CITE = 58 FR 37299 (7/9/93) Filename = 93-709.htm
------------------------------------------------------------
[C-351-818]
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain
Steel Products From Brazil
AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 9, 1993.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Philip Pia or Laurel Lynn,
Office of Countervailing Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce,
room 3099, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20230; telephone (202) 482-3961 or 482-1168, respectively.
Final Determinations
The Department determines that benefits which constitute
subsidies within the meaning of section 701 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended (the Act), are being provided to manufacturers,
producers, or exporters in Brazil of certain steel products.
For information on the estimated net subsidies, please see
the Suspension of Liquidation section of this notice.
Case History
Since the publication of the preliminary determinations (57
FR 57806, December 7, 1992) the following events have occurred.
On December 22, 1992, we issued a supplemental questionnaire
to the Government of Brazil (GOB). On January 12, 1993, we received
a response to that questionnaire from the respondents. We conducted
verification of the responses submitted in these investigations
from January 27, 1993, through February 18, 1993. Public hearings
were held on April 21, 1993, regarding case-specific issues,
and on May 5-6, 1993, regarding general issues affecting this
and other certain steel investigations from various countries.
On March 8, 1993, we published in the Federal Register a
notice postponing the final determinations in these investigations
in accordance with the postponement of the final determinations
in the companion antidumping duty investigations (58 FR 12935).
On April 6, 1993, we terminated the suspension of liquidation
of all entries of the subject merchandise entered, or withdrawn
for consumption, on or after that date (see Suspension of Liquidation
section, below).
Scope of Investigations
The products covered by these investigations, certain steel
products, constitute the following four separate ``classes or
kinds'' of merchandise, as found in the ``Scope Appendix'' to
the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain
Steel Products from Austria: (1) Certain hot-rolled carbon steel
flat products, (2) certain cold-rolled carbon steel flat products,
(3) certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products,
(4) certain cut-to-length carbon steel plate.
Injury Test
Because Brazil is a ``country under the Agreement'' within
the meaning of section 701(b) of the Act, the U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC) is required to determine whether imports
of the certain steel products from Brazil materially injure,
or threaten material injury to, U.S. industries. On August 21,
1992, the ITC preliminarily determined that there is a reasonable
indication that industries in the United States are being materially
injured or threatened with material injury by reason of imports
from Brazil of the subject merchandise (57 FR 38064, August
21, 1992).
Respondents
The GOB is a respondent for each class or kind of merchandise
subject to these investigations. The following is a list of
respondent companies for each class or kind of merchandise subject
to these investigations:
Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products: USIMINAS,
COSIPA, CSN.
Certain Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products: USIMINAS,
COSIPA, CSN.
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products: CSN.
Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon Steel Plate: USIMINAS, COSIPA.
Analysis of Programs
Based on our analysis of the petition, the responses to our
questionnaires, verification and comments by interested parties,
we determine the following:
General Issues
Several issues raised by interested parties in these investigations,
and in other countervailing duty investigations of certain steel
products from various countries were not case-specific but rather
general in nature. These included:
· Allocation Issues;
· Denominator Issues;
· Equity Issues;
· Prepension Program Issues;
· Privatization Issues; and
· Restructuring Issues.
The comments submitted by interested parties concerning these
issues, in both the general issues case and rebuttal briefs
as well as the country-specific briefs, and the Department's
positions on each are addressed in the General Issues Appendix
which is attached to the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination: Certain Steel Products from Austria which is
published concurrently with this notice.
Period of Investigation
For purposes of these final determinations, the period for
which we are measuring subsidies (the period of investigation
(POI)) is calendar year 1991, which corresponds to the fiscal
years of USIMINAS, COSIPA, and CSN.
Calculation of Country-Wide Rates
In determining the benefits received under the various programs
described below, we used the following calculation methodology.
We first calculated a country-wide rate for each program. This
rate comprised the ad valorem benefit received by each firm
weighted by each firm's share of exports, separately, for each
class or kind of merchandise, to the United States. The rates
for all programs were then summed to arrive at a country-wide
rate for each class or kind of merchandise.
Pursuant to section 355.20(d) of the Department's regulations
(19 CFR 355.20(d)(1992)), for each class or kind of merchandise,
we compared the total ad valorem subsidy received by each firm
to the country-wide rate for all programs. Only one company,
CSN, is a respondent in the corrosion-resistant carbon steel
flat products investigation. Its rate, therefore, is the country-
wide rate for corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products.
Of the three respondent companies in the hot-rolled carbon
steel flat products investigation, two of the companies, USIMINAS
and COSIPA, have rates that are significantly different than
the country-wide rate as defined in section 355.20(d) of the
Department's regulations. Therefore, USIMINAS and COSIPA received
individual company rates for this class or kind of merchandise.
For the remaining firm, CSN, we recalculated the country-wide
rate, based solely on the benefits received by this firm for
this class or kind of merchandise. This is the rate that will
be applied to all other manufacturers, producers, and exporters,
with the exception of USIMINAS and COSIPA.
For the cut-to-length carbon steel plate investigation, both
companies under investigation, USIMINAS and COSIPA, were significantly
different from the country-wide rate. Therefore, these firms
received individual company rates for this class or kind of
merchandise. Because all of the firms under investigation were
significantly different from the country-wide rate, we are applying
the weighted-average rate for these two companies to all other
manufacturers, producers, and exporters of cut-to-length carbon
steel plate, with the exception of USIMINAS and COSIPA.
For the cold-rolled carbon steel flat products investigation,
all three companies under investigation, USIMINAS, CSN and COSIPA,
were significantly different from the country-wide rate. Therefore,
these firms received individual company rates for this class
or kind of merchandise. Because all of the firms under investigation
were significantly different from the country-wide rate, we
are applying the weighted-average rate for these three companies
to all other manufacturers, producers, and exporters of cold-
rolled carbon steel flat products, with the exception of USIMINAS,
CSN and COSIPA.
Equityworthiness
The Department considers a company equityworthy if, from
the perspective of a reasonable private investor examining the
firm at the time the government equity infusions were made,
the firm showed an ability to generate a reasonable rate of
return within a reasonable period of time. For a detailed explanation
of the standards used by the Department to determine whether
a company is equityworthy, please see the Equity section of
the General Issues Appendix.
Petitioners have alleged that USIMINAS, COSIPA and CSN were
unequityworthy during 1980-1988, 1977-1989 and 1991, and 1977-
1991, respectively, and, therefore, that equity infusions received
during those years were inconsistent with commercial considerations.
