin United Tire &amp; Rubber International Co., Ltd. (TUTRIC)</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others</td>
<td>5.62</td>
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</table>

Pass-Through Estimates

Based on the Department’s findings in the OTR Tires Preliminary DR Estimation Memorandum, the Department has also identified those input price subsidies demonstrated to have reduced the OTR Tires industry’s export prices during the POI and made pass-through estimates.106

Revised Antidumping Duty Cash Deposit Rates

Based upon the methodology described in the OTR Tires Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memorandum for making adjustments pursuant to section 777A(f) of the Act, the Department has, for purposes of these final section 129 determinations, revised the AD duty cash deposit rates as follows:107

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103 See OTR OTR Tires Section 129 Preliminary CVD Calculation Memorandum.
104 See OTR Tires/PRC CVD Final Determination (07/15/2008).
105 See OTR Tires Section 129 Preliminary CVD Calculation Memorandum.
106 See Attachment 2 to the OTR Tires Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memorandum (Pass-Through Ratios for Input Price Subsidies).
107 See Attachment 1 to the OTR Tires Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memorandum, (Calculation of Revised Cash Deposit Rates), for the full adjustment calculations.
### Amended Cash Deposit Rates (Percent)
**Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exporter</th>
<th>Producer</th>
<th>Weighted-Average Dumping Margin (Investigation) (percent)</th>
<th>Revised AD Cash Deposit Rate (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>Guizhou Advance Rubber</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<td>Hebei Starbright Co., Ltd./GPX International Tire Corporation, Ltd.</td>
<td>Hebei Starbright Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>29.93</td>
<td>29.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tianjin United Tire &amp; Rubber International Co., Ltd. (TUTRIC)</td>
<td>Tianjin United Tire &amp; Rubber International Co., Ltd. (TUTRIC)</td>
<td>8.44</td>
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<td>Xuzhou Xugong Tyres Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>Xuzhou Xugong Tyres Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>10.01</td>
<td>9.92</td>
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<td>Aeolus Tyre Co., Ltd.</td>
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<td>Double Coin Holdings Ltd.</td>
<td>Double Coin Holdings Ltd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Double Coin Holdings Ltd.</td>
<td>Double Coin Group Shanghai Donghai Tyre Co., Ltd.</td>
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<td>Oriental Tyre Technology Ltd.</td>
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<td>12.83</td>
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<td>KS Holding Limited</td>
<td>Shandong Taishan Tyre Co., Ltd.</td>
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<td>KS Holding Limited</td>
<td>Xu Zhou Xugong Tyres Co., Ltd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oriental Tyre Technology Limited</td>
<td>Midland Off the Road Tire Co., Ltd.</td>
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108 See OTR Tires Amended Final AD Determination and Order at 73 FR 51624, 51626-51627 and OTR Tires Amended Final in Accordance with Court Decision at 75 FR 49459.

109 See Attachment 1 to the OTR Tires Preliminary Determination AD Cash Deposit Adjustment Memorandum, entitled Calculation of Revised Cash Deposit Rates.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exporter</th>
<th>Producer</th>
<th>Weighted-Average Dumping Margin (Investigation) (percent)</th>
<th>Revised AD Cash Deposit Rate (percent)</th>
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IV. CONTINUATION OF THE SUSPENSION OF LIQUIDATION

In accordance with sections 129(b)(4) and 129(c)(1)(B) of the URAA, if the U.S. Trade Representative, after consulting with the Department and Congress, directs the Department to implement, in whole or in part, this determination, we will instruct CBP to continue to suspend liquidation of all imports of the product at issue from the PRC that are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the date on which the U.S. Trade Representative so directs us. CBP shall continue to require a cash deposit equal to the estimated AD duty margins. The suspension of liquidation instructions will remain in effect until further notice.

RECOMMENDATION:
In light of the findings of the Panel and Appellate Body and based on our analysis of the comments received, we recommend adopting all of the above positions, which will render our determination not inconsistent with the recommendation and rulings of the DSB.