The Department has previously analyzed the equityworthiness
of some of these years. COSIPA has been previously found to
be unequityworthy in the following years: 1977-1984 (See Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Carbon
Steel Products From Brazil, 49 FR 17988 (April 26, 1984), (Carbon
Steel), and subsequent administrative reviews); and 1985-1991
(See Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination: Circular
Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe From Brazil, 57 FR 42968 (September
17, 1992) (Pipe and Tube)). USIMINAS was found unequityworthy
from 1980-1987 (See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination:
Steel Wheels From Brazil, 54 FR 15523 (April 16, 1989) (Steel
Wheels)). CSN was determined to be unequityworthy in the following
years: 1977-1982 (See Carbon Steel, 1984 Investigation); and
1983-1984 (See Certain Carbon Steel Products from Brazil: Final
Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 52 FR
829 (January 9, 1987)).
In the present investigations, respondents submitted additional
information for our consideration of whether they were equityworthy
after 1986. A financial restructuring plan was adopted in 1987
by the GOB-owned steel holding company SIDERBRAS, which owned
COSIPA, CSN and USIMINAS. The plan was based on internal studies
and outside consultants' recommendations, and entailed financial
restructuring of the three companies and government assistance
in various forms. We have examined the financial restructuring
plan, and particularly the projections contained therein, in
analyzing the equityworthiness of COSIPA, CSN, and USIMINAS
for the years after 1986.
The projections contained in a consultant's evaluation of
the plan, as supplied by respondent, do not support a determination
of equityworthiness for any of the companies in the years under
investigation. The goal of the restructuring plan was that at
the end of the restructuring period, the companies would provide
a satisfactory return on equity. However, according to the plan
itself and the projections provided, that goal would not be
achieved until the end of the plan's implementation period,
after the years under investigation.
In addition, respondents have argued that one of the reasons
for their poor financial health was the failure of the GOB to
provide equity infusions in accordance with long-term plans
established by the GOB and the companies. Given that history,
a reasonable investor would have had cause to be skeptical regarding
the full implementation of the restructuring plan, which included
future GOB assistance to the companies.
Projections of future earnings are only one part of the Department's
analysis of equityworthiness. The Department's ``Equityworthy
and Creditworthy'' memorandum dated November 27, 1992, outlines
the analysis of the current and past indicators of the firms'
financial health as calculated from financial statements and
financial ratios. The analysis of these factors strongly indicates
that the companies were unequityworthy during the years under
investigation. A private investor would have had to reconcile
such an analysis of past performance with projections of future
earnings based on the financial restructuring plan. As noted
above, the information in the response regarding the projections
does not support a finding of equityworthiness. The projections
do not provide a sufficient basis to overcome the historical
records of poor performance by the companies under investigation.
This analysis of the impact of the SIDERBRAS financial restructuring
plan on the companies' equityworthiness does not provide evidence
which would cause us to change our preliminary determinations
regarding equityworthiness.
Based on prior Department determinations and analysis of
respondents' data, we have determined that respondents were
unequityworthy in the following years: USIMINAS 1980-1988 (USIMINAS
did not receive equity infusions after 1988); COSIPA 1977-1989,
1991; CSN 1977-1991. We, therefore, determine that equity infusions
provided by the GOB to each company in these respective years
were inconsistent with commercial considerations. See the Department's
memorandum dated June 21, 1993, regarding final determinations
of equityworthiness and creditworthiness.
Creditworthiness
The Department will find a firm uncreditworthy if the firm
did not have sufficient revenues or resources to meet its fixed
financial obligations in the three years prior to the year in
which the firm and the government agreed upon the terms of the
loan.
Based on petitioners' allegation, we initiated investigations
to determine whether USIMINAS, COSIPA, and CSN were uncreditworthy
during the period 1979-1991. For certain years, we had previously
determined that these companies were uncreditworthy and respondents
provided no new information that would lead us to reconsider
those determinations. Based on previous Department determinations
and respondents' submitted financial data, we determine that
respondents were uncreditworthy in the following years: USIMINAS,
1980-1988; COSIPA, 1979-1991; and CSN, 1979-1991. See the Department's
memorandum dated June 21, 1993, regarding final determinations
of equityworthiness and creditworthiness.
Privatization
In these final determinations, we have decided that a portion
of the price paid for a formerly government-owned company represents
partial repayment of prior subsidies. We calculated the portion
of the purchase price attributable to repayment of prior subsidies.
We then reduced the benefit streams for each of the prior subsidies
by the ratio of the repayment amount to the net present value
of all remaining benefits from those prior subsidies at the
time of privatization. A further explanation of the Department's
determination on privatization and these calculations can be
found in the Privatization section of the General Issues Appendix.
The subsidies allocated to the POI for USIMINAS reflect, where
appropriate, the application of the privatization methodology.
USIMINAS was partially privatized in 1991.
Grant Methodology
The Department's methodology for calculating the net subsidy
rate attributable to grants is discussed in the Allocation section
of the General Issues Appendix.
A. Programs Determined To Be Countervailable
We determine that subsidies are being provided to manufacturers,
producers, or exporters in Brazil of certain steel products
under the following programs:
1. Equity Infusions. USIMINAS, COSIPA, and CSN received equity
infusions from the GOB in the following years: USIMINAS, 1980
through 1988; COSIPA, 1977 through 1989 and 1991; and CSN, 1977
through 1991. We have consistently held that government provision
of equity does not per se confer a subsidy (see section 355.44(e)(1)
of the Department's Proposed Regulations (Countervailing Duties;
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comments,
54 FR 23366 (May 31, 1989)) (Proposed Regulations)). Government
equity infusions bestow a countervailable benefit only when
provided on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.
Therefore, we examined whether the responding companies were
reasonable investments in the years they received infusions
from the GOB in order to determine whether the infusions were
inconsistent with commercial considerations. For the reasons
specified in the Equityworthiness section of this notice, and
in the Equity section of the General Issues Appendix, we determine
that the GOB's equity infusions into USIMINAS between 1980-1988,
into CSN between 1977-1991, and into COSIPA from 1977-1989 and
in 1991, were made on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations,
and thus countervailable.
In calculating the benefit from the equity infusions it was
necessary to adjust the nominal values of the equity infusions
to account for Brazilian hyperinflation that averaged over 350
percent per year since 1977. While various Brazilian inflation
indices are available to hold nominal cruzeiro values constant,
we have determined that it is more appropriate to convert the
nominal cruzeiro amounts of the infusions into U.S. dollars
using the exchange rate in effect at the time of the infusions.
We have chosen dollarization over Brazilian inflation indices
for a number of reasons. First, because of triple-digit inflation,
there has been very little long-term cruzeiro lending in Brazil
over the last decade. Consequently, no appropriate long-term
cruzeiro discount rate for use in our grant calculation exists.
Second, the Brazilian currency has undergone three reforms since
1977. With each currency reform, the Brazilian government introduced
a new inflation index. Thus, indexing individual equity infusions
across different currencies and indices becomes extremely complex.
Third, the government-published indices have been generally
criticized as understating real increases in prices. For these
reasons, therefore, we have dollarized all equity infusions
as a reasonable and workable alternative.
In calculating a benefit from the infusions, we first established
a discount rate, as provided for in section 355.49(b)(2) of
the Proposed Regulations. Because we have converted the equity
infusions into dollars in order to account for hyperinflation,
we must use a long-term discount rate in dollars. For our benchmark
discount rates, we used data for U.S. dollar lending in Brazil
for long-term non-guaranteed loans from private lenders as published
in World Bank Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries.
For those years that respondents were found to be uncreditworthy,
we added a risk premium to the discount rate. This risk premium
was calculated in accordance with the Proposed Regulations.
To calculate the benefit from the subsidies, we used the
calculation methodology specified in the Equity section of the
General Issues Appendix.
On this basis, we determine the net subsidies for this program
to be 28.10 percent ad valorem for certain hot-rolled carbon
steel flat products except for USIMINAS (3.45 percent ad valorem),
and COSIPA (43.12 percent ad valorem); and 19.20 percent ad
valorem for certain cold-rolled carbon steel flat products except
for USIMINAS (3.45 percent ad valorem), CSN (28.10 percent ad
valorem), and COSIPA (43.12 percent ad valorem); 28.10 percent
ad valorem for certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat
products; and 19.66 percent ad valorem for certain cut-to-length
carbon steel plate except for USIMINAS (3.45 percent ad valorem)
and COSIPA (43.12 percent ad valorem).
2. Fiscal Benefits by Virtue of CDI. Under Decree-Law (D.L.)
1428, the Industrial Development Council (CDI) provides for
the reduction of up to 100 percent of the import duties and
up to 10 percent of the IPI tax (value-added sales tax) on certain
imported machinery for specific projects in 14 industries approved
by the GOB. In order to qualify for these reductions, the recipient
must prove that the machinery or equipment to be imported is
not available from a Brazilian manufacturer.
This program was repealed in 1979 under Decree-Law 1726.
However, companies whose projects were approved prior to the
repeal continue to receive benefits from this program pending
completion of their respective project. We verified that only
USIMINAS received benefits under this program, in the form of
import duty and IPI tax reductions, during the POI.
This program was found to be limited to a specific enterprise
or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, in Steel
Wheels. In these investigations, respondents have provided no
new information or evidence of changed circumstances to contradict
that decision.
To calculate the benefit from the CDI program import duty
and IPI tax exemptions, we computed the amount of import duties
and IPI tax that would have been paid by USIMINAS in 1991 absent
this program and divided that amount by sales of cut-to-length
steel plate. We are allocating this exemption to the POI because
this is a recurring benefit (see the Allocation Issues section
in the General Issues Appendix). We used only sales of that
product since the machinery imported under CDI can only produce
cut-to-length carbon steel plate. On this basis, we determine
the net subsidies for this program to be 0.21 percent ad valorem
for cut-to-length carbon steel plate except for USIMINAS (0.36
percent ad valorem) and COSIPA (zero).
3. IPI Rebate Program Under Law 7554/86. The IPI Rebate Program,
which consists of a rebate of 95 percent of the IPI tax paid
on domestic sales of industrial products, was established by
Decree-Law 1547 in 1977. Although the program was suspended
in April 1990 (Decree-Law 8034), steel companies with projects
approved before April 12, 1990, are eligible for IPI rebates
until 1996 (pursuant to the old legislation, as amended by Law
7554/86).
In the Pipe and Tube and Final Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination: Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon
Steel Products From Brazil (Leaded Bar), 58 FR 6213 (January
27, 1993), we determined this program was limited to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries.
The GOB did not provide any information or evidence of changed
circumstances to contradict that decision. USIMINAS, COSIPA,
and CSN received benefits under this program during the POI.
These benefits are not tied to any class or kind of merchandise.
We determine these benefits to be recurring, based on the analysis
set forth in the Allocation Issues section in the General Issues
Appendix. Therefore, to calculate the benefit, we divided the
total amount of each company's IPI rebates received during the
POI by their respective total sales during the POI.
On this basis, we determine the net subsidies for this program
to be 2.04 percent ad valorem for certain hot-rolled carbon
steel flat products except for USIMINAS (2.00 percent ad valorem),
and COSIPA (0.58 percent ad valorem); 1.56 percent ad valorem
for certain cold-rolled carbon steel flat products except for
USIMINAS (2.00 percent ad valorem), CSN (2.04 percent ad valorem)
and COSIPA (0.58 percent ad valorem); 2.04 percent ad valorem
for certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products;
and 1.42 percent ad valorem for certain cut-to-length carbon
steel plate except for USIMINAS (2.00 percent ad valorem) and
COSIPA (0.58 percent ad valorem).
4. Exemption of IPI and Duties on Imports under Decree-Law
2324. Decree-Law 2324 of March 30, 1987, provided exporters
of manufactured products exemptions from IPI and duties on imported
spare parts and machinery. This program was used by CSN and
USIMINAS during the POI. Because this exemption was limited
to exporters, and because the imported goods were not physically
incorporated into the subject merchandise, we determine this
program to be countervailable.
We determine these benefits to be recurring, based on the
analysis set forth in the Allocation Issues section in the General
Issues Appendix. We calculated the benefit for CSN by dividing
the amount of IPI and import duties exempted in 1991 by that
company's total exports in 1991. The USIMINAS claim for this
exemption is being challenged by the GOB, and the matter is
presently before the Brazilian courts. Therefore, since the
matter has not been resolved by the Brazilian judicial system
and there is a possibility that USIMINAS may have to pay the
IPI taxes and import duties, we are treating the amount of the
exempted tax and duty as an interest-free loan. To calculate
the benefit to USIMINAS, we determined the amount of IPI and
export duties not paid in 1991 and multiplied that by the short-
term interest rate in Brazil and the number of days those payments
were outstanding during the POI. If a countervailing duty order
is issued in these investigations, and if a section 751 administrative
review is requested, we will reexamine this issue in an administrative
review pending the resolution of this challenge in the Brazilian
judicial system.