Agree / Disagree

Paul Piqued
Assistant Secretary
for Import Administration

21 July 2012
(Date)
# ATTFACHMENT I

## Acronym Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Appellate Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Tariff Act of 1930, as amended</td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>Antidumping</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994</td>
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<td>Aifudi</td>
<td>Zibo Aifudi Plastic Packaging Co., Ltd.</td>
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<td>Allied Tube and Conduit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Tube/TMK IPSCO</td>
<td>Allied Tube and Conduit and TMK IPSCO</td>
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<td>U.S. Customs and Border Protection</td>
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<td>CHEFTYOY</td>
<td>Bloomberg PPI YoY Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLSA Report</td>
<td>Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia China PMI Report on Manufacturing</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPPIY</td>
<td>China Purchase Price YoY Index</td>
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<td>Countervailing Duty</td>
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<td>Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe</td>
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<td>CWP Petitioner</td>
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<td>Department</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Development Research Center of the State Council of China</td>
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<td>DSB</td>
<td>WTO Dispute Settlement Body</td>
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<td>Federal Circuit</td>
<td>United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</td>
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<td>FIEs</td>
<td>Foreign Invested Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>Government of China</td>
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<td>HSBC Report</td>
<td>Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation-Markit China Manufacturing PMI Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTAR</td>
<td>Less Than Adequate Remuneration</td>
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<tr>
<td>LWRPT</td>
<td>Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube</td>
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<tr>
<td>The LWS Committee</td>
<td>Laminated Woven Sacks Committee (aka Sacks Petitioner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>National Development and Reform Commission</td>
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<td>NME</td>
<td>Non Market Economy</td>
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<td>NV</td>
<td>Normal Value</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OTR Tires</td>
<td>Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires</td>
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<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Period of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Purchase Price</td>
</tr>
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<td>PPI</td>
<td>Producer Price Index</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Ratio Change Test - the ratio between changes to an index of Chinese producer prices (Bloomberg’s monthly CHEFTYOY producer price index) and changes to an index of producer input costs (Bloomberg’s monthly CNPPIY index)</td>
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<td>RPT</td>
<td>Reasonable Period of Time</td>
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<td>United States Steel Corporation</td>
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<td>Wheatland Tube Company</td>
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<td><strong>LWRPT Public Bodies and Facts Available Preliminary Determination Memorandum</strong></td>
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<td><strong>OTR Tires Loans and Trading Companies Preliminary Determination</strong></td>
<td>Memorandum for Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, “Preliminary Section 129 Determination of the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China (PRC); Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from the PRC (WTODS 379),” dated April 6, 2012</td>
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<td><strong>OTR Tires Public Bodies Preliminary Determination Memorandum</strong></td>
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<td>Sacks Land Preliminary Determination</td>
<td>Memorandum for Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, “Preliminary Section 129 Determination of the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China (PRC); Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from the PRC (WTO DS 379),” dated April 9, 2012</td>
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<td>Sacks Public Bodies Preliminary Determination Memorandum</td>
<td>Memorandum for Paul Piquado, Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, “Preliminary Section 129 Determination Regarding Public Bodies in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China; Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (WTO DS 379),” dated May 18, 2012</td>
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### Submissions

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<td><strong>OTR Tires Amended Final AD Determination and Order at 73 FR 51624, 51626-51627</strong></td>
<td>Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China: Notice of Amended Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order, 73 FR 51624 (September 4, 2008)</td>
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<td><strong>OTR Tires Amended Final in Accordance with Court Decision at 75 FR 49459</strong></td>
<td>Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China: Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Amended Antidumping Duty Order in Accordance With Final Court Decision, 75 FR 49459 (August 13, 2010)</td>
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<td><strong>OTR Tires/PRC AD Preliminary Determination (February 20, 2008)</strong></td>
<td>Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final Determination, 73 FR 9278, 9288-89 (February 20, 2008)</td>
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