On this basis, we determine the net subsidy to be 0.01 percent
ad valorem for certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products
except for USIMINAS (0.19 percent ad valorem) and COSIPA (zero);
0.11 percent ad valorem for certain cold-rolled carbon steel
flat products except for USIMINAS (0.19 percent ad valorem),
CSN (0.01 percent ad valorem), and COSIPA (zero); 0.01 percent
ad valorem for certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat
products; and 0.11 percent ad valorem for certain cut-to-length
carbon steel plate except for USIMINAS (0.19 percent ad valorem),
and COSIPA (zero).
The Department has verified that Decree-Law 2324 terminated
by its own decree in 1991 and that no residual benefits have
been provided. Because the program was terminated prior to the
preliminary determination in these investigations and no residual
benefits have been provided since before the preliminary determination,
we will reduce the estimated cash deposit of countervailing
duties to zero in accordance with section 355.50(a)(2) of the
Department's Proposed Regulations.
5. BNDES Financing. The Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Economico e Social (BNDES) is Brazil's government-owned bank
for economic and social development. BNDES lends to a variety
of sectors of the economy through a set of operating programs
in accordance with government economic objectives. BNDES is
the only source of long-term cruzeiro lending in Brazil.
BNDES financing has been found to be non-specific and therefore
not countervailable in prior Department determinations. See,
e.g., Carbon Steel, 1984 Investigations. However, in these current
investigations, petitioners have alleged that BNDES provided
a disproportionate share of loans to the steel sector. Petitioners
have also alleged that the loans were provided on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations because the companies were uncreditworthy
at the time of receipt of the loans. USIMINAS, COSIPA, and CSN
received loans from BNDES which were outstanding during the
POI.
In prior investigations, the Department has considered whether
respondent companies received disproportionate benefits under
a program. See, e.g., Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination: Iron Ore Pellets from Brazil (Iron Ore), 51 FR
21961 (June 17, 1986); and Final Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determinations: Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada (Magnesium),
57 FR 30946 (July 13, 1992). In these investigations, we analyzed
whether respondents received a disproportionate share of benefits
by comparing their share of benefits to the collective or individual
share of benefits provided to all other users of the program
in question.
In Iron Ore, the Department compared the amount of BNDES
lending to the mining sector (the notice mistakenly refers to
the metallurgy sector) to the amount of BNDES lending provided
to the total industrial sector. Based on that analysis, we determined
that the mining sector did not receive a disproportionate share
of BNDES lending. Similarly, in Magnesium we compared the amount
of program assistance provided to each of the recipients to
the amount of assistance provided to the respondent. Based on
this examination, we found that the respondent received a disproportionate
share of benefits under the program, and thus the benefits it
received were countervailable.
We have employed the same type of analysis in these investigations.
To determine whether the steel industry received a disproportionate
share of loans under BNDES, we went back to the earliest year
in which loans were received by any of the respondents which
were still outstanding during the POI. We then compared BNDES
lending to the steel industry in those years to total BNDES
lending to all other industries in Brazil.
In every year from 1975 through 1986, the steel industry
was the largest single industrial recipient of BNDES lending.
The steel industry received two-and-a-half times more in BNDES
lending than the second largest industrial recipient during
that same time period. We also compared the lending received
by the steel industry during those years to total BNDES lending
to all sectors of the economy, not just lending provided to
industry. A comparison of total lending provided to the steel
industry to total BNDES lending, including funding for the development
of electrical energy and infrastructure in Brazil, also shows
that the steel industry is the single largest recipient of BNDES
financing in those years. Therefore, BNDES provided more funding
to one single industry, steel, than was provided for the entire
development of electricity or infrastructure within the country.
Based on this analysis, we determine that the steel industry
in Brazil received a disproportionate share of BNDES lending
for the years 1975 through 1986, and, therefore, loans provided
to the respondents from BNDES in those years are specific to
the steel industry.
We verified that BNDES sets the interest rates to be charged
on indexed cruzeiro loans based on the long-term rates for U.S.
dollars. Because there is no other source for fixed-rate, long-
term cruzeiro lending, we converted the indexed BNDES loans
into U.S. dollars, and used a U.S. dollar benchmark. Because
respondents were uncreditworthy in each of the years BNDES loans
were approved, we added a risk premium to the benchmark. The
risk premium was calculated in accordance with section 355.44(b)(6)(iv)
of the Proposed Regulations. For further information on the
calculation of the benchmark, please see Comment 8, below. A
comparison of the benchmark interest rates to the interest rates
on these loans indicates that at least some of the BNDES loans
were provided on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.
Because virtually all of the BNDES loans were contracted
and recorded in the respondents' accounting system in inflation
indices and not in cruzeiros, it was not possible to convert
the loan principal into dollars at the time of loan contract.
However, we do have verified information regarding the indexed
amounts of each loan in cruzeiros outstanding at both the beginning
and at the end of our POI. Therefore, instead of calculating
the benefit from BNDES loans using our standard long-term, fixed-
rate loan methodology we have used the following methodology:
(1) We converted the cruzeiro amounts of principal outstanding
at the beginning and at the end of the POI into dollars using
the corresponding exchange rates, (2) we subtracted the year-
end balance from the year-beginning balance to find the amount
paid during 1991, (3) we multiplied the differential between
our dollar benchmark and the interest rate on the loan by the
amount of principal paid in 1991 to derive the dollar benefit
during 1991, and (4) we divided the dollar benefit by 1991 total
sales in dollars to calculate the ad valorem benefit.
On this basis, we determine the net subsidies for this program
to be 0.24 percent ad valorem for certain hot-rolled carbon
steel flat products except for USIMINAS (0.07 percent ad valorem),
and COSIPA (0.96 percent ad valorem); 0.37 percent ad valorem
for certain cold-rolled carbon steel flat products except for
USIMINAS (0.07 percent ad valorem), CSN (0.24 percent ad valorem)
and COSIPA (0.96 percent ad valorem); 0.24 percent ad valorem
for certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products;
and 0.43 percent ad valorem for certain cut-to-length carbon
steel plate except for USIMINAS (0.07 percent ad valorem) and
COSIPA (0.96 percent ad valorem).
6. Provision of Infrastructure: Port of Praia Mole. Petitioners
alleged that the use and sale of these port facilities, constitute
a provision of subsidized infrastructure to USIMINAS.
Praia Mole Port consists of a pier, terminals, and other
facilities designed for use by steel and coal companies. Praia
Mole Port is located within the larger Vitoria Bay Port, which
contains port facilities for a variety of industries. Praia
Mole Port was jointly constructed by SIDERBRAS (GOB-owned steel
holding company), CVRD (GOB-owned mining concern) and PORTOBRAS
(GOB entity responsible for ports and associated infrastructure).
The port was built for the exclusive use of CVRD and three steel
manufacturers which were subsidiaries of SIDERBRAS: USIMINAS,
CST, and ACOMINAS.
SIDERBRAS's interest in the port was sold in October 1991
in three equal shares to the three steel companies. USIMINAS's
purchase agreement with SIDERBRAS stipulated that USIMINAS would
have a grace period before principal and interest payments were
required, but that monetary correction and interest would be
computed from the date of the agreement.
We verified that, prior to the sale of the port, the three
steel companies paid the following four types of fees for the
use of the facilities: (1) To SIDERBRAS, a fee of twelve percent
of the total of its invested capital per year for recovery of
its investment; (2) to CST, which held a contract to operate
the port, a fee for operating expenses such as management, maintenance,
and insurance; (3) to PORTOBRAS, a GOB agency administering
ports, a fee to cover costs of the general port infrastructure;
and (4) to unrelated third parties, a fee for handling cargo.
We verified the origin and calculation of each of the charges.
SIDERBRAS' charge is based on the cost to SIDERBRAS of constructing
the port facilities plus a twelve percent return on investment.
The operating costs are based on use of the facilities. The
PORTOBRAS charges are based on the agency's standard charges
applicable to all ports. The charges for cargo handling are
negotiated directly with the outside parties.
After the sale, the fees paid by USIMINAS, CST, and ACOMINAS
for the use of the port changed only in that there was no longer
a fee to SIDERBRAS for its return on investment.
We determine that USIMINAS did not receive a benefit from
the use of the port facilities in the form of preferential fees.
The fees charged by PORTOBRAS were calculated on the same basis
as the other companies' fees and reflect standard fees applied
to all users of port facilities, thus, they are non-specific.
We found no evidence that the fees charged by CST or the unrelated
third parties were set by the GOB or at the GOB's direction.
However, we do determine that a benefit did accrue to USIMINAS
in the form of a preferential interest rate on the purchase
agreement with SIDERBRAS. For purposes of these final determinations,
as in the preliminary determinations, we analyzed the purchase
agreement effectively as a loan, and find that the interest
rate is inconsistent with commercial considerations based on
a comparison to a real short-term benchmark rate. Although the
financing for the Praia Mole Port was at a fixed long-term interest
rate, we had to use a short-term interest rate as our benchmark
because there are no long-term fixed interest rates for cruzeiro
loans available from commercial sources in Brazil. We calculated
the differential between the actual interest deferred during
the POI and the amount that should have been deferred using
the benchmark rate. The amount of that differential was then
divided by USIMINAS' total export sales.
On this basis, we determine the net subsidies to be less
than 0.005 percent ad valorem for all products subject to these
investigations.
B. Programs Determined Not to Exist
We determine that the following program does not exist:
Deferred Income Tax and Social Contribution
Interested Party Comments
The following are country-specific comments only. All other
issues are either addressed in the sections above or in the
General Issues Appendix.
Comment 1: Respondents argue that the Department's equity
infusion calculation overstated the benefits received by respondents.
First, the Department's use of U.S. dollars in the benefit stream
distorted the calculation of benefits conferred by prior infusions.
Second, even if the Department uses the dollar methodology,
the Department must use the daily exchange rate in effect on
the last day of each month to dollarize those amounts of equity
infusions that were provided to the Department on a monthly
basis in order to avoid overstating the amount of the equity
infusion.
Petitioners argue that the Department's dollar-based methodology
for quantifying the equity infusion benefit does not overstate
the benefit. On the contrary, the methodology actually understates
the benefits, but to a much lesser degree than the methodology
advocated by respondents, which is indexing the cruzeiro values.
Petitioners, therefore, state that the Department should continue
to dollarize equity infusions.
Department Position: For the reasons explained in the Equity
Infusions section of this notice, we find that dollarizing the
equity infusions is the most reasonable and workable method
to account for Brazilian hyperinflation. As for the respondents'
argument that we should use the daily exchange rates in effect
at the last day of each month, we must continue to use the monthly
average exchange rates since the information provided by respondents
shows only the month, not the particular day, in which the infusion
occurred. Where the respondent provided only yearly totals,
we continued to use the average annual exchange rate to dollarize
the infusions.
Comment 2: Respondents argue that the Department should use
COSIPA's equity infusion amounts tables net of interest. COSIPA
accidently included interest as part of the equity infusion
when it submitted its questionnaire response. Information for
making this revision was provided to the Department at verification
and is contained in the verification exhibits.
Department Position: We agree that interest should be deducted
from the amount of the equity infusion. We have adjusted our
calculations accordingly.
Comment 3: Petitioners argue that the World Debt Tables (World
Bank publication) used by the Department are not appropriate
measurements for discount rates in these investigations. World
Debt Tables interest rates are rates for public and publicly-
guaranteed debt in various currencies. As an alternative, the
Department should use a variable, U.S. dollar-based rate that
reflects each firms' actual borrowing experience.
Department Position: We disagree. Petitioner's request that
we construct company-specific discount rates contravenes the
ranking of discount rates in the Department's Proposed Regulations.
Section 355.49(b)(2) of the Proposed Regulations establishes
the hierarchy of discount rates used with respect to valuing
equity infusions over time. The first two discount rates in
the hierarchy are inappropriate because the respondents were
found to be uncreditworthy at the time they received the equity
infusions. Therefore, to determine the most appropriate discount
rate, we have followed the interest rate hierarchy for uncreditworthy
firms found in section 355.44(b)(6). We consider the rates in
the World Debt Tables to be the closest proxy available for
the highest fixed, long-term, rates commonly available to firms
borrowing dollars in Brazil. They represent rates for private,
nonguaranteed debt from private creditors. As such they are
appropriate discount rates to use for our equity calculations.
In those years that the respondent firms were uncreditworthy,
we added a risk premium stipulated in section 355.44(b)(6) of
the Proposed Regulations.
Comment 4: Petitioners contend that the Department should
reject its preliminary determination that the IPI tax exemptions
received by USIMINAS under the CDI program were also available
to all companies in Brazil under Decree-Law 8191. Petitioners
contend that the Department's verification report states that
less than one percent of USIMINAS' CDI-related imports would
have been covered under Decree-Law 8191.
Department Position: In our preliminary determinations, the
Department stated that, based on the information on the record,
the IPI exemptions received by USIMINAS under the CDI program
were available to all Brazilian companies under Decree-Law 8191.
At verification, the Department determined that while Decree-
Law 8191 does provide for exemption from IPI on certain imports,
less than one percent of the goods imported by USIMINAS under
CDI would have been covered by Decree-Law 8191. Respondents
have made no argument that benefits under these laws are integrally
linked, and there is no evidence on the record that they are
integrally linked; therefore, we have not included the industries
benefitting from D.L. 8191 in our analysis of the specificity
of the CDI program. Because the CDI program was the only program
which offered these benefits, and the CDI program has been determined
to be specific, we have included the IPI exemption in the subsidy
calculation.
Comment 5: Respondents argue that in these investigations,
the CDI program and its benefits, including eligibility for
residual benefits, terminated prior to the preliminary determination.
Therefore, they argue the cash deposit rate should be set at
zero.
Department Position: At verification, the GOB informed the
Department that USIMINAS' eligibility for CDI benefits expired
on September 1, 1992. However, USIMINAS had been granted CDI
benefits prior to September 1, 1992, for imports which would
enter the country between September 1, 1992, and December 31,
1992. The GOB granted USIMINAS the right to receive its previously-
approved CDI benefits through December 31, 1992. Because USIMINAS
was still receiving benefits until December 31, 1992, the Department
considers that benefits were provided under CDI after the preliminary
determinations in these investigations. Therefore, the termination
does not constitute a program-wide change in accordance with
section 355.50(d) of the Proposed Regulations, and the cash
deposit rate has not been set to zero.
Comment 6: Respondents argue that the Department should not
countervail the IPI rebate program, because the IPI tax is selectively
imposed by the GOB on only 14 sectors of the Brazilian economy,
and the rebate of that tax merely places the steel sector in
the same position as other sectors in Brazil. Petitioners argue
that the IPI rebates do constitute a non-specific benefit. Petitioners
contend that the industry sectors subject to IPI tax account
for a major portion of the Brazilian economy. Therefore, they
state it is incorrect to suggest that a rebate of the tax for
the steel industry serves to place steel on an even basis with
the rest of the economy. The rebate of IPI tax is specifically
provided to the steel industry by the GOB, and should be countervailed.
Department Position: We agree with petitioners. The program
under investigation in this case is the IPI rebate program,
under which the steel industry in Brazil receives a specific
subsidy not provided to other industries. While other industries
may or may not be required to pay the IPI tax, the GOB rebates
that tax only to the steel industry, and thus we have determined
that the rebate is specific and countervailable. The Department
has previously found the IPI rebate program specific to the
steel industry (see, e.g., Carbon Steel, Pipe and Tube (1992),
and Leaded Bar (1993)). In these investigations, respondents
provided no new information or evidence of changed circumstances
to contradict our determination of specificity.
Comment 7: Petitioners state that the Department, in its
preliminary determination in these investigations, correctly
determined that Decree-Law 2324 provided countervailable benefits
to USIMINAS and CSN through exemptions of IPI and import duties
on machinery and spare parts, and that the Department should
affirm this finding in its final determinations.
Respondents argue that none of the respondents in these investigations
received countervailable benefits under the 2324 program during
the POI. Respondents first state that the Department verified
that COSIPA did not receive benefits under this program during
the POI.
Respondents state that while the imports for which CSN received
2324 program benefits cleared Brazilian Customs in January 1991,
those imports were related to imports made in 1990, and therefore
were assessed and exempted in 1990. Respondents argue that benefits
under this program did not accrue to CSN during the POI, and
therefore are not countervailable.
Respondents also argue that the Department should determine
that USIMINAS did not receive countervailable benefits under
this program during the POI. USIMINAS did claim 2324 program
benefits during the POI, but that claim is currently being disputed
by the GOB. The legal position of the GOB, as explained by respondents,
is that USIMINAS was not eligible for these benefits in 1991.
Respondents argue that, because the GOB itself disputes USIMINAS's
claim to these benefits, the Department should not consider
that a subsidy has been granted.
Department Position: In these final determinations, the Department
affirms its preliminary determination that Decree-Law 2324 provided
countervailable benefits to CSN and USIMINAS during the POI.
At verification, the Department examined documentation which
showed that CSN's benefits did derive from imports which entered
the country in 1990. However, because the imports cleared Brazilian
Customs in 1991, CSN actually realized the benefit from this
program during the POI. This is consistent with Department policy
which states that a benefit is received at the time of the cash
flow to the company from the subsidy program (see section 355.48(a)
of the Department's Proposed Regulations). Under this program,
the cash flow to the company from the program occurred in 1991,
because it is during that year that import duties would have
been paid, absent this program.
The Department also considers that USIMINAS received a benefit
from the 2324 program during the POI. Respondents' argument
that USIMINAS and the GOB are disputing the propriety of the
benefit is not relevant to the Department's determination of
whether a countervailable subsidy was received by USIMINAS.
However, because the matter has not been resolved by the Brazilian
judicial system, and there is a possibility that USIMINAS will
ultimately have to pay the IPI taxes and import duties, we are
treating the non-payment as an interest-free loan. If a countervailing
duty order is issued in these investigations, and if a section
751 administrative review is requested, we will reexamine this
issue in an administrative review pending the resolution of
this challenge in the Brazilian judicial system.
Comment 8: Petitioners argue that the Department should develop
a benchmark rate for fixed-rate, indexed BNDES loans that is
based on U.S. dollar interest rates plus a spread derived from
each respondent's real cost of U.S. dollar borrowings. The Department
found support at verification for comparing indexed loans with
a U.S. dollar-denominated benchmark. The most appropriate benchmark
is a U.S. prime-based rate for COSIPA and a LIBOR-based rate
for CSN and USIMINAS. In addition, the Department should include
a 25 percent remittance tax in the nominal rate to reflect the
actual cost of borrowing U.S. dollars in Brazil.
Respondents argue that the Department's Proposed Regulations
state that the benchmark rate should be fixed and that variable
rates such as the U.S. prime and LIBOR would violate the criteria
established in the Department's regulations. The Proposed Regulations
are concerned with the average cost of long-term debt in the
country in question. Therefore, if the Department decides to
base its discount rate on U.S. dollar interest rates, the Department
should continue to use the World Debt Tables referred to in
the preliminary determinations. Respondents also argue that
U.S. dollar financing obtained in Brazil will not be subject
to the 25 percent remittance tax. The income tax associated
with each loan depends on the source of the loan and the particular
agreements underlying some of the loan contracts stipulate that
the lending bank will often pay the tax.
Department Position: As explained in the BNDES Financing
section of this notice, we learned at verification that BNDES
regularly sets the interest rates to be charged on fixed-rate,
long-term indexed cruzeiro loans based on long-term rates for
U.S. dollars. Moreover, there are no long-term rates for cruzeiro
loans whether or not they are indexed. It is reasonable and
consistent to convert indexed BNDES loans into U.S. dollars
and to use a U.S. dollar benchmark. While petitioners have noted
the logic and consistency of this approach based on a reading
of the information in the record, we disagree with their argument
for a company-specific benchmark.
For uncreditworthy firms, the first preference for a benchmark
for a fixed-rate loan under section 355.44(b)(6) of the Proposed
Regulations is the highest long-term fixed interest rate commonly
available to firms in the country in question. In the case of
Brazil, the Department has relied on the World Bank because
that was the only source found during the course of these investigations
which published interest rates on long-term dollar lending in
Brazil. Of all the U.S. dollar rates published in the World
Bank's Debt Tables, the highest rates are those for private,
nonguaranteed debt from private creditors lending U.S. dollars
in Brazil. Absent the availability of any other source providing
statistics on the interest rates charged in Brazil on long-term
U.S. dollar lending, we are using the highest interest rates
published in the World Bank's Debt Tables.
Furthermore, in our view it is not appropriate to move outside
of Brazil, such as to the U.S. lending market as suggested by
petitioners, in search of another dollar-based benchmark. This
decision is based on several specific facts unique to these
Brazilian investigations. Both BNDES loans and equity infusions
were originally provided in cruzeiros, but because of persistent
hyperinflation over the last decade they were converted into
U.S. dollars for purposes of calculating the benefits conferred
by these programs. Therefore, because we have converted the
loans and equity infusions into dollars for purposes of our
calculations, we do not consider it appropriate to search outside
of Brazil for a benchmark. In our view, only in-country dollar
rates accurately reflect the unique factors involved in lending
dollars in a hyperinflationary economy. These factors are presumably
accounted for in the dollar interest rates available within
Brazil, but are not reflected in interest rates on dollar lending
within the United States. Therefore, due to these economic conditions
which are unique to Brazil, it would be inappropriate to move
to the U.S. market for our dollar benchmark.
Regarding the remittance tax, we found no evidence at verification
that such a tax is levied in Brazil. An examination of the verified
loan lists submitted by the respondents shows that the remittance
tax was not required on U.S. dollar borrowings in Brazil from
either BNDES or private commercial banks. Therefore, we do not
find it appropriate to account for that tax when constructing
our benchmark.
Accordingly, we determine that the World Bank's Debt Table
rates are appropriate representations of ``the highest long-
term fixed interest rate commonly available to firms in the
country.'' For those years that the respondents were found to
be uncreditworthy we have also included a risk premium.
Comment 9: Petitioners argue that the Department must include
FINAME loans as part of its analysis of the countervailability
of the BNDES lending system. FINAME financing is an integral
part of BNDES preferential provision of capital to the steel
industry.
Respondents argue that allegations regarding direct lending
by BNDES do not pertain to FINAME, or any other of the various
separate and distinct lending programs of BNDES. The Department
has always investigated FINAME separately and has always found
it to be noncountervailable. See, e.g., Construction Casting,
(1986); Tool Steel, (1986); Wire Rod, (1982). Appropriately,
the Department did not separately solicit information regarding
FINAME lending.
Department Position: We disagree with petitioners. It has
been the Department's practice to treat loan programs administered
by these sub-agencies as separate programs. The Department did
not initiate an investigation of the lending of BNDES sub-agencies
BNDESPAR and FINAME, because, unlike the information provided
regarding long-term BNDES loans, no argument or evidence regarding
the steel sector's share of borrowing from these sub-agencies
was provided in the petition. Thus, there was no new information
in the petition that would have led the Department to reexamine
the noncountervailability determinations cited by respondents.
Comment 10: Respondents argue that the question of disproportionate
use must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and is not subject
to a simple mathematical test that would apply to all cases.
Doing otherwise would be analyzing disproportionate use in the
extreme abstract with no consideration of the program or policy
being analyzed. There is no authority or logic for the proposition
that the analysis of whether a benefit is disproportionally
provided to a specific industry should ignore the nature of
the alleged benefit. Particularly in this case, development
banks such as BNDES should be given such case-by-case analysis.
Bunching or spikes in the distribution of benefits may be justified
given the natural course of economic development. Presumably,
in the absence of other evidence, the market is the ultimate
allocator of benefits rather than the government.
Department Position: Respondents' basic premise is that if
a program provides specific benefits to selected industries
due to the inherent nature of the program or the inherent needs
of the recipients of the benefits under the program, then the
program should not be found countervailable. This analysis is
untenable and has been explicitly overturned by the Department
in Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review:
Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 FR 30385 (1986), and Final Countervailing
Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
57 FR 22570, 22582 (1992).
We do agree, however, with respondents' statement that disproportionate
use should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Our analysis
in this case shows that for the years 1975 through 1986, the
steel industry was the single largest recipient of BNDES lending.
The steel industry received two-and-a-half times more loans
under this program than the second largest industrial recipient
of BNDES funds. The steel industry received more in BNDES financing
than the total financing provided to either the development
of electricity or infrastructure in Brazil. It is based on this
case-specific analysis that we find BNDES lending disproportionate
to the steel industry.
Comment 11: Respondent argues that neither the purchase nor
the use of the Praia Mole Port conferred a countervailable subsidy
to USIMINAS. The sale of Praia Mole was a fair-value, arm's-
length sale based on market considerations. The financing terms
available to USIMINAS were not preferential. The Department's
use of an ``overnight'' rate (a daily rate) as a benchmark is
unreasonable for comparison to an eight-year loan. The fees
paid by USIMINAS for the use of the port did not confer a benefit.
Petitioner argues that because the interest rate on the loan
used to purchase Praia Mole was below the Department's benchmark,
the Department correctly found the terms preferential and therefore
countervailable. In the absence of preferred information regarded
benchmarks, the Department was correct in choosing a short-term
interest rate for its benchmark in accordance with practice
and the Proposed Regulations.
Department Position: Section 355.44(b)(2) of the Proposed
Regulations state that the Department must take into account
any deferral of principal repayments or interest payments on
a loan. Unless such deferral is a normal or customary lending
practice in the country in question, the deferral of principal
or interest provides a countervailable benefit to the extent
that the deferral results in a total loan repayment that is
less than the repayment would have been in the absence of the
deferral. While we find no evidence that grace periods on repayment
of local currency loans were the normal or customary lending
practice in Brazil, the interest on the loan began accruing
from the date of the loan contract in 1990. Therefore, the grace
period itself bestows no benefit. However, as long as the interest
rate on the purchase agreement is preferential in relation to
our benchmark, a countervailable benefit accrues to USIMINAS
every time it makes an interest payment.
Regarding the benchmark, since USIMINAS was creditworthy
in 1990, we followed the hierarchy for creditworthy firms established
in section 355.44(b)(4) of the Proposed Regulations. The first
five benchmarks in the hierarchy are long-term rates. Long-term
rates for cruzeiro loans are not available. Therefore, we arrive
at the sixth preferred rate in the long-term, fixed-rate hierarchy
which is a benchmark based on the ``predominant source of short-
term financing in the country in question.'' The predominant
source of short-term financing in Brazil in 1990 was the ``overnight''
rate. Monthly averages for overnight rates are published in
Conjuntura Economica, a private Brazilian statistical publication.
Since ``overnight'' rates are nominal rates, we use the same
deflator index applied to USIMINAS' loan to derive a real ``overnight''
rate to use as our benchmark.
The benchmark derivation for this indexed cruzeiro loan is
different from our treatment of indexed BNDES loans, which were
converted into U.S. dollars. As explained in both the BNDES
Financing section and an earlier comment, BNDES indexed loans
were converted into U.S. dollars because rates set by BNDES
were usually based on U.S. dollar rates. In this instance, there
is no information that the interest rate charged by SIDERBRAS
in the purchase agreement is based on U.S. dollar interest rates.
Therefore, we used the ``overnight'' rate because it is consistent
with the benchmark hierarchy prescribed by the Proposed Regulations.
Verification
In accordance with section 776(b) of the Act, we verified
the information used in making our final determinations. We
followed standard verification procedures, including meeting
with government and company officials, examination of relevant
accounting records, and examination of original source documents.
Our verification results are outlined in detail in the public
versions of the verification reports, which are on file in the
Central Records Unit (room B-099 of the Main Commerce Building).
Suspension of Liquidation
In accordance with our affirmative preliminary determinations,
we instructed the U.S. Customs Service to suspend liquidation
of all entries of certain steel products from Brazil, which
were entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on
or after December 7, 1992, the date of publication of our preliminary
determinations in the Federal Register. These final countervailing
duty determinations were aligned with the final antidumping
duty determinations on certain steel products from various countries,
pursuant to section 606 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984
(section 705(a)(1) of the Act).
Under article 5, paragraph 3 of the Subsidies Code, provisional
measures cannot be imposed for more than 120 days without final
affirmative determinations of subsidy and injury. Therefore,
we instructed the U.S. Customs Service to discontinue the suspension
of liquidation on the subject merchandise entered on or after
April 6, 1993, but to continue the suspension of liquidation
of all entries, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption
of the subject merchandise entered between December 7, 1992,
and April 6, 1993. We will reinstate suspension of liquidation
under section 703(d) of the Act, if the International Trade
Commission (ITC) issues final affirmative injury determinations,
and will require a cash deposit of estimated countervailing
duties for such entries of merchandise in the amounts indicated
below.
[In percent]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Net | Deposit
| subsidy | rate
| rate |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
Certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products: | |
Country-wide ...................................... | 30.39 | 30.36
USIMINAS .......................................... | 5.71 | 5.52
CSN ............................................... | 30.39 | 30.36
COSIPA ............................................ | 44.66 | 44.36
Certain cold-rolled carbon steel flat products: | |
Country-wide ...................................... | 21.24 | 21.04
USIMINAS .......................................... | 5.71 | 5.52
CSN ............................................... | 30.39 | 30.36
COSIPA ............................................ | 44.66 | 44.36
Certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat | |
products: | |
Country-wide ...................................... | 30.39 | 30.36
Certain cut-to-length carbon steel plate: | |
Country-wide ...................................... | 21.84 | 21.61
USIMINAS .......................................... | 6.07 | 5.88
COSIPA ............................................ | 44.66 | 44.36
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ITC Notification
In accordance with section 705(c) of the Act, we will notify
the ITC of our determinations. In addition, we are making available
to the ITC all nonprivileged and nonproprietary information
relating to these investigations. We will allow the ITC access
to all privileged and business proprietary information in our
files, provided the ITC confirms that it will not disclose such
information, either publicly or under an administrative protective
order, without the written consent of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Investigations, Import Administration.
If the ITC determines that material injury, or threat of
material injury does not exist, these proceedings will be terminated
and all estimated duties deposited or securities posted as a
result of the suspension of liquidation will be refunded or
cancelled. If, however, the ITC determines that such injury
does exist, we will issue countervailing duty orders, directing
Customs officers to assess countervailing duties on entries
of certain steel products from Brazil.
Return or Destruction of Proprietary Information
This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject
to Administrative Protective Order (APO) of their responsibility
concerning the return or destruction of proprietary information
disclosed under APO in accordance with 19 CFR 355.34(d). Failure
to comply is a violation of the APO.
These determinations are published pursuant to section 705(d)
of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1671(d) and 19 CFR 355.20(a)(4)).
Dated: June 21, 1993.
Joseph A. Spetrini,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 93-15631 Filed 7-8-93; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
The Contents entry for this article reads as follows:
International Trade Administration
NOTICES
Countervailing duties:
Steel products from-
Brazil, 37